

2005 REPORT OF THE HARRY FRANK GUGGENHEIM FOUNDATION



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American Historical Epic Series, ca. 1924-1926. Courtesy of
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FOREWORD

2004 was a pivotal year for The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, with the retirement of our president, James Hester, after fifteen exemplary years in that role and his succession by Josiah Bunting III, the election of four new board members, and the passing away of our benefactor's daughter, Joan Van de Maele, and fellow directors Howard Graves and Donald Griffin, a former president.

We welcome Tina Bennett, Victor Davis Hanson, Patricia Rosenfield, and Reeve Lindbergh, daughter of Harry Guggenheim's close friend Charles Lindbergh. Peyton Cochran, Jim Hester, Theodore Lockwood, and Alan Pifer have achieved the status of Lifetime Director. And we thank Madeleine Albright, who has retired from our board.

During his extraordinarily successful fifteen-year presidency, Dr. Hester shifted the foundation's focus from animal models of human behavior to a concern with contemporary problems of violence. This shift did not entail the elimination of research on animals, but it did change the kind of animal research we fund. That work has moved from studies in which other species served as models of human behavior to neurobiological and genetic work on tissues and chemicals that have known equivalents in humans. For example, under Dr. Hester the foundation funded a number of studies of the relationship between serotonin and aggression, and this research has played an important role in the development of medicines that hold promise for treatment of impulsive violence.

Dr. Hester's abiding interests were media violence, crime, and punishment. He understood that basic research—this foundation's stock in trade—does not automatically yield practical application but nonetheless wanted to make our work available to scholars, policy makers, and anyone else who might find it of value in practical efforts to ameliorate problems of violence and aggression. He is responsible for an increase in the number of publications derived from our conferences, as well as our magazine, *The HFG Review*. And we have recently added to our web site a searchable database of the findings from our research grants.

Daniel Island, located in the city limits of Charleston, South Carolina and left to the foundation in our benefactor's will, was the focus of much of Dr. Hester's attention. His stewardship led to the disposition of this valuable property in commendable fashion and with great financial benefit to the foundation.

We are enormously pleased that Dr. Hester will continue to serve in his new capacity as Lifetime Director.

I take great pleasure in providing our new president's impressive resume. Josiah Bunting III earned a B.A. in English in 1963 from the Virginia Military Institute, where he was First Captain. From 1963 to 1966 he was a Rhodes Scholar at Christ Church, Oxford. He entered the United States Army in 1966. During six years of service, he reached the rank of Major, with duty stations including Vietnam (Ninth Infantry Division) and West Point, where he was an assistant professor of history and social sciences. While teaching at West Point, he did further study in British History as a John W. Burgess Fellow at Columbia University from 1970 to 1972. His military citations include the Bronze Star with two Oak Leaf Clusters and the Combat Infantry Badge. In 1972 he resigned his commission at West Point to become Professor of Military History at the U.S. Naval War College. From 1973 to 1977 he was president of Briarcliff College, after which he served for ten years as president of Hampden-Sydney College. He became head of The Lawrenceville School in 1987 (when I was serving as president of the school's board). In 1995, he was appointed superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute, where he served until retiring in 2003. While presiding at Hampden-Sydney, The Lawrenceville School, and VMI, he taught courses in English, government, and history.


An accomplished author, Mr. Bunting has been published many times. His novel *The Lionheads* has been re-published several times and translated into fifteen languages. He has published three other novels as well as several books of nonfiction. His recent biography of Ulysses S. Grant was selected by *The Economist* and the *Washington Post Book World* as among the best books of 2004 and chosen as an alternate selection of the History Book Club. His current writing project is a biography of General George C. Marshall.


Mr. Bunting serves on the National Commission to UNESCO and as chairman of the National Civic Literacy Board of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. In 2003, he served on the Secretary of Defense's commission investigating allegations of sexual assault at the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has been a member of the HFG board of directors since 1986.

Si Bunting is versatile, charming, and brilliant, with unexcelled qualities of leadership. The foundation is truly fortunate that his retirement as superintendent of VMI coincided with our search for a new president.

I am confident that my cousin Harry Guggenheim would agree with me that his vision for the foundation is being fulfilled just as he had planned and that, through our grants and program activities, we continue to shed light on “Man’s Relation to Man.”

PETER LAWSON-JOHNSTON
Chairman of the Board





PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

In a speech to the cadets at Woolwich, the Royal Artillery School, the Victorian sage John Ruskin asserted the urgency of the young men's learning "the value of what they might be called upon to destroy." Reading it, I thought of Henry Stimson's removal of the city of Kyoto from the list of approved targets for the atomic bombs that would be dropped on Japan, in August, 1945. Kyoto, the lovely ancient Japanese capital, the site of great treasures of architecture and art: what the Army Air Force might be called upon to destroy. I think still of the Duke of Burgundy's mournful, tired lament, in *Henry V*, what the long war between France and Britain has done to his lovely France, and to her children, and indeed to her soldiers, that (now) "grow like savages, as soldiers will, that nothing do but meditate on blood." I think, as all of us must, of 9-11, of Fallujah, of Rwanda, Bosnia, of Kuwait, of Darfur, and North Korea, of (I quote A. J. P. Taylor) "the present preparations for the destruction of the human race." We have only just begun. "Passion and slaughter, ruth, decay/descend, minutely whispering down," a poet wrote; and we remember the ageless understanding of another writer, who mistrusted all poetry: *Only the dead have seen the end of war.*

In the New York Street's demotic shrug, What can I tell you? Harry Frank Guggenheim and the foundation that is his greatest legacy exist, poised in this paradox, acknowledged by Harry and acknowledged by those who labor in his stead—that the evidence is overwhelming and unignorable, and unchanging: Violence, war, aggression, the propensity for dominance—these are constants in the lives of humankind. There is surcease; there are blessed fragments of sanity and peace within and among nations, but the reality almost overwhelms. And it mocks us, too. We remember our vision of what we called "The Peace Dividend" in 1990, as the Soviet Union broke apart and its satellites became independent and free. I remember being in Mongolia in December, 1998, driving in an empty arctic plain, slowly passing a vast assembly of corroding engines of war: tanks, huge self-propelled artillery pieces, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, empty barracks with flapping doors at each end. "The Russians just left," a guide told us. "They left their gear." Even then, I remembered an Oxford don writing of the Treaty of Amiens, 1802, which ended one of the coalition wars against Napoleon: "Already, however, the first shots were being fired in a new war...."

But as constant as the depredations of war and violence is the human determination to master their causes and assure that, if their existence must be “a part of the human condition,” it is no less our urgent mission to work to mitigate, to curtail, to shrink its horrors, its waste, its suffering and tragedy, whether our researches seem to point to a fecklessness of effort or not. To remember another contemporary of Ruskin, “Say Not the Struggle Nought Availeth.” A cynic might say that we are obliged to work at the margins. We might rejoin, success at the margins is victory. And if that is the only victory we may claim, it is a victory we remain obliged to pursue: through basic research, through propagation of the fruits of that research, and, ultimately, in such a way that those fruits can and will influence the course of human action.

I have spent much of my life in military service or in the education of military people. I know how hollow it sounds when we read of tired old campaigners avowing their determination to sustain peace—how hollow it sounds to most people. But not, frankly, to me. It sounds, simply, necessary and noble. The architect of the 1947 plan for European recovery was also the American charged with preparing the country’s army for the terrible war that it followed. He understood better than all but a very few “the value of what he was called upon to destroy.” Few people were more determined, the odds be damned, to build a world in which it might, somehow, not be necessary to prepare for such labors. George Marshall’s legacy, like Harry Frank Guggenheim’s, is a living one, which, like the foundation itself, remains both to abide, and to labor to resolve, the paradox.

JOSIAH BUNTING III
President

PROGRAM ACTIVITIES 2000-2004

Women's Group

June 24–26, 2000, London

For some time foundation staff had discussed whether there were approaches to research on violence against women and women's social subordination which should have particular priority in our grantmaking, so we convened an international group of female scholars and activists to discuss priorities. Participating in this first meeting were Malathi de Alwis, Begoña Aretxaga, Janice Boddy, Liz Kelly, Patricia McFadden, Sally Merry, Amina Mire, Loretta Ross, Purna Sen, and Karen Colvard. The group discussed bridges between the personal and political and practices of mentoring younger women. Then a sharp rift developed over the issue of ownership and exploitation of the experiences of

violence of third-world women when they are studied by outsiders.

Comparative Genocide

December 7–10, 2000, Barcelona

We asked Robert Gellately, who studies Nazi Germany, and Ben Kiernan, a scholar of the Cambodian genocide, to organize a meeting which would look at similarities and differences in episodes of mass killing at different times and places. There was some dissension about the usefulness of the label "genocide" for killings with a range of motivations and victims, but interesting accounts were presented of political violence in diverse sites. The edited papers were published as *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical*



In the genocide of the Armenians during World War I, hundreds of thousands were killed through forced migration or outright murder. Comparative study of state-sponsored efforts to exterminate groups of people began only in the last two decades.

Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2003), with chapters by the editors and Elazar Barkan, Omer Bartov, Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma, Marie Fleming, Greg Grandon, Isabel V. Hull, Gaven McCormack, Robert Melson, Jacques Semelin, John G. Taylor, Eric Weitz, Nicholas Werth, and Jay Winter. Karen Colvard and James Hester attended on behalf of HFG.

Margaret C. Lee, Master's Seminar
January 7–10, 2001, Cape Town

We are beginning to see in our application pool more proposals which take account of economic motivators for violence, and how the actions of states with respect to trade and cooperation often frame their abilities to cooperate peacefully in other ways. Margaret Lee had completed the penultimate draft of her book *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa* when we invited economists and social scientists to criticize her arguments and offer advice. Margaret's interlocutors were George Agbango, Karen Colvard, Belmiro Malate, Sam Mutanhaurwa, Daniel Ndlela, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Roger Southall, Lynne Thomas, Jeanne TOUNGARA, and Yvonne TSKIKATA. Brian Slattey served as rapporteur. The book was published in 2003 by the University of Cape Town Press. It is distributed in the U.S. by Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Women's Group
February 9–13, 2001, Madrid

A reconstituted women's group comprising Malathi de Alwis, Begoña Aretxaga, Elham Bayour, Hope Chigudu, Karen Colvard, Liz Kelly, Sally Merry, Regan Ralph, Loretta Ross, and Purna Sen continued our discussions about women's priorities for research on violence. Particularly because of Hope's intervention, based in her experiences in Zimbabwe, we began to focus on the issue of HIV and its connections to other aspects of women's lives, in particular violent abuse by intimate part-


ners. Reflecting on our disagreements in the initial meeting, we also talked about the dynamics of female leadership and cooperation and about their engagement in political violence.

