When the Rebels Win: State Power and Public Interests after Civil Wars

Dissertation Fellowship, 2017

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How do rebel organizations govern when they gain control of an internationally recognized state?

In my research project, I advanced an organization-level theory, arguing that an organization’s ideals and goals—in some cases articulated as a full ideology—affect recruitment, training, socialization of fighters and followers, and group relations with civilians, creating path dependencies that carry over to shape post-victory state building and governance.

I first identified rebel groups opposing the state on a spectrum between two ideal types: programmatic and opportunistic. More programmatic organizations’ aims extend beyond power to socioeconomic and political transformation, spurring attempts to expand state reach over and through territory and society. More opportunistic organizations primarily desire power and private wealth, and are uninterested in public goods provision.

I then conducted a theory-testing comparison of three victorious rebel organizations, selected for diversity along the programmatic-opportunistic spectrum, despite similar national structural conditions before taking power: the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) of Nicaragua (more programmatic), the National Resistance Army (NRA) of Uganda (middle ground), and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in Liberia (more opportunistic).

Using data from interviews with 127 subjects and extensive archival research from more than 16 months of fieldwork, I find strong evidence supporting the theory.

Civil war can lead to state-building in cases of rebel victory, but it depends on what type of rebels are fighting.

The FSLN’s goals of societal transformation led it to develop an ideology and commitment to public welfare that it instilled in members through political education, and once in power, it sought to extend the reach of the state to previously marginalized regions and social groups and to organize society in mass organizations.

The NRA had a more limited program of political transformation, building new local representative councils, but neglecting significant portions of the country and failing to seek socioeconomic transformation or to expand public service provision.

The NPFL was organized around the private interests and desire for power of its primary leader, Charles Taylor, and his associates, failing to engage in rebel governance in the extensive territory the group controlled. Once in power, NPFL leaders diverted state funds to private accounts and failed to engage in efforts to build noncoercive state influence. These findings are validated by further evidence from the cases of three rebel organizations in Angola (the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA) and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Civil war can lead to state-building in cases of rebel victory, but it depends on what type of rebels are fighting. The theory and findings suggest that understanding the state-building strategies and policies of victorious rebel organizations requires examining groups’ foundational ideals and practices and how they are institutionalized while opposing the state.

When examining groups’ ideologies, however, it is important to look not only at discourse but also at practice to separate cheap talk from sincere commitments. The study also provides a reminder to focus not only on international interventions in postconflict settings but also on the domestic potential for postconflict state building and stabilization and the desires of civil war-affected populations.

Bibliography

1. Kai M. Thaler. 2018. From Insurgent to Incumbent: State Building and Service Provision after Rebel Victory in Civil Wars. Dissertation, Harvard University, Department of Government.