In Practice Archive

How Emerging Diseases Can Spread Conflict and Violence

Photo by Sia Kambou/AFP via Getty Images

Since well before the COVID-19 pandemic, epidemiologists have worried about the possibility that bird flu could jump to other species, including humans. That’s why recent news reports of the virus spreading to cows in Texas and subsequently infecting more than seventy humans set off alarm bells among scientists.

However, when pathogens jump from animals to humans, mobilizing an effective public health response is only one part of the resulting challenge. Zoonotic disease outbreaks also risk secondary social consequences that can be equally disruptive and, in many cases, similarly deadly.

When Ebola struck North Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2018, for example, the virus did more than introduce illness and death to the region. It also unleashed a wave of violence that forced local health workers to rely on militias for protection. This reliance on armed partisans in turn fueled public mistrust of health authorities, further destabilizing the region.

Ore Koren, associate professor of political science at Indiana University Bloomington, has explored the connection between emerging zoonotic diseases and political instability with support from The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. His 2024 study with coauthor Kaderi Bukari, “(Re)Emerging Disease and Conflict Risk in Africa, 1997–2019,” analyzes local-level data from 1997 to 2019 across continental Africa—including information about conflict patterns, zoonotic disease outbreaks, economic development, and climate indicators.

“Zoonotic diseases can exert a profound influence on conflict dynamics.”

The findings, drawn from news stories that were confirmed and triangulated against policy reports and statements from the World Health Organization and the International Society for Infectious Diseases, showed that zoonotic diseases can exert a profound influence on conflict dynamics. They also showed, however, that the exact effect can vary depending on the type of conflict. For example, during zoonotic disease outbreaks, governments involved in fighting civil wars against rebels decreased their military efforts by an average reduction of as much as 120 percent, according to one statistical model. Rebel groups, by contrast, did not reduce their military activity. And conflicts prosecuted by “identity militias”—typically local groups pursuing specific agendas, like protecting grazing rights or expanding their political influence rather than government overthrow—increased their military activity by an average of 55 percent.

These outcomes arise, Koren explains, because zoonotic disease outbreaks divert state resources toward containment and treatment. Often this leads to reductions in law enforcement or military operations, creating a vacuum that nonstate forces fill. In Nigeria, for example, a massive increase in abductions by armed groups during the COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed the state’s security forces; in many regions, vigilante militias became the de facto protectors, creating the possibility of a rise in local conflicts. In other parts of the country, where lockdowns led to a decline in official police presence, community defense forces emerged to combat rising crime. These groups often positioned themselves as protectors of their communities, but their increased power and influence weakened the state and undermined political institutions over the long term.

Given these findings, Koren recommends that state and international actors find ways to bolster government capacity so that affected jurisdictions can better handle outbreaks without neglecting other governance functions. This means, for instance, investing in robust health systems and ensuring that security forces can operate effectively even during a health crisis.

Photo by Isaac Kasamani/AFP via Getty Images

It would be useful, too, Koren says, to design interventions that take into account the type of pathogens involved. One of his findings was that the most virulent pathogens—those that are fast-acting and deadly—do not drive declines in state activity, likely because their impact can be so swift. In such outbreaks, he says, bolstering local government capacity might not reduce conflict. Outbreaks of these pathogens may still contribute to greater frequency of violent conflicts involving identity militias, exploiting the local vulnerabilities posed by the outbreak. Therefore, broader healthcare interventions should take this risk into account as part of their design.

More generally, Koren recommends looking beyond traditional civil wars and considering all forms of violent conflict to understand how emerging diseases might affect security.

“The spectrum of violent actors active in conflict zones around the world is far wider than [rebels versus government],” he says. “You have a lot of groups that are not necessarily anti-government as much as they are seeking more autonomy.” By considering the full range of violence, better strategies can be developed to address the root causes and mitigate the impacts.

“Conflict and insecurity arising from disease can shape the spread of disease.”

Finally, conflict and insecurity that arise from or are intensified by a disease outbreak can, in turn, shape the spread of that disease. For example, if agricultural populations flee to forested areas to escape from armed groups seeking crops, cattle, or cash, the refugees may be exposed to zoonotic pathogens through direct contact with forest wildlife or via insect vectors. As well, in long conflicts, permanently displaced populations often settle at the edges of forests, where forest regrowth can increase transmission rates.

In a study published in Bioscience, Koren and Luis Chavez show that conflict and economic development matter for whether land use and land cover changes may increase the risk of infectious zoonotic disease.

If zoonotic disease outbreaks become more frequent due to trends such as population growth, shifts in land use and land cover, and climate change, the need for considering their broader implications in susceptible states will become increasingly important. Koren says, “Something that I would like people to take from this research is, think of the second-order effects: If I am now stopping the government from working, if I’m now stopping security, what does it do to the average person that needs it? And what’s it going to do to the stability of this government if a nonstate militia gains power and prestige at its expense?”