Interventions Group
April 28–30, 2001, London

We had noticed that many of the dissertation-writing fellowships we had awarded in recent years focused on the unforeseen violent consequences of social and economic interventions. We invited these younger scholars, along with a few others working on similar issues, to meet and mentor each other and to propose collaborative or comparative projects to the foundation for future attention. Participants were Alex Argenti-Pillen, Mario Blaser, Johan Kruger, Patricia Langan, Anne-Marie Makhulu, Robert Marlin, Carlota McAllister, Samuel Nguiffo, Aminur Rahman, Jens Reinke, Ajantha Subramanian, Martin Terre Blanche, and Kimberly Theidon. Karen Colvard, James Hester, and Joel Wallman were there for the foundation.

Women's Group
April 12–14, 2002, New York

A final meeting of the ongoing working group on women's issues was convened to review reports on the history of the women's movement, women as political activists, women's rights viewed through the lens of human-rights activism, and problems involved in the association of HIV risk with violence against women. These were presented to the foundation's board as the products and recommendations of this group. Subsequently the foundation took up the issue of the association of HIV and violence against women for future investment, in the form of grants and conferences. Attending this meeting were Malathi de Alwis, Hope Chigudu, Karen Colvard, Liz Kelly, Sally Merry, Regan Ralph, Loretta Ross, and Purna Sen. A further result of this group's discussions was our invitation to Liz Kelly to join the foundation's



Pakistani women protest against murders of women that are justified in terms of alleged violations against family honor.

panel of grant evaluators, which has been reflected in increasing sensitivity to political and international issues in our funding on projects related to women.

The work of this group is dedicated to the legacy of our friend and sister Begoña Aretxaga, who died far too young, later that year, a victim of cancer.

Prisoner Reentry and Public Safety

April 16–17, 2002, Philadelphia; March 17–19, 2003, New Orleans

The successful reentry into society of former prisoners is an ongoing challenge for them as well as the society that receives them. In recent years, it has gained enormously in significance, as the number of prisoners returning each year from state and

federal institutions has grown to nearly two-thirds of a million, a predictable result of the recent quadrupling of the U.S. prison population. The sheer number of returnees may be overwhelming the capacity of parole and other agencies charged with overseeing the reintegration of returnees. Returning prisoners have had less access in prison to mental-health, substance-abuse, education, and job programs than was true twenty years ago, and they have served longer sentences, which means weaker ties to work, family, and the other institutions that militate against criminal behavior. Moreover, increasing use by the prison system of mandatory release, in which prisoners are automatically released after a set fraction of their sentence rather than being evaluated as ready by a parole board, does not bode well for crime trends. Finally, the prisoners returning home are increasingly concentrated in a small number of neighborhoods in our major cities, communities already beset by the familiar array of urban woes. In collaboration with Jeremy Travis of the Urban Institute (now president of John Jay College), HFG enlisted a group of scholars who study crime and the corrections system to consider the factors that promote or interfere with successful reentry. The resulting volume, *Prisoner Reentry and Crime in America*, edited by Travis and Christy Visher, will be published by Cambridge University Press in 2005. The contributors are Travis and Visher; Alfred Blumstein and Allen Beck; Todd Clear, Elin Waring, and Kristen Scully; Shadd Maruna and Hans Toch; Joan Petersilia; Anne Piehl and Stefan LoBuglio; Richard Rosenfeld, Joel Wallman, and Robert Fornango; and Christopher Uggen, Sara Wakefield, and Bruce Western.

Zimbabwe Group

June 15–18, 2002, London

Zimbabwe's economic and social crisis was worsening through the months this conference was planned, and the presidential election held only

two months before we met was widely regarded as dishonest and coercive, maintaining Robert Mugabe in power sustained by violent youth gangs and groups of war veterans. They were mobilized around the issue of return of lands seized from black natives during colonialization that became large farms owned mostly by whites. Outside analysts placed the blame for this crisis solely on the self-interest of Mugabe and his followers, but Margaret Lee and Karen Colvard organized this conference to acknowledge that a just resolution of the disputes about land ownership there was far from clear and that similar ambitions were beginning to arise among the landless in other parts of southern Africa as well. We convened a meeting of mostly Zimbabweans and South Africans to discuss how Zimbabwe had moved from a confident and prosperous independence to a violent and disordered dictatorship, what steps in political and economic areas might lead to a resolution, and what mistakes neighboring South Africa and Namibia might learn from this history to avoid. Participants were Knox Chitiyo, Karen Colvard, Shannon Field, Rudo Gaidzanwa, Ruth Hall, Norma Krieger, Margaret Lee, John Makumbe, Daniel Ndlela, Solani Ngobeni, Thami Ka Plaatje, Reg Rumney, Lloyd Sachikonye, and Siphamandla Zondi. Diego de Soto served as rapporteur. The resulting volume, *Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa*, was published in 2003 by the Africa Institute of South Africa (Lee and Colvard, editors) with additional chapters by Alois Mlambo and Tony Hawkins. It is distributed in the U.S. by Michigan State University Press.

HIV-VAW Meeting

February 14–17, 2003, Madrid

Building on the recommendations of our working group on women's issues, we convened a group of scholars already doing research on or interested in the connections between HIV risk and physical and sexual violence against women. This is an

important issue relating to treatment, as recommendations to women to protect themselves against HIV infection might put them in the way of spousal violence, and women who depended on a male for day-to-day living might not take seriously the threat of future illness. Moreover, living in a disorganized, violent society, with, for example, a high prevalence of rape, might put women at risk of poor health, compromised immune systems, and future infection. Citizens and scholars from Africa and from inner-city populations in the U.S. together assessed what is known about these connections and the research strategies necessary to find out the things we don't know. We also discussed the essential collaboration between scholars, practitioners, and activists on these issues. The participants were Jill Astbury, Jacqueline Campbell, Karen Colvard, Hope Chigudu, Dazon Diallo, Claudia Garcia-Moreno, Rachel Jewkes, Niamani Mutima, Loretta Ross, and Suzanne Maman. Katie Wilson, an intern at the foundation and now assistant program officer, served as rapporteur.

Uganda Historical Commission

January 24–29, 2004, Kampala, Uganda

Historian Elazar Barkan, author of *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (Norton, 2000), noted that truth commissions and war crimes trials tend to examine the recent history of political injustice and violence but that ongoing conflicts are often sustained by different versions of a long history of conflict. Myths of origin or particular attachment to one promised land or another can fuel wars when two peoples share stories about one location. Other groups cherish what political psychologists have called "chosen traumas," the stories of some transgression against them in history so great that its perpetrators and their descendants become forever the enemy, while the other side remembers a different history. Barkan has constructed a project he calls the "International History Initiative" to provide a

space where partisans of disparate views can explore the possibilities of writing synthetic histories, using history as a weapon of reconciliation rather than an excuse for war. Barkan and Karen Colvard made a trip to Kampala to continue discussions with Ugandan scholars and activists about how they would design and focus such a project if HFG were to provide the funds for a Ugandan commission. In general, the scholarly and activist communities were interested and embarked immediately, convening seminars to discuss participation and focus and volunteering for next steps. Some of the most critical and informed advisors during these meetings were Professor A. B. K. Kasozi, author of *Social Origins of Violence in Uganda*, Parliamentarian Norbert Mao, Professor D. W. Nabudere, Dr. Mwambutsya Ndebesa (who was selected by his colleagues to chair a steering committee), Prime Minister Apolo Nsibambi, Mrs. Sara Ntiro, William Pike (editor of *The New Vision* newspaper), Dr. Simon Rutabajuuka and his colleagues at the Centre for Basic Research, and Father J. M. Waliggo of the Human Rights Commission.

African Young Scholars, Conflicts Over Natural Resources

April 5–9, 2004, Yaounde, Cameroon

In collaboration with the African Association of Political Science, the foundation held a competition for research proposals from African scholars under age 35 working on issues to do with violence related to conflicts over natural resources. Eleven scholars were selected and invited to a research planning meeting in Yaounde, Cameroon. Dr. Vivian Nain Kuma, AAPS Council member representing young scholars, directed the program. Musa Abutudu, Beverlee Bruce, Yves Chouala, Karen Colvard, Margaret Lee, Samuel Nguiffo, and Cyril Obi served as senior resource persons, and the laureates (and their projects) were Hussaini Abdu (Land question and conflict in northern

Nigeria: Ethno-religious and socio-economic dimensions), Amadu Sidi Bah (Rights-based approach to mining campaigns), Gerald Djouonang (Terre et conflits communautaires au Cameroun: Dynamique et enjeux du litige frontalier Bagam/Bamenyam), Halima Fonda Haga, (Des querelles de femmes au differend entre etats? Reflexion sur le conflit relative a la peche sur la partie camerounaise de Lac Tchad), Dauda S. Garuba (Gunning for the barrel: Oil and communal violence in the Niger Delta city of Warri), Ronald Sebba Kalyango (Gendered impact of land conflicts on household livelihoods in refugee hosting areas), Alvine Fabienne Ngbwa (Les acteurs dans les conflits sociaux forestiers: Entre logique d'interet et logique identitaire), Abigail Ogwezzi (Resolving conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: An evaluation of the activities of the mass media, government and oil companies), Rasheed Olaniyi (Communal conflict over land in western Nigeria: A case study of Yoruba farmers and Fulani pastoralists, 1986-2002), Toyin Oluwaniyi (Oil wealth and militarization of youths in Nigeria: The case of Niger Delta), and Didier Pidika (Conflits interethniques dans "La region de l'Ituri" et l'exploitation illegale des ressources naturelles de la R. D. Congo). Along with organizing and editing the papers, Vivian Nain Kuma will research "Oil-generated conflict in the Chad/Cameroon pipeline project." Research proposals were discussed and refined, and each of the scholars will receive a small grant for fieldwork. Findings will be presented at the 2005 AAPS meeting in Cairo.

Exporting Democracy

*April 22–25, 2004, Ascona, Switzerland
(with the Centro Incontri Umani)*

Nearly a year after the American invasion of Iraq, when threatening weapons failed to be found, the administration was justifying the war as necessary for removing a tyrant and establishing a democracy in Iraq. "Resistors" were the new enemy. We

invited a group of scholars to discuss the paradox of establishing peace through war, the future of democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere, and varieties of democracy other than the American model which might be taken as models for democratizing states. We heard about classical models of democracy, preconditions for democratic transitions, and nineteenth- and twenty-first-century versions of globalizing hegemony, as viewed from the center and various points in the periphery. Participating were Josiah Bunting III, Karen Colvard, Christopher Dandeker, Leslie Dwyer, Victor Davis Hanson, Bruce Kapferer, Jocelyn Linnekin, Samuel Martinez, Dani Nabudere, Tandeka Nkiwane, and Jack Snyder. Held up by

travel and visa problems, Paul Bove, Degung Santikarma, and Eyad El Sarraj sent papers. We expect a volume to emerge, edited by Bunting, the new president of HFG. Special thanks to Angela Hobart, president of the Centro Incontri Umani, for her hospitality and contributions, and to Pauline Hanson for assistance.

Dangerous Intersections

June 15–17, 2004, Baltimore

The working group of February 2003 considered that there were sufficient research reports on the connections between HIV risk and violence against women to recommend a critical survey of the literature and a publication incorporating the discus-

Military invasions to overthrow oppressive regimes have the potential to catalyze the growth of democracy but can strengthen the hand of those opposed to the invaders and their goals if the intervening power violates moral norms of the intended beneficiaries. Below: Afghans wait to vote in 2004 presidential elections. Facing: U. S. soldiers brutalize a prisoner in Iraq, 2003.



sion. Our board approved funding and delegated Dazon Dixon Diallo, the founder and director of Sisterlove in Atlanta, a human-rights organization, and Rachel Jewkes, the director of the Medical Research Council Gender & Health Group in Pretoria, South Africa, to collaborate as organizers, underscoring our conviction that this is an issue which requires collaboration between activists and scholars, and one that concerns not only African populations but women in the developed world also. Bolanle Adetoun, Adwoa Agyeman, Jamarah Amani, Carlos Caceres, Jackie Campbell, Karen Colvard, Dazon Dixon Diallo, Kristin Dunkle, Mary Ellsberg, Annabel Erulkar, Nata Duvvury, Claudia Garcia Moreno, Paris Hatcher, Rachel Jewkes, Michael Koenig, Heidi Lary, Suzanne Maman, Laura McCloskey, Mzi Nduna, Michael

Relf, Lynn Roberts, Loretta Ross, Marijo Vazquez, Njoki Wainaina, Lisa Diane White, Gina Wingood, Kate Wood, and Iryna Zablotska convened to present research results and criticize the presentations of others. Some surprising findings emerged, such as the perception that, while risky and illegal behaviors contribute to the chance of a young man's contracting HIV in South Africa, the greatest risk factor for a young woman is marriage (mostly, it seems, because she cannot control her husband's risky behaviors). Proceedings will be published by the World Health Organization, and other products are planned from these discussions.

Small Arms in World Conflict

June 27–29, 2004, New York

Very few of today's armed conflicts take place between armed forces of different states. Rather, most such violence occurs within states. The great majority of victims are civilians, and most of their casualties are inflicted with small arms and light weapons—instruments wielded by one or two people, such as pistols, rifles, and mortars. An estimated 300,000 people are killed in such conflicts each year with these weapons, and another 200,000 die from homicide or suicide by firearm. In their aggregate effects, these are proven weapons of mass destruction.



While many organizations have taken up the cause of stemming the illicit flow of small arms, only a modest effort has been devoted thus far to systematic research on the nature of this problem—the diversion of arms from the legitimate to illicit market, the role of small arms in the outbreak and persistence of political violence, the relative efficacy of alternative approaches to controlling the problem. HFG convened a meeting of scholars and activists in this area to consider ways to expand the number of scholars and disciplines involved in small-arms research. An organization was born of this meeting: RISA (Research Initiative on Small Arms). The first product of this group will be an issue of *The HFG Review* devoted to the small-arms problem. Participants were Reuben Brigety, Katherine Christoffel, William Godnick, Owen Greene, David Hemenway, Anna Khakee, Keith Krause, Edward Laurance, Sara Meek, Rachel Stohl, Herbert Wulf, and Joel Wallman for the foundation.

Uganda Historical Commission
July 8–10, 2004, Jinja, Uganda

The first official meeting of the Uganda Historical Commission was organized by the Centre for Basic Research. Its director, Simon Rutabajuuka, welcomed a group of forty scholars and activists to hear presentations on longtime conflicts in different parts of the country. The meeting's goals were to decide on a focus for the work of the Commission and to establish an agenda for new research and writing which would engage disparate perspectives on conflicts and their sources. Justice K. K. Onega, head of the government's Amnesty commission and Father J. M. Waliggo of the Human Rights Commission welcomed the opportunity to link their work with that of the Commission. Professor D. W. Nabudere emphasized the essential need to involve people from the communities undergoing conflict in the analysis rather than depending on the opinions of

urban elites. After hearing papers and very frank discussion on many different aspects of political insecurity in Uganda, the steering committee decided to focus the Commission's work on the long history underwriting the 19-year war in the North, which they recognized would incorporate many of the concerns reviewed in the meeting, such as "the Kibaale question," "the Buganda question," multi-party politics, religion, military affairs, and pre-colonial diplomacy and conflicts. Plans were laid for regular meetings of the steering committee and a next meeting, in 2005, to report on new research and progress in writing.

Youth and Violence

December 9–11, 2004, Pretoria, South Africa
(with the Social Science Research Council)

Young men with guns are involved in most of the situations of insecurity worldwide. Gang violence, street crime, political insurrections, paramilitary and state violence would not be possible without the foot soldiers of violence, young men (and sometimes women) who have few commitments, fewer prospects, and perhaps an enhanced appetite for risk and adventurous behaviors. Research on "child soldiers" has contributed to what we know of how—voluntarily and involuntarily—young people get involved in wars, and a healthy discipline of ethnographic criminology over the past two decades has produced a body of knowledge about the social situation and the internal dynamics of different types of youth gangs. Along with Alcinda Honwana, a program director at the SSRC, we thought it would be profitable to bring the knowledge on young people in gangs, wars, and other types of violent groups together to sketch out a new research agenda. The first meeting of this project, hosted by South Africa's Institute for Security Studies, involved Ibrahim Abdullah, Larry Aber, Sara Maria Acosta, Philippe Bourgois, Brenda Coughlin, Luke Thomas Dowdney, Jonathan Friedman, Francisco Gutierrez, John

Hagedorn, S. T. Hettige, Alcinda Honwana, Ron Kassimir, Angela McIntyre, Abubacar Momoh, Thierry Nlandu, Suren Pillay, Pamela Reynolds, Owen Sichone, Boyane Tshela, Rob White, James Williams, and Elana Zilberg.

HFG program officers have been guests at meetings sponsored by the African Association of Political Science, Africa Grantmakers Affinity Group, Afrika Studies Centre, Association of University Women in Africa, International Human Rights Funders Group, International Peace Academy, International Peace and Security Funders Group, INCORE of Northern Ireland, New York Academy of Sciences, Reducing Political Violence Action Group, Rockefeller Foundation's Bellagio conference center, Social Science Research Council, Urban Institute, Watson Center at Brown University, and World Health Organization.

Hfg.org

The foundation's web site (hfg.org) was thoroughly renovated in 2004. An esthetic makeover has produced a strikingly improved appearance. The usefulness of the site has been improved as well. In addition to the previously available information on HFG research interests, application forms and detailed guidelines, and issues of *The HFG Review*, the site now contains a searchable database of findings from HFG research conducted over the past ten years. Users can search in two ways. They may click any combination of keywords (topical, geographic, and/or chronological) to retrieve summaries that have been assigned those keywords. Or they may conduct a simple but powerful search of the summary texts by entering words, word stems, or phrases. These may be combined with Boolean operators (e.g., *violence or aggression*, "*Latin America*" *and women*).

The database is regularly augmented as research projects are completed, and we hope that it will be an important resource for scholars, journalists, and others interested in the knowledge that our grantees and fellows produce.

HFG
THE Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation

The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation sponsors scholarly research on problems of violence, aggression, and dominance.

The foundation provides both research grants to established scholars and dissertation fellowships to graduate students during the dissertation-writing year. HFG DOES NOT SUPPORT institutions, programs, or pure interventions.

The HFG Review of Research is published on a periodic basis.

Research Priorities
Introduction | Youth | Family
Media | Crime | Biology
War & Peace | Terrorism
Religion, Ethnicity, Nationalism

Research Grants
Guidelines | Past Grants

Dissertation Fellowships
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The HFG Review Annual Reports

Search research reports
Request a grant application

HOW TO APPLY

Grants

The foundation makes most grants in the range of \$15,000 to \$30,000 per year, usually for periods of one or two years. Money is available for salary, field expenses, research assistance, clerical services, and any other expenses directly related to and necessary for the specific research project proposed. Applications for research grants are reviewed once a year and are due in the foundation's offices on August 1. Decisions are made in December, and money is available for funded projects as early as January 1.

Ph.D. Awards

Fellowships are awarded to fund the writing phase of the Ph.D. dissertation. Awards are \$15,000 and granted once a year. The application deadline is February 1 and decisions are made in June. Dissertation applicants and their advisors must assure us that the dissertation will be finished during the award year. It is not appropriate to apply if this time constraint cannot be honored.

Citizenship

Applicants for either the research grant or the Ph.D. fellowship may be citizens of any country. Research-grant applicants must possess a Ph.D, M.D., or the equivalent. However, grant applicants need not be affiliated with an institution of higher learning, although most are university professors. Ph.D. fellowships are available for graduate students enrolled at any university in the world who are writing doctoral dissertations on subjects related to the foundation's interests.