Recognizing the complex interplay between health and security can help develop more effective responses and promote more resilient societies.

This article is based on research by Ore Koren, an associate professor of international relations and methodology in the Department of Political Science at Indiana University Bloomington, and a 2022 HFG Distinguished Scholar. Koren is an applied political economist specializing in conflict, political violence, and economic development.

This article was written by Robin Campbell, a writer and communications strategist based in Baltimore, Maryland. For more information about Campbell and his work, visit Catalyze LLC.

In Ukraine and Elsewhere, Is Third-Party Diplomacy Helpful in Ending Wars?

*Photo by Wolfgang Schwan/Anadolu via Getty Images*

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, the role of outside countries in restoring peace has taken on heightened urgency.

Historically, third-party countries have been willing to spearhead diplomatic efforts to stop international conflicts. The United States, for example, after sending approximately $120 billion in aid to Ukraine under President Biden, has engaged in unilateral diplomacy and paused its aid under the second Trump administration, hoping to pressure Ukraine into a peace deal.

Eric Min, assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, was curious to learn whether such third-party efforts—in Ukraine and elsewhere—are effective in resolving conflict or might instead delay or even impede the desired outcome. With support from The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, Min collected daily-level data on battles and negotiations from ninety-two interstate wars between 1823 and 2003 to gauge the impact of third-party diplomacy.

Min finds a consistent pattern in which failed negotiations are frequently followed by battlefield trends that strongly differ from those that preceded the talks. In some circumstances, diplomacy is used by the antagonists not to end wars but rather to help fight them.

His investigation, Fighting and Bargaining Across Two Centuries of International Conflict, suggests that negotiations borne of external third-party pressure are not only likely to fail but also liable to be exploited in service of belligerents’ war efforts. He finds a consistent pattern in which failed negotiations are frequently followed by battlefield trends that strongly differ from those that preceded the talks. In some circumstances, he concludes, diplomacy is used by the antagonists not to end wars but rather to help fight them.

The Arab-Israeli War of 1948–1949 is a useful case study. In mid-May 1948, when hostilities erupted, the nascent United Nations immediately called for a temporary ceasefire to allow mediator Folke Bernadotte time to engage in shuttle diplomacy. However, over the next several weeks, as he flew among the belligerents’ capital cities, attempting to assemble a comprehensive peace agreement, both Israel and the Arab states were secretly using this respite to rearm, remobilize, and regroup for more intense hostilities once the ceasefire ended.

Min’s research also identified, conversely, two conditions that predispose belligerents toward negotiating with a sincere intention of arranging peace:

First, the battlefield must exhibit a clear trend favoring one side. This provides information that is vital for all actors to reach a shared understanding of the war’s trajectory and likely outcome.

Second, external pressures to negotiate must be low. Historically, belligerents have hesitated to enter negotiations because doing so might be seen as a sign of weakness. Under heavy third-party pressure, they may be willing to participate in negotiations, but not in the interest of pursuing peace, instead leveraging diplomacy insincerely to promote their own war effort.

Min believes that initial diplomatic efforts during the Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrate his thesis. In early 2022, externally motivated talks in Belarus and Turkey exposed massive gaps in the belligerents’ bargaining positions, yet both sides agreed to create temporary humanitarian corridors for fleeing civilians. Initially, this development seemed promising. However, Russian forces’ repeated attacks on Ukrainians in these corridors suggested their commitment to peace was weaker than their aspiration to gain an upper hand in the war.

Ultimately, the value of third parties is not in forging peace out of thin air but in standing ready to help arrange peace quickly when the belligerents are ready to stop fighting.

Amid the painful march of hostilities since then, as well as their drain on both military and political resources, the US under President Trump has moved to directly negotiate a settlement with Moscow and pressure Ukraine into its acceptance of such a deal.

However, Min’s research suggests the Trump administration’s efforts to pressure Ukraine into peace talks are unlikely to produce a durable peace. Russia’s recent successes in retaking Kursk following Ukraine’s incursion last summer may indicate some momentum for its military effort. However, European leaders’ ambivalence towards providing aid to Ukraine leaves open significant uncertainty about the war’s medium-term trajectory. Consequently, any ceasefire arranged by third parties in this moment would be “unnatural.” Experience in other theaters suggests, moreover, that it would require massive third-party involvement to enforce, and would likely collapse over time, leading to further hostilities if third parties’ commitment to keeping the peace waned.