Advice

Please read this section carefully. It discloses our ideas about what makes a convincing, promising

proposal for research. These comments could direct you towards what we see as the most fruitful research plans and could prevent you from sending us an application which asks for support for activities that we do not recognize as supportable research. Refer to "Research Grants and Dissertation Fellowships" on page 21 for examples of the sort of work we fund.

We fund research, not interventions. Nor do we fund evaluations of intervention programs where the research question is how well the particular intervention is being implemented or how strong its effects are. Our program aims at new understandings of problems specifically related to aggression and violence themselves, not to the feasibility of interventions. Apart from our own conferences and workshops, we do not fund meetings or group projects, although we do accept proposals for work shared among two or three principal investigators if their roles in and specific contributions to the research are clear.

A good proposal will pose a specific research problem. After reviewing previous work done in the area, the applicant will focus on questions that would still puzzle someone familiar with the relevant literature, and then will propose specific and creative methods to approach the problem directly. As well, an application should not only convince us that its subject is interesting and understudied but also show us how larger general lessons about violence will be drawn from an investigation of this particular instance of it.

A proposal describing a general problem—for example, "violence in the Great Lakes region of central Africa"—that does not include the specific research questions the topic poses and a practical plan to get at the answers to those questions will not convince us that the project is feasible and

likely to be productive. Likewise, it is not very promising when an applicant states that “very little is known about”—for example, “resilience in children at risk for problem aggression”—and then proposes a research plan that replicates the many prior research attempts that have resulted in that “very little.” We will not fund yet another study that will simply add a small increment of progress to past work of essentially the same form.

Even if we could afford to give much more money to any one project than we do now, we would prefer to support analysis over raw data collection; scholars whose work relies on large data sets which are expensive to collect may find in our program an opportunity to ask for time to think about what the numbers mean and how their conclusions should affect the design of future studies.

While the practical value of some research is readily apparent, the applicability of scholarly insight is often only potential. We do not expect immediate social change to result from the completion of a foundation-supported project, and we are skeptical about applications which promise to design “solutions” to persistent and vexing problems. However, we do look for evidence that an applicant is involved in the study of violence or aggression because of a concern with it as a problem in the world. The “Relevance” box on our application form’s Abstract page is the applicant’s chance to tell us, in a persuasive, pithy paragraph, about the value of the research and its contribution to the larger goals of the foundation. Why is *this* particular case chosen by which to investigate *this* larger problem? How do salient questions to be investigated here relate to understandings developed elsewhere?

We do not fund in an area just because a project addresses an unsolved and apparently urgent problem related to aggression if we cannot be assured that first-rate, useful research can be done. And we do not fund studies in areas that might be argued to have an ultimate, basic relevance to understand-

ing aggression or violence but do not have a central focus on it. Should there be any concern about whether a planned project is relevant to the foundation’s interests, please consult with one of our program officers.

Detailed guidelines for submitting applications for research grants and dissertation fellowships accompany this report and also can be downloaded from our web site, hfg.org, or mailed from our office. Applications for the research grant will include a title page, abstract and statement of relevance, informative budget, detailed research plan, and curricula vitae for the principal investigator and each professional collaborator. Applications for the dissertation fellowship will include a title page, abstract and statement of relevance, description of the research and planned dissertation, and curricula vitae for the doctoral candidate and advisor. Four copies of all materials must be submitted.

Please read the guidelines carefully—including the budget rules—and follow instructions meticulously, providing all of the information requested and in the quantity specified. Disorganized, incomplete, sloppy applications testify to the same qualities in the conduct of research and seriously damage a proposal’s chances of funding. Take the space necessary to describe your research adequately, with full attention to methodology, but have pity on our reviewers and be succinct—typically, a research plan ranges from ten to twenty double-spaced pages, and we prefer them printed on one side of the sheet. It is not a good idea to shrink text to make it appear shorter than it is: the readable application is clear in both appearance and thought. Even typographical errors will distract the reader from your argument and might lead to a negative evaluation. Take the trouble to proofread the text and to check your math and you will impress our reviewers as a careful and accurate worker.

Budgets

Budget requests are appropriate only for expenses specifically related to the proposed research, and salary requests should cover only the time required by the research. We do not make it a priority to fund small percentages (3-7%) of the salaries of scholars employed in research universities so that they can devote small portions of their time to overseeing a project where the work is being done by students. These salary portions, with attached benefit percentages, add thousands of dollars to the cost of a project, money that could be given to other investigators who cannot complete their work without grant aid. Ask only for the salaries essential to getting the work done and which are not being paid by other sources.

Deadlines

Deadlines refer to receipt by the foundation, not postmark, and applications will be returned if they reach us after the due date. If the due date falls on a weekend, the deadline is the following Monday. There are no exceptions to this policy.

Evaluation

The applications are evaluated for their scholarly quality and methodological aptness, as well as for the salience of the research questions to the foundation's interests and mission. This is done with the help of a panel of consultants who work together over several years and contribute to defining and refining the foundation's mission and to our ideas about how to pursue it.

In 2004, the panel consisted of Gary LaFree (Criminology, University of Maryland, College Park), Stathis Kalyvas (Political Science, Yale University), Jay Kaplan (Comparative Medicine and Anthropology, Wake Forest University), Lamia Karim (Anthropology, University of Oregon), Liz Kelly (Child and Woman Abuse Studies, University of North London), Clark McCauley (Social Psychology, Bryn Mawr College),

Catherine Merridale (Historical Studies, Queen Mary University of London) and Fred Myers (Anthropology, New York University).

Serving on the panel between 2000 and 2004 were Assaad Azzi (Social Psychology, Universite Libre de Bruxelles), Russel Barsh (Native American Studies, University of Lethbridge), Richard Rosenfeld (Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Missouri, St. Louis), Neal Simon (Biological Sciences, Lehigh University), and Cathy Spatz Widom (Criminology, SUNY at Albany).

Recommendations are made by the review panel to the Program Committee of the HFG board, who choose according to their interpretation of the foundation's mission the proposals to be considered for funding by the full board of directors each year at its meetings in December and June.

If a proposal is turned down, it can be resubmitted, although our reviewers will want to see evidence of progress in your thinking in the meantime. Although often it is not easy to pinpoint what is "wrong" with a proposal which has been rejected, on request we will describe our general concerns about the work so that you can re-think areas which might have affected our decision. But keep in mind that the grant-evaluation process is very competitive, and often the only thing wrong with a rejected proposal is that what we consider better ones have been chosen instead. We can only fund a small percentage of the projects proposed to us. If your proposal is rejected twice, it is usually not worthwhile to try yet again unless you have amended it considerably.

Members of the foundation staff are happy to discuss possible applications, describe the review procedure, and answer questions about the application materials, by phone, letter, or email (info@hfg.org). Our job includes helping applicants prepare the best applications they can and then choosing among these the sharpest, most promising ones for funding.

RESEARCH GRANTS
AND
DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIPS

RESEARCH GRANTS
JULY 1999 – DECEMBER 2005

ROGAIA MUSTAFA ABUSHARAF (Sociology and Anthropology, Tufts University). Under many fires: Factors influencing the adoption of female circumcision by war-displaced southern Sudanese women in Khartoum. 2002.

BOLANLE ELIZABETH AKANDE ADETOUN (Rural Sociology and Demography, Center for Sustainable Development and Gender Issues). Ethnic conflict and socio-economic development in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. 2001, 2002.

ASMA AFSARUDDIN (Classics, Notre Dame University). Striving in the path of God: Discursive traditions on Jihad and the cult of martyrdom. 2003.



New York City, 2001.
Aftermath of a
Jihadist martyrdom
attack.

BEGOÑA ARETXAGA (Anthropology, University of Texas, Austin). States of terror: Nationalist youth and political violence in the Basque country. 2002.

ALEX ARGENTI-PILLEN (Anthropology, University College London).

A war trauma pandemic? The humanitarian discourse on “traumatized” populations. 2001.

JAVIER AUYERO (Sociology, State University of New York, Stony Brook). Scrutinizing the gray zones: Dynamics of collective violence in contemporary Argentina. 2005.

MICHAEL BARKUN (Political Science, Syracuse University). Conspiracy beliefs and violence in American culture: A comparative study of black and white separatism. 1999.

ROGERS BRUBAKER (Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles). Nationalism and ethnicity in a Transylvanian town: Between politics and everyday life. 2003.

JEFFREY BURDS (Russian and Soviet History, University of Rochester). The Soviet “struggle against banditry,” 1941–1953. 2000, 2001.

CHRISTOPHER CANDLAND (Political Science, Wellesley College). Pakistan’s educational system and violence: Is there a connection? 2004, 2005.

JOSE A. CANELA-CACHO (Law, University of California, Berkeley). Incidence of violence in the Mexico City metropolitan area: A comparative analysis of two recent victimization surveys. 2001.

CONERLY CASEY (Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles). Youthful martyrdom and heroic criminality: The formation of youth groups in northern Nigeria. 2000, 2001.

YVES-ALEXANDRE CHOUALA (Political Science, University of Yaounde II). Violence, security and state in Cameroon and South Africa: State de-monopolization of organized violence and privatization of public security. 2002.

YVES-ALEXANDRE CHOUALA (Political Science, University of Yaounde II). Crime and insecurity in Africa and Europe: Comparing Cameroon and South Africa with France and Belgium. 2005.

JOHN N. CONSTANTINO (Psychiatry, Washington University School of Medicine). Mental representations of attachment in twins: A study of

monozygotic female pairs concordant and discordant for abnormally aggressive behavior. 2001, 2002.

THEODORE F. COOK JR. (History, William Paterson University). The Japanese soldier's experience of war, 1937–1945: Violence, citizenship, and the individual in modern Japan's lost war. 1999.

STEPHANIE CRONIN (History, University of London). The Middle Eastern military as a factor in domestic and regional conflict and violence: A case-study of the Iranian army. 2000.

JAMES M. DABBS (Biology, Georgia State University). Testosterone affects transient readiness for action. 2000, 2001.

KRISTIN L. DUNKLE (Epidemiology, University of Michigan). Masculinity, gender-based violence, sexual risk behavior and HIV: What are the connections in the South African youth AIDS epidemic? 2004.

LESLIE DWYER (Cultural Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles). The violence of 1965–66 and its aftermath in Bali, Indonesia. 2003, 2004.

DOUGLAS ECKBERG (Sociology and Anthropology, Winthrop University). The South Carolina Murder Project. 2005.

IVAN ERMAKOFF (Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison). Enacting state persecution: The police and anti-Semitic policy in France, 1940–1944. 2004.

MALCOLM M. FEELEY (Law, University of California, Berkeley). An exploration of the marked decline of women's involvement in crime and criminal violence: 1700–1900. 2000.

ALLEN FELDMAN (Anthropology, National Development and Research Institute). Remembering violence and the transvaluation of the public sphere: An ethnography of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and apartheid and post-apartheid violence. 2000.

RICHARD B. FELSON (Sociology, The Pennsylvania State University). Distinctive characteristics of marital violence. 2004.

HENRY FRIEDLANDER (History, City University of New York, Brooklyn College). German law and Nazi crimes. 2000.

KAJSA EKHOLM FRIEDMAN (Social Anthropology, Lund University). The involution of violence: Social disintegration, cosmological crisis and child-witchcraft in the Congo region. 2004.

ROBERTO GARGARELLA (Law, Chr. Michelsen Institute). Throwing “paper stones”: Argentina’s institutional collapse. 2003, 2004.

LESLEY GILL (Anthropology, American University). Military training, violence, and human rights: The School of the Americas. 2001.

DENNIS M. GORMAN (Health Science, Texas A&M University System Health Science Center). The Texas three-cities study of neighborhood structure, alcohol availability, and violent crime. 2001.

JOHN HAGEDORN (Criminal Justice, University of Illinois, Chicago). Violence, gangs, and the redivision of space in Chicago. 2002.

JOZSEF HALLER (Biology, Institute of Experimental Medicine). Mechanisms underlying pathological forms of aggression in rats. 2002, 2003.

JOZSEF HALLER (Biology, Institute of Experimental Medicine). The behavioral, neural, and pharmacological specificity of different forms of abnormal aggression in rats. 2005.

PATRICIA HAWLEY (Psychology, Southern Connecticut State University). Social dominance and coercive strategies of resource control in children. 2001.

TOBIAS HECHT (Social Anthropology). The violent life of Bruna Verissimo: An experimental ethnographic biography of a homeless Brazilian youth. 2002, 2003.

DONALD L. HOROWITZ (Law, Duke University). Constitutional design in divided societies: New reasons for optimism. 2000.

MACARTAN HUMPHREYS (Political Science, Harvard University). Ethnic identity, collective action and conflict: An experimental approach. 2003.

CYNTHIA L. IRVIN (Political Science, University of Kentucky). Negotiating end games: The Northern Irish peace process as a model for conflict resolution in the Basque country—prospects, lessons, and limitations. 2000.

BRUCE A. JACOBS (Criminology, University of Missouri, St. Louis). Criminal retaliation: A qualitative study of social control beyond the law. 2003.

SHAHEEN ASHARAF KAGEE (Psychology, University of Pennsylvania). The psychological sequelae of political torture in South Africa. 2002.

STATHIS N. KALYVAS (Political Science, University of Chicago). The dynamics of violence in civil war: Evaluating the impact of ethnicity on violence. 2000, 2001.

BRUCE KAPFERER (Anthropology, University College London). Globalization, the forces of poverty, and their formations of violence. 2000.

BEN KIERNAN (History, Yale University). Blood and soil: Modern genocide, 1500–2000. 2002, 2003.

VLADIMIR A. KOZLOV (Russian and Soviet Studies, University of Rochester). A social history of Gulag after Stalin's death: The emergence of a new repressive policy and the fate of the prisoners, 1953–1960. 2001, 2002.

MENNO R. KRUK (Biology, Amsterdam Center for Drug Research). Telemetry of neural activity of brain mechanisms involved in aggression, fear and stress response. 2003.

CHARALAMBOS P. KYRIACOU (Genetics, University of Leicester). Molecular genetics of aggressive behavior in *Drosophila melanogaster*. 2002.

JOHN LAMPHEAR (Oriental and African Studies and History, University of Texas, Austin). A military history of East Africa in the nineteenth century. 2000, 2001.

ROYCE LEE (Psychiatry, University of Chicago). Effect of acutely altering serotonergic activity on the performance of tasks relevant to cortical-amyg-

daloid circuits in IED and control subjects. 2002, 2003.

LAUREN LEVE (Anthropology, New School University). Social justice and “failed development”: Violent ironies of women’s empowerment in Nepal. 2004.



Perhaps a third of the soldiers in Nepal’s Maoist insurgency, which aspires to overthrow the government and expel foreign NGOs, are women. Many of them are graduates of state-run and NGO development programs intended to educate and empower women.

LIANJIANG LI (Political Science, Hong Kong Baptist University). Local government violence and rights in contemporary rural China. 2004.

STEPHEN C. LUBKEMANN (Anthropology, George Washington University). The politics of conflict in nations beyond borders: The Liberian diaspora in war making and peace building. 2004, 2005.

JOE L. P. LUGALLA (Anthropology, University of New Hampshire).

Hardships and violence against street children in sub-Saharan African cities: Understanding street children and street life in urban Tanzania. 2000.

DARIO MAESTRIPIERI (Psychology, University of Chicago). Genetic and experimental mechanisms underlying the intergenerational transmission of infant abuse in monkeys. 2004.

SUZANNE MAMAN (Public Health, The Johns Hopkins University). The intersection of HIV and violence among youth in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 2004.

TERRY MARTIN (History, Harvard University). The limits of totalitarian domination: Soviet social practices and the Stalinist system of social control. 2000.

SHADD MARUNA (Criminology, Northwestern University). Let 'em rot: Understanding public punitiveness toward offenders. 2004.

NUR MASALHA (Political History of the Middle East, Saint Mary's University of Surrey). Political violence, military conflict, and civil unrest in Palestine: The Palestinian police, the Fatah Tanzim, and the "al-Aqsa Intifada." 2002, 2003.

SEAN MCCONVILLE (Law, Queen Mary College, University of London). Irish political prisoners, 1920–2000. 2003, 2004.

WILLIAM P. MELEGA (Molecular and Medical Pharmacology, University of California, Los Angeles). Frontal cortical and hypothalamic serotonin system correlates of individual difference in cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid levels. 2001.

MARK D. MEYERSON (History and Medieval Studies, University of Toronto). Social violence and religious conflict in late medieval Valencia. 2003.

EDWARD MIGUEL (Economics, University of California, Berkeley). War and economic development in Vietnam and Sierra Leone. 2005.

HARVEY MOLOTCH (Sociology, New York University). Strategic observers underground: How they see trouble and what they do next. 2005.

KAIVAN MUNSHI (Economics, Brown University). Intra-household income inequality and conflict: Testing an economic model of domestic violence in Kerala, India. 2003, 2004.

DANI W. NABUDERE (Political Science, Afrika Study Centre). The transformation of the agro-pastoralist conflict and violence in North-eastern Uganda. 2000, 2001, 2002.

NICHOLAS E. NEWTON-FISHER (Biological Anthropology, University of Cambridge). Male-female aggression in chimpanzees. 2003, 2004.



Human aggression, especially group conflict and war, is shaped by psychological, social, and political influences. However, studying aggression in closely related species may illuminate the individual human potential for aggression and its evolutionary origins.

VESNA NIKOLIC-RISTANOVIC (Sociology, Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research, Belgrade). Violence against women and social changes in post-communist countries. 2000.

GANANATH OBEYESEKERE (Anthropology, Princeton University). Terrorism and the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka. 2003.

RAKIYA OMAAR (African Studies, Africa Rights). The meaning and relevance of genocide ideology in past and present Rwanda. 2005.

ARJUNA PARAKRAMA (English, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka). Saturated with loss: The bereaved sexualities of Sri Lanka's protracted war. 2001.

GEOFFREY PARKER (History, The Ohio State University). The world crisis, 1635–1665. 2002.

KATHARINE B. PAYNE (Bioacoustics, Cornell University). Competitive and cooperative behaviors among forest elephants in the presence of a limited resource. 2001, 2002.

NANCY LEE PELUSO (Society and the Environment, University of California, Berkeley). Violent territorialities and the cultural politics of belonging in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. 2002.

SUSAN PHILLIPS (Anthropology, Pitzer College). Operation Fly Trap: Gang violence in Los Angeles. 2005.

ROBERT PLOMIN (Behavioral Genetics, King's College London). Identifying genes responsible for a highly heritable aspect of antisocial behavior in 7-year-old children. 2004.

VALLI RAJAH (Sociology, City University of New York, John Jay College). Relations on the margins: Love, drug use, and violence in the inner city. 2005.

CHARLES RITTER (History, College of Notre Dame of Maryland). Sexual justice in the American Civil War. 2005.

AKI ROBERTS (Sociology, University of New Mexico). Economic stress and crime in Japan. 2002.

AKI ROBERTS (Sociology, University of New Mexico). Violence in urban America, 1990–2000: Impact of changing economic and social conditions and police resources. 2005.

EUGENIA RODRIGUEZ SAENZ (History, University of Costa Rica). Happy marriages: Civilizing domestic life in Costa Rica (1850–1950). 2000.

MAURICIO RUBIO (Economics, University of Carlos III, Madrid). Kidnapping in Colombia. 2002, 2004.

YASMIN SAIKIA (History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill). “My Body is in Pain”: Understanding gender violence in the 1971 liberation war of Bangladesh. 2004.

NICHOLAS SAMBANIS (Political Science, Yale University). The onset, duration, and termination of ethnic civil war. 2003.

SARA SCHATZ (Latin American Studies, The Ohio State University). In cold blood: Dissent, opposition, and murder in the rise of Mexico's Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD). 2005.

DAVID Z. SCHEFFEL (Anthropology, University College of the Cariboo). Conflict between Roma and ethnic Slovaks in comparative and historical perspective. 2004, 2005.

NEAL SIMON (Biology, Lehigh University). Soy, the brain, and aggression: Cellular and molecular mechanisms. 2005.

IRA SOMMERS (Criminology, California State University, Los Angeles). Methamphetamine and violence. 2000.

JONNY STEINBERG (Journalism, Center for Violence and Reconciliation). The farm killings. 2000.

SVETLANA STEPHENSON and SIMONS HALLSWORTH (International Comparative Sociology, London Metropolitan University). Violent street groups and organized crime in Russia. 2005.