Ultimately, the value of third parties is not in forging peace out of thin air but in standing ready to help arrange peace quickly when the belligerents are ready to stop fighting. Such a conclusion may be depressing and conjure images of the international community idly watching more blood be shed instead of promoting diplomacy. Yet, given the evidence Min has collected, an undisciplined approach to peace may only make things worse.

This article is based on research by Eric Min, assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles (Distinguished Scholar 2020), titled Fighting and Bargaining Across Two Centuries of International Conflict. His book on this research, Words of War: Negotiation as a Tool of Conflict, was published as part of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs series.

This article was written by Robin Campbell, a writer and communications strategist based in Baltimore, Maryland. For more information about Campbell and his work, visit Catalyze LLC.

In the Balkans, Barriers Made Neighbors Bad

For many people living in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the possibility of interethnic violence was inconceivable. Until it wasn’t.

Conflict between conationals of differing ethnic or religious backgrounds is not a new phenomenon. But in a fractious world it is something to watch for—and to guard against.

With support from The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, Mila Dragojević, professor of politics at the University of the South, conducted extensive qualitative and archival research on the emergence of ethnic violence in Croatia. Croatia embarked upon a path to independence in 1991, eleven years after the death of longtime Yugoslavian leader Josip Tito. Dragojević’s work focuses on, among other things, how once-peaceful, ethnically integrated communities devolved into separate enclaves of ethnic Serbs and Croats engaged in deadly internecine warfare. Implicit in Dragojević’s findings are actions that can forestall similar tragedies from occurring elsewhere.

“How can you rebel against a crazy person who carries a gun?”

The political vacuum created by the dissolution of the Yugoslavian government following Tito’s death provided opportunities for a range of actors seeking to establish or expand their own political influence and power. These activities were contained and peaceful for most of a decade. But as Dragojević documents, an intentional process of “political ethnicization,” which sought to overlay political agendas onto existing ethnic identities, incrementally constrained residents’ political choices. It suppressed political diversity and in time channeled residents—willingly or not—into violently opposed political entities that were either ethnically Serbian or or ethnically Croatian.

A key event in this process was the ethnic Serbs’ creation of physical barricades in some Croatian communities. In the western Slavonian town of Pakrac, for example, barricades went up for the first time in early March 1991, following a brief gun battle between Croatian authorities and a predominantly Serbian local police force. More barricades were set up in August, following Serb leaders’ declaration of the Serbian Autonomous Province of Western Slavonia within the state of Croatia. In both cases, the barricades established boundaries within the region that resulted in immediate concrete consequences, including, for many, an end to routine activities like traveling to work or visiting nearby friends and family. “After that everything was over,” one interviewee later told Dragojević. “There was no more train, or bus or anything.” Notably, the builders of those barricades—the people responsible for the disruptions to community life—were initially perceived as political outliers. “…[T]hose who were at the barricades were people who do not understand any laws,” another interviewee recalled. Yet the practical consequences of the boundaries these figures created marked a precipitous break with the past. As one person bluntly asked, “How can you rebel against a crazy person who carries a gun?”

The barricades, and the possibility of violence they advertised, engendered an atmosphere of distrust and fear. Within this new environment, ethnic identity became an increasingly common heuristic for discerning the political leanings of strangers, neighbors, and even family members and friends. Those who resisted this process—who insisted upon seeing political diversity independent of ethnic identity—were ostracized, threatened for their perceived lack of loyalty, and eventually, as the conflict escalated, killed. It is hardly surprising, then, that the political middle soon evaporated as moderates either adjusted their political views in an effort to stay safe or fled.

“Once violence happens,” Dragojević notes, “it will carry on the ethnicization process almost by inertia…”

Dragojević draws clear lessons from this process, which in time resulted in officially enforced separations of territory and political authority. Foremost among these lessons is the importance of acting against ethnic politicization. In practice, this means resisting pressure to accept a flattened political landscape and remembering, instead, that ethnic groups are politically diverse and that generalizations on the basis of ethnicity are both factually incorrect and dangerous. Even more important, she says, is the urgency of acting on these ideals while peaceful norms are still firmly in place. “Once violence happens,” Dragojević notes, “it will carry on the ethnicization process almost by inertia,” and the space for discussing political disagreements and differences in a nonviolent and democratic manner will be removed.

Dragojević also calls, more specifically, for greater support for and recognition of political moderates. “Moderates are the first to be targeted by extremists and they are the most vulnerable in the early phase of an ethnicization process,” she says.

There is something discomfiting in Dragojević’s admonition that we should be vigilant for early signs of ethnicization. Who among us wants to view their neighbors as potential aggressors or their community as at risk of political violence? Fortunately, her prescriptions for these potential ills—cultivating a broad understanding of friends and neighbors, continuing to interact freely and supportively throughout one’s community, and expressing concern and support for the political center—are things we should probably be doing anyway.