RAEL D. STROUS (Medicine, Beer Yaakov Mental Health Center). The association of polymorphism in genes affecting monoamine neurotransmission with aggressive behavior in schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic

Kidnapping for ransom is a lucrative tactic of rebel groups in Colombia. Abductions numbered around 3,000 annually in recent years.



violent individuals. 2000, 2001.

BERT USEEM (Sociology, University of New Mexico). Cross-national study of prisons and crime control. 2000.

NIKOLAUS WACHSMANN (History, University of Cambridge). Hitler's prisons: Prisons and penal policy in Germany, 1900–1945. 2002.

MICHAEL WATTS (International Studies, University of California, Berkeley). Economies of violence: Petroleum, politics and community in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. 2002.

ERIC D. WEITZ (History, University of Minnesota). Germans abroad: The Herero and Armenian genocides and the origins of the Holocaust. 2004.

Oil from a sabotaged pipeline burns in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Interethnic conflict and mobilization against the government and multinational corporations center on the distribution of revenues from oil extraction in the Delta region.



RICHARD WRIGHT (Criminology, University of Missouri, St. Louis). The carjacker's perspective: A qualitative study of urban violence. 2000.

HONGLING XIE (Developmental Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill). Aggressive behaviors among inner-city children

and adolescents. 2002.

MARGARET ZELLER (Psychology, Children's Hospital Medical Center). Contextual variations in children's peer relations: The impact of community violence and neighborhood disadvantage. 2000, 2001.

DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIPS 1999 – 2004

BRETT S. ABRAHAM (Molecular Medicine and Therapeutics, University of British Columbia). Mouse strains transgenic for human nuclear receptor 2E1: New tools for understanding the biology of aggression. 2003.

FIONA B. ADAMSON (Political Science, Columbia University). Globalization and the territorial state: International migration, transnationalism, and "national security." 2000.

ASAD ALI AHMED (Anthropology, University of Chicago). Adjudicating the nation, disciplining Islam: Blasphemy trials and Islamic nationalism in contemporary Pakistan. 2002.

LORI A. ALLEN (Anthropology, University of Chicago). Suffering through nationalist uprising: Violence, victimization, and human rights in Palestinian politics. 2004.

TONIO ANDRADE (History, Yale University). Commerce, culture, and conflict at the margins of empire: Dutch Taiwan and the Spanish Philippines, 1574–1662. 1999.

DANIEL J. BEAL (Psychology, Tulane University). Understanding aggression and racism: The roles of anger and inhibitory motivations. 1999.

KIMBERLY BARLETTO BECKER (Psychology, University of Arizona). Reactions to violence: A study of children from violent homes. 2000.

VASILE B. CERNAT (Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University). Ethnic stereotypes and attitudes: The role of social knowledge. 2003.

RUCHI CHATURVEDI (Anthropology, Columbia University). The

political and its violence: Party workers, democracy and law in South India. 2004.

JANGAM CHINNAIAH (History, University of London). Contesting Hinduism: Emergence of dalit paradigms in Telugu country, 1900–1950. 2004.

THOMAS H. CHIVENS (Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill). Democracy on the beat: Policing of domestic violence in Poland. 2002.

RACHEL HOPE CLEVES (History, University of California, Berkeley). The problem of violence in the early American republic. 2004.

MEGAN LEE COMFORT (Sociology, London School of Economics and Political Science). Home sweep: The social and cultural consequences of mass incarceration for women with imprisoned partners. 2002.

JAMES PATRICK DAUGHTON (History, University of California, Berkeley). The civilizing mission: Missionaries, colonialists, and French identity, 1885–1914. 2001.

ALEXANDER B. DOWNES (Political Science, University of Chicago). Targeting civilians in war. 2003.

THEODORA DRAGOSTINOVA (History, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign). Between two motherlands: Struggle for nationhood among the Greeks in Bulgaria, 1906–1949. 2004.

IOANNIS D. EVRIGENIS (Government, Harvard University). “Carthage Must Be Saved”: Fear of enemies and collective action. 2004.

PEGGY FROERER (Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science). Ethnic conflict and emergent Hindu nationalism: Christian/Hindu Adivasi relations in Chhattisgarh, Central India. 2001.

SUZANNE E. FRY (Politics, New York University). When states kill their own: The legitimating rhetoric and institutional remedies of authority crisis. 2003.

MELISSA GONZALEZ-BRENES (Economics, University of California,

Berkeley). Determinants of domestic violence: Quantitative evidence from rural Tanzania. 2004.

JONATHAN GUMZ (History, University of Chicago). Streams of violence in the “Land of Milk and Honey”: The Habsburg occupation of Serbia, 1913–1918. 2003.

PETER N. S. HOAKEN (Psychology, Dalhousie University). The roles of executive cognitive function, impulsivity and reactivity in aggression. 2000.

TIN-BOR VICTORIA HUI (Political Science, Columbia University). Rethinking war and change: Competing logics in world politics. 1999.

JENNY ISAACS (Psychology, Saint John’s University). In-school weapon carrying: Associations with aggression, environmental threat, and social cognitions. 2002.

Police enter a New York City high school after a shooting. Although school shootings are relatively rare events, gun carrying by youth is common.



KELLY LYNNE JARVIS (Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California, Irvine). Maternal parenting and child adjustment in the context of domestic violence. 2004.

LAMIA N. KARIM (Anthropology, Rice University). Development and

its discontents: NGOs and the reproduction of an underclass in rural Bangladesh. 1999.

MATTHEW E. KEITH (History, The Ohio State University). The logistics of power: Tokugawa response to the Shimabara Rebellion and power projection in seventeenth-century Japan. 2001.

MICHELLE KUHL (History, Binghamton University). Modern martyrs: African Americans redefining the meaning of lynching, 1890–1940. 2000.

MOHAMMED J. KUNA (Political Science, Usmanu Danfodiyo University). The nation-state and violence: Incorporation, exclusion and state formation in Northern Nigeria, 1900–1966. 1999.

DEBORAH LAND (Psychology, University of Virginia). Teasing, bullying, and sexual harassment in adolescence. 1999.

MANUELA LEONHARDT (Anthropology, University College London). Troubled peace in the Caucasus: Violence, community and ethnicity in post-Soviet Daghestan. 1999.

RON LEVI (Law, University of Toronto). The constitution of community in policing the everyday: Legal implications of an emerging criminal justice paradigm. 2001.

JENNIFER MACDONALD (Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Family crime on trial in rural France, 1815–1914: The case of Cote-d’Or. 2002.

ROCHONA MAJUMDAR (South Asia Languages and Civilizations and History, University of Chicago). Dowry deaths, marital violence and the politics of marriage in Bengal: 1914–1961. 2001.

ANNE-MARIE BOITUMELO MAKHULU (Anthropology, University of Chicago). Squatter politics, squatter violence: Challenges to the new housing policy in South Africa. 2000.

B. GREGORY MARFLEET (Political Science, Arizona State University). Taking risks for war and peace: Groups, leaders, and crisis behavior. 2001.

ROBERT P. MARLIN (Anthropology, Rutgers University). Legacies of

violence: Spirit possession and constructions of gender and illness in central Mozambique. 2000.

CARLOTA MCALLISTER (Anthropology, The Johns Hopkins University). Good people: Violence and responsibility in a post-revolutionary Guatemalan village. 2000.

MICHAEL MCGOVERN (Culture, History, Theory, Emory University). Narratives of betrayal: The creation of a productive other and a flirtation with genocide in Southeastern Guinea, West Africa. 2003.

MARY NIAL MITCHELL (History, New York University). Raising freedom's child: Race, politics and the lives of black children in 19th-century Louisiana. 1999.

DANIEL MONTERESCU (Anthropology, University of Chicago). The limits of peaceful co-existence: Jewish-Arab relations, urban space and the state in Palestinian-Israeli mixed towns, 1948–2003. 2003.

MICHAEL NEST (Politics, New York University). Restraining the state: The role of social groups in limiting state violence and dominance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 2001.

VADIM OGOEV (Sociology, McMaster University). Ethnic violence in the Northern Caucasus: The evolution of Ossetian nationalism (1989–1998). 1999.

THOMAS PEGELOW (History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill). Between control, reunification and discursive congestion: The politico-cultural conflicts over Germanness and Jewishness in Germany, 1928–1948. 2003.

BRIAN J. PETERSON (History, Yale University). Transforming the village: Migration, colonialism and Islam in French Southern Mali, 1880–1960. 2004.

DIANE PURVIN (Policy and Management, Brandeis University). Intimate partner violence among low-income urban families: Economic, social, and relational consequences. 2002.

ANNE RAFFIN (Historical Studies, New School for Social Research).

Imperial militarization and its aftereffects: The mobilization of “Youth of Empire” in France and in Indochina, 1940–1975. 1999.

RAMNARAYAN SINGH RAWAT (History, University of Delhi). Overcoming domination: Struggles of identity among the Chamars of Uttar Pradesh, 1881–1956. 2003.

ROSELLEN N. ROCHE (Social Anthropology, The University of Cambridge, England). The inheritors: Violence and the social development of working-class Protestant and Catholic youth in Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland. 2002.

JAVIER CARRERA RUBIO (Social Anthropology, University of Saint Andrews). The Yanomami discourse and practices of the interplay between peace and war in the process of their political integration within the Venezuelan nation-state. 2003.

LOREN RYTER (Political Science, University of Washington). Pemuda Pancasila: Youth, gangs and privatized violence in Indonesia. 1999.

KAMAL SADIQ (Political Science, University of Chicago). When migrants become a threat: Conflict over citizenship in India and Malaysia. 2000.

LISA L. SAMPLE (Criminology, University of Missouri, St. Louis). The social construction of the sex offender. 2000.

MARTHA S. SANTOS (History, University of Arizona). *Serties temerosos* (menacing backlands): Honor and violence in a changing world, Ceará Brazil, 1830s–1890. 2002.

SHARON SHALEV (Sociology, London School of Economics and Political Science). Social isolation as a form of control: The use of solitary confinement in contemporary penal systems and the proliferation of Supermax prisons. 2003.

SUSAN SHEPLER (Social and Cultural Studies in Education, University of California, Berkeley). Conflicted childhoods: Fighting over child soldiers in Sierra Leone. 2003.

ALEXANDER STATIEV (History, University of Calgary). Soviet coun-

terinsurgency policy (1943–50). 2002.

KIMBERLY THEIDON (Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley). Traumatic states: Violence and reconciliation in Peru. 2000.

ANDRES VILLAREAL (Sociology, University of Chicago). Structural determinants of violent crime in contemporary Mexico. 2000.

DUANE EDWARD THOMAS (Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University). The impact of the school classroom context on the development of aggressive behavior problems in children. 2001.

MARINA WELKER (Anthropology/History, University of Michigan). Corporate security by other means: Mining and the rise of “Corporate Social Responsibility” in Indonesia. 2004.

Retired soldier of RUF, a rebel group in Sierra Leone. Child soldiering, practiced by both insurgent groups and government forces, is opposed by Sierra Leoneans as well as Western groups, but the grounds for objection are different.



CAROLINE YEZER (Cultural Anthropology, Duke University). Memory and truth in the shadow of war: Local and national reconciliation in the Peruvian Andes. 2004.



Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created to investigate the twenty years of violence (1980-2000) in which the rebel group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and government forces visited massive violence on rural populations. Many residents of the Ayacucho highlands, who suffered the most, were indifferent or hostile to the TRC because of its emphasis on individual culpability rather than problems of discrimination and economic desperation, which were made worse by the war.

THE USE OF RESEARCH IN PUBLIC POLICY ON VIOLENCE

It was Harry Guggenheim himself, who died in 1971, who determined that his foundation would support the efforts of intellectuals rather than direct efforts at intervening or responding to problems of violence. He noted that the tools of diplomacy and therapy available for such efforts were apparently inadequate to control human conflict and trusted that the work of scholars, free from the pressures of immediate crises and specific political interests, would eventually turn up new ideas and new frameworks for thinking about violence which could in the end have practical effect. So we fund projects with academic merit and wait with patience for practical insights to develop. However, a foundation which funds research on social problems may also have a responsibility to follow through in digesting and evaluating the findings of that research in a way that might begin to make a difference in the world.

It seems incontrovertible that a better understanding of violent situations and practices would contribute to better responses and solutions. What gets in the way? Much of the blame for the impasse between scholarship and practical value can be laid on government and policymakers, who don't always listen to scholarly wisdom. But after the World Trade Center disaster the need to communicate has taken on a greater urgency—all the lessons of terrorism research seem in danger of being ignored. This foundation began to think more seriously about how scholars could influence public opinion and its potential contribution to policymaking.

Some policymakers don't value the contributions of scholars nearly so much as the scholars think they should. Representatives of international agencies with peacemaking responsibilities agreed in a private meeting in December 2001 that "we already know all we need to know" about violence in order to do their work. Since their successes are few, perhaps they were mistaking a commitment to morality and idealism for objective understandings grounded in social science, with consequences for the effectiveness of their actions. Governments work that way, too. Early in the second Bush's administration, John Podhoretz, a leading architect of neo-conservative public policy, speculated about the influence of thinkers like himself on the president's policy ideas. He wrote, "The President seems to have come to an understanding of these ideas entirely on his own. He didn't need the books we wrote or the magazines we published" (*Washington Post*, April 18, 2001).

Likewise, in the past some social scientists have also made claims based on their scientific authority on issues which are not social science problems, or have claimed to know more than they do on a policy issue on which they have strong

feelings. It should be clear when the scholar is speaking as an “expert” and when as an involved party. The equivocity of social science—“on the one hand...but on the other hand...”—can be confusing to policymakers looking for a simple analysis and solution. It may be that a social scientist is more helpful to governments and policy agencies as critic than as advocate. However, in fulfilling her responsibility to her research subjects, a scholar may have to take sides, make recommendations, and face the real world consequences of her ideas. This is a heavy responsibility, considerably more serious than publishing a journal article, and researchers who accept the responsibility for advocacy had better be sure they know what they are doing.

Further, the path from idea to implementation is strewn with political roadblocks, barriers of bureaucracy and institutional inertia, and the human failings of greed, power, and prestige which may always oppose reason and compromise. And there is a tension that should be analyzed between valuing democratic decision-making and advocating public policy based on the findings of social science. There is a legitimate place for a part of the policy process informed by cultural practices, moral thinking, and social idealism, which can either contradict or further scholarly thinking.

Despite all this, findings have emerged from our grants, and from other academic investigations of violence, which have been usefully applied in the world: for example, in designing equitable constitutions, negotiating disputed histories, and debunking entrenched but faulty explanations of why people fight. There are some success stories about how ideas have changed the world in some important ways.

The four success stories we publish here were selected in a competition for the best essays submitted to us which dealt with how scholarship has contributed to combating organized violence, including international and civil wars and small-group political violence. Nancy Scheper-Hughes tells about how a community she studied in Brazil used her scholarship as a source and a model to help them solve a problem of violence in their own neighborhoods. Vivian Nain Kuma describes how research into what ethnic groups in Cameroon were fighting about suggested legal and political solutions to their conflicts which had nothing to do with the difficulties of ethnic difference. Erin Baines writes about how a generation of feminist research and advocacy transformed the way UN agencies responded to female war refugees, and Ivan Zverzhanovski explains how his professor, James Gow, took the lessons of the classroom into the courtroom to sort out culpability in the Bosnian war.

Death Squads and Democracy in Northeast Brazil

Nancy Scheper-Hughes

Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful committed citizens can change the world.

—Margaret Mead

Prologue: The Legacy of Margaret Mead

Before Margaret Mead, anthropologists treated children roughly the same way that Evans-Pritchard treated cattle in Nuer society—as omnipresent, part of the backdrop of everyday life, but otherwise mute and useless creatures, unable to teach us anything significant about “real,” that is, adult, society and culture. Mead challenged this Victorian paradigm of children as seen but rarely heard from. She herself seemed to read the world largely through the eyes and sensibilities of children and adolescents.¹ If Mead’s child-centeredness was one of her most enduring and endearing traits, another was her Bakhtinian playfulness as she used the comparative method as radical juxtaposition so as to normalize (and make familiar) the exotic other and to critique (and make strange) American society, as she did in her first book, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, a work still capable of raising hackles in some quarters.²

Still another endearing if politically incorrect trait was Mead’s no-nonsense Yankee pragmatism and her self-confident, upbeat, and optimistic belief in the power of positive “facts” and anthropological fact-gathering to illuminate and to ameliorate the human condition. At mid-twentieth century Mead was still able to use cross-cultural materials to critique who we, Americans, were, and what we might be doing wrong, comparatively speaking, and how we might fix it. So, with Mead’s celebrated dictum as a backdrop, I will reflect on a recent foray into critically engaged anthropology in which a small group of thoughtful citizens in Northeast Brazil managed to transform the incredibly violent local world in which they had been trapped, a situation that the majority there accepted as normal or inevitable.

Human Rights Discourse in the Defense of Children

If the 1980s will be remembered as the decade of the triumph of neo-liberal economic globalization, the 1990s will be remembered as the decade of rapid transitions to democracy, the resurgence of cultural nationalism and genocides, and (paradoxically) the spread of core global social values, especially human rights discourses, including children’s rights, as formalized in the UN’s Convention on the Rights of the Child.

For many anthropologists, however, “rights talk” and rights activism presented a problem. Human rights could all too easily serve as a screen for the transfer of “Western” values with a view toward incorporating new populations of independent and rights-bearing workers and consumers into the global economy.³ Moreover, how could cultural anthropologists accept a universal code of children’s rights when the very concept of “the child” was so dependent on local meanings and practices? International acts of “child saving” (whether through commercialized international adoption networks or sensational media exposés of Romania’s and China’s systems of state orphanages) and blanket condemnations of child labor and child slavery reeked of smug cultural imperialism. And human rights rhetoric was often used politically by Western democracies to discipline and punish “ethically backward” countries and was all too often accompanied by economic sanctions calculated to hurt local economies.⁴

Still, it is fair to ask what role anthropologists can have in current debates in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa, where new constitutions and bills of rights now speak forcefully to a growing transnational consensus concerning the rights of women, children, and cultural and sexual minorities. While rights talk tends to ignore the cultural constructedness of social categories like child, woman, and mother, an observation to which anthropologists are so attached, how can we ignore the fact that so many people from peripheral or non-Western settings have eagerly embraced human rights agendas and organized around political and civil liberties? Shall we join them, or shall we simply stand on the sidelines criticizing their “over-determined” choices? What would Margaret Mead say? Do? Now for my story.

Democratization and Death Squads

In the spring of 2001, I received an unexpected and startling fax from Timbaúba, Brazil (the “Bom Jesus de Mata” of my book *Death without Weeping*) signed by a newly appointed judge, Dra. Marisa Borges, and a prosecutor, Dr. Humberto da Silva Graça. The fax included a *relatorio* of legal proceedings against a local man, Abidoral Querizoz, and his band of accomplices who had been either, depending on one’s class position and political view, protecting or terrorizing this economically strapped interior market town of 58,000 inhabitants (including its rural surrounds) for at least eight years (1994–2001). Abidoral’s “public security” operation, the so-called Guardian Angels, was, in effect, a hyper-active death squad of hired killers.

The brief I was sent referred to Abidoral and his men as a “grupo de extermínio” charged with the summary executions of more than 100 people, most of them “street children” and marginalized young men, poor, uneducated, unemployed, and black.⁵ “You know, lost people without a future,” one working-class resident, still sympathetic with the local system of “popular justice,” later explained to me.

Death squads and vigilante justice were nothing new in this part of Brazil.⁶

They often worked, as Abidoral's gang had been doing, in the employ of the semi-feudal sugar plantation owners of the *zona da mata* to keep the post-slave population cutting and milling sugarcane at roughly the same levels of human misery as before emancipation. During the long military dictatorship years (1964–1985), the actual or even just rumored operations of paramilitary death squads with ties to local civil and military police were sufficient to terrorize rural workers and the urban poor of hillside shantytowns into political passivity, complicity, and silence. But even following Brazil's democratic transition and the adoption of an enlightened and progressive constitution and the implementation of new political structures and institutions to safeguard the rights of vulnerable social groups, death squad attacks continued. There was a difference, however. As described in *Death without Weeping*, the targets of the death squad attacks had changed, and rather than suspected political subversives the hit men went after young marginals and roving bands of street children. And these executions took place in the absence of public outrage. Street kids and young thieves were not seen as rights-bearing individuals but as bandits, public enemies, and rubbish people (*lixo*), those who were better off dead.