During even the best of times, exercising tolerance, refusing to view members of one’s community as enemies just because they may hold different political views, and being an engaged neighbor are good practice.

21.10.2022., Zagreb – Politologinja Mila Dragojevic.

This article is based on research by Mila Dragojević, a professor of politics at The University of the South and a 2014 HFG Distinguished Scholar. Dragojevic’s HFG research, “Collective Crimes in Times of War: Explaining Local Violence Against Civilians in Croatia,” informed her book, Amoral Communities: Collective Crimes in Time of War (Cornell University Press, 2019).

This article was written by Robin Campbell, a writer and communications strategist based in Baltimore, Maryland. For more information about Campbell and his work, visit Catalyze LLC.

Violence Against Public Figures Fuels Central American Immigration

The July assassination attempt on President Donald Trump at a campaign event in Butler, Pennsylvania, shocked the world—in large part because attacks on public figures in the United States are relatively rare. Sadly, in many other nations, a similar incident of political violence—however awful and unwelcome—might feel far less exceptional. With support from The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, a team of researchers led by Laura Blume of the University of Nevada has begun compiling incidents of lethal violence against public figures in seven Central American nations between 2008 and 2022. Their goal is not only to gauge the full scope of violence against politicians, media workers, activists, and judicial officials, but also to gain insight into its character and causes. The early results of their Violence Against Public Figures (VAPF) dataset are stunning. In Honduras alone—a nation whose population is roughly the same as that of North Carolina—the VAPF has recorded the murder of nearly 650 public figures over just fifteen years.

“Hondurans entering the US without legal authorization do so because they are fleeing rampant corruption and danger, a lack of economic opportunities, and, increasingly, factors related to climate change, such as intensifying hurricanes and drought.”

There is a certain irony in President Trump’s brush with the kind of political violence that bedevils countries like Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. From its earliest days, the president’s political career has been centered on a critique of immigration, particularly from Mexico and Central America. He has offered a range of policy responses, from building a wall along the southern US border, to organizing mass deportations of people already living in the US.

But according to Blume, the kind of violence catalogued by the VAPF, and which Trump narrowly escaped in Pennsylvania, is a key driver of the immigration he seeks to resist. “Hondurans entering the US without legal authorization do so because they are fleeing rampant corruption and danger, a lack of economic opportunities, and, increasingly, factors related to climate change, such as intensifying hurricanes and drought,” Blume says. Implementing policies directed at these root causes—including political violence—would be far more effective at reducing unauthorized migration than building walls or forcing relocation, she says.

By aggregating the details about the violence it is recording, the VAPF has also highlighted an important distinction between the attack on Trump and political violence in Central America. The Pennsylvania gunman seems to have been a “lone wolf” without a clear motive. In contrast, most attacks on public figures in Honduras are carried out by violence specialists, including former or off-duty security officials, gang members, and professional hitmen. All too often, these malefactors are acting on orders from corrupt politicians, organized criminal groups, or business and economic elites.

Photo: National Geographic via Getty Images

“Violence against public figures—be they politicians, journalists, judicial officials, or social leaders—is known to have adverse ripple effects on society and governance.”

Given this etiology, reducing unauthorized immigration from this region would require US officials to pay more attention to these influential sponsors—and that, in turn, could necessitate radical changes in US policy. For example, during Trump’s first term, his administration touted Honduras’s then-President Juan Orlando Hernandez (JOH) as a key ally and provided him with extensive security aid. Since then, however, JOH has been extradited to the US for his role in cocaine trafficking, and he is now serving a forty-year sentence in a US prison. Investigative reporting has shown, moreover, that under JOH’s leadership, US military aid was not used to combat drug traffickers, but was instead wielded against political opponents.

Violence against public figures—be they politicians, journalists, judicial officials, or social leaders—is known to have adverse ripple effects on society and governance. By recording and collecting information about instances of lethal political violence, the VAPF is revealing the extent of this problem in Central America and exposing its causes. In doing so, Blume and her colleagues hope to illuminate a path toward greater stability and safety within those nations—which, in turn, could help stem the tide of immigration. It remains to be seen, however, whether US leadership has the political will to act on these findings.

This article is based on research by Laura Blume of the University of Nevada, Reno (Distinguished Scholar 2020-21) Cataloging Murder: Tracking Violence Against Public Figures in Central America.

This article was written by Robin Campbell, a writer and communications strategist based in Baltimore, Maryland. For more information about Campbell and his work, visit Catalyze,LLC.

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Archives: In Practice

How Emerging Diseases Can Spread Conflict and Violence

In Ukraine and Elsewhere, Is Third-Party Diplomacy Helpful in Ending Wars?

In the Balkans, Barriers Made Neighbors Bad

Violence Against Public Figures Fuels Central American Immigration

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