Indeed, if anything, the new human rights discourse, embodied in Brazil's new constitution, which promised civil liberties to homeless children, vagrants, the unemployed, and petty criminals, was counter-intuitive to a great many ordinary Brazilians, who saw these innovations as empowering bandits and public enemies and as an attack on the liberty of "respectable" people (see Caldeira 2000). And so these new human rights initiatives were undermined by strong popular backlash against street children and other sub-citizens. One could even say that democratization had provoked a crisis. The old military state had kept the social classes safely apart and the "hordes" of "dangerous" street children contained to their favelas or in public detention. When these policing structures loosened following democratization, the shantytowns ruptured and poor people—unemployed young men and street children in particular—descended from the hillside slums and seemed to be everywhere, flooding downtown streets and plazas, flaunting their misery and their socially antagonistic needs.

Unwanted and perceived as human waste, shantytown youths and street children evoked contradictory emotions of fear, aversion, pity, and anger. Unlike other kinds of refuse, these "garbage" kids suddenly refused to stay in the dump (the favelas and slums of Brazil). Their ubiquitous presence betrayed the illusion of Brazilian "modernity" and made life feel very insecure for those with homes and other enviable possessions. Excluded and reviled, abandoned street youths were easily recruited to work for petty criminal rings, especially as drug messengers (*avioes*).

During this period of social, political, and economic transition in the 1990s, Timbaúba, a sprawling market town in the sugar plantation zone near the border between Pernambuco and Paraíba, a place where 80% of the population still lives in deep poverty, had become a primary transit point for a new regional traffic in

drugs (mostly marijuana that was cultivated in the backlands of the arid sertao, but also counterfeit prescription drugs), small arms, stolen merchandise (especially motorcycles, cars, and trucks), and in babies to supply semi-criminal networks and markets in international adoption.⁷ “Aye, Nancy,” I was told in the summer of 2001, “Timbaúba is becoming famous as suppliers of ‘tudo que não presta’ (everything that was worthless).” The outlaw status of the community had become so legendary in the region that young boys took to wearing baseball caps with “#1 Mafia” sewn across the front. “What does ‘Mafia’ mean?” I asked a cute little street urchin who could not have been more than five years old. “E, eu sei?” he replied. “Bonito, não é?”—“I don’t know—beautiful, right?”

In the midst of this transition, Timbaúba fell, like an over-ripe apple, into the hands of Abidoral Gomes Queiroz, a man who originally promised to deliver what the police were seen as no longer capable of providing: security and protection. Queiroz, the son of an itinerant hammock salesman (who was also a hired gun, a *pistoleiro*, in his day) and Abidoral’s twenty-two-year-old right-hand man, Jose Eron da Silva, were of modest, but certainly not miserable, backgrounds. Both had completed primary school, had wives, owned cars, and had “connections” with powerful people in Timbaúba—plantation and factory owners, police, the mayor, town counselors, and corrupt judges and juries. Abidoral and his gang gave protection to local businessmen, settled bad debts, carried out vendettas, protected stolen cargo, and ran various black markets in the region. They could be “gentlemanly,” almost courtly, as when they provided unnecessary round-the-clock surveillance of a small cornmeal factory owned by the neurotic aunt of a town-council member. And they could be vicious, as when they were paid by a wife to kidnap, torture, and humiliate the seventeen-year-old lover of her husband, a local pharmacist (“Dr. George”).

Most death squad activities, however, fell under publicly approved “social hygiene” and “street-cleaning” (*limpeza*), ridding the municipio of its vagrants, drifters, street kids, chicken thieves, trouble makers, “large” blacks, unemployed men, sexual deviants, and just plain poor people. The only drug runners killed, however, were “disobedient” young couriers in the employ of the death squad; otherwise, drug traffickers were safe. The local business community of Timbaúba was by and large grateful for the activities of the Guardian Angels, which they saw as a gift to their social class.

As the band grew stronger, other powerful groups and institutions fell under its control, from the local government and the police to certain organs of the local Catholic Church. The names of those who refused to pay for Abidoral’s protection were added to the death list. In the space of a few years, the extermination squad had managed to kill most of Timbaúba’s male street children. Gildete, herself a former street child of Timbaúba, today a children’s rights activist,⁸ explained Abidoral’s reign of terror as follows:

This “street cleaning” was ordered by the businessmen. The idea was to rub out, to

remove all those street urchins who spent their days sniffing glue *{cheirando cola}*, stealing, getting into trouble. They wanted them gone because they thought they were hurting businesses, keeping people away from shopping in Timbaúba for fear of “the dirty ones.” They said business was declining because there were just too many “dirty flies” [street children] in the marketplace. So Abidoral’s group took care of them, but only after they used them. They recruited the kids to steal for them and to run drugs, creating a pretext to justify their clean-up operation and to show the shopkeepers that they really needed protection and to make them pay “big time” to get all the security that they needed. It was a real scam.

Not only street kids, but those who dared to defend or shelter them or to report their deaths were executed as a warning. Such was the case of a forty-eight-year-old woman whose violent death I found buried in the death records kept at the *cartorio civil* (the privately owned municipal registry office). Gildete recalled this death squad murder, which had escaped even her memory until I brought it to her attention.

This Josefa Maria Conceicao was actually killed by her lover, a former street kid himself. They were doing pretty well, beginning to put a life together, when suddenly he arrived home and shot her point blank. You see, she came from a poor, disorganized family and each of her three younger sisters was the mother of street kids who were “cleaned up” by Abidoral’s group. As the eldest, she had the courage to seek justice. She went to the former prosecutor to lodge a complaint about the executions of her nephews and she even named names. Soon after that her *companheiro* came home and killed her. For sure, he was “sent,” bought by the death squad to kill her. Maybe they gave him no choice.

When there was no organized attempt to stop them, Abidoral and his men became bolder. They began to appear and conduct their activities in public, sometimes flamboyantly and in the company of high-profile citizens and leading members of the commercial and landed classes. Eventually, they had the support of the mayor and the town council. No one commented at the absurdity when gunmen from Abidoral’s gang showed up at the town hall (*prefeitura*) to pick up their “wages” from the city council or when Abidoral was seen in public bars and restaurants drinking with the former mayor.

Indeed, by the late 1990s no one in Timbaúba knew exactly where the local government began and where the *grupos de extermínio* ended. Inevitably, the small band of outlaws wormed their way into the local government and gained control over the local police and even the former judge and prosecutor. They assumed the roles and functions of public administration, policing, and judiciary. As the new prosecutor, Dr. Humberto, put it: “The extermination group had become Timbaúba itself. It was totally absurd!” Things veered so out of control that at the annual *Seite de Setembro* (Seventh of September national holiday) parade in 2000, Abidoral and a dozen of his men wearing matching jackets with “Guardian Angels” insignia led the marchers with the mayor and town council members in tow.

In the period of 1994–2001, between 100 and 200 petty thieves, drug sellers, and street children, along with a host of ordinary people who ran afoul of the death squads or whose deaths were “ordered” on commission, were executed in this backlands municipio, giving the population a political homicide rate comparable to Palestine or Israel.⁹ But this state of emergency would never be covered by national, let alone, international media.

Then, in July 2000, the situation changed abruptly when a small and diverse group of local activists joined forces with the outspoken and fearless new judge, Dra. Borges, and the tough and fair-minded prosecutor, Dr. Humberto, in a to-the-death battle to wrest the city away from the death squads.¹⁰ They were armed with little more than the new constitution and their passion for “human rights,” a term of very recent currency in this community, where Marxist and neo-Marxist analysis, sometimes in the language of progressive education (as in Freire’s radical pedagogy), sometimes in the language of theology of liberation, was for generations the only idiom of resistance against class and race oppression. This was something quite new and unprecedented in Northeast Brazil. If, as James Holston has suggested, citizenship implies the right to participate in grassroots politics within the public sphere, then citizenship is ultimately about the right of self-representation and self-expression in the public sphere, especially the right of previously marginalized and subaltern groups to display and to make themselves seen.¹¹

The fax I spoke of earlier came with a request that caused some consternation in the Scheper-Hughes household. For I was asked to return to Timbaúba as quickly as possible to put my anthropological skills to work in supporting



Brazilian street children held, illegally, in a local jail.

the brave, or foolhardy, but most certainly exceedingly dangerous attempts of this human rights oriented vanguard to recapture the municipio from murderous vigilantes. (In fact, both Dra. Borges and Dr. Humberto continue to receive periodic death threats and they requested, and were provided with, armed escorts in coming to and leaving the municipal courthouse.) Abidoral and his gang had demonstrated their loathing for a broad spectrum of vulnerable people

—not only poor, black marginals, and homeless street children, but also sexual outlaws (homosexuals, *travesti* [cross-dressers], and single women involved in affairs with married men of means) and human rights workers.

In her letter, Dra. Borges explained: “We are trying to restore ‘rule of law’ and to extend basic human rights to the entire population of Timbaúba, includ-

ing the shantytowns and peripheral rural districts.” These words, which I had never before heard articulated in this part of the Brazilian “interior,” sounded odd, almost like promotional materials from Amnesty International or the Open Society Institute. Then came the direct question: “Would you return quickly to join us in the struggle?”

Specifically, Dra. Borges wanted my help in identifying the many as yet still unknown victims and survivors of the death squad. Many families were still afraid to come forward and testify. Consequently, only a fraction of executions had come to the attention of the courts. Many individuals were “disappeared” and their bodies desposited in clandestine rural graves owned and operated by small, renegade Protestant churches. Other suspicious deaths were registered and shelved at the *cartorio civil*, but no one had the time or the wherewithal to go through the books. “Couldn’t I use the same skills I had once used to uncover ‘invisible’ infant and child mortalities to uncover the ‘invisible’ victims of the death squads?” I was asked.

I hesitated. Was this an appropriate role? At what point does one leave anthropology behind and join or, in my case, re-join a frankly political struggle?¹² Or was this a false dichotomy, as Pierre Bourdieu had so eloquently argued in calling for a scholarship with (rather than opposed to) commitment.¹³ In the end I hardly had a choice. Dr. Humberto informed me that my writings on “everyday violence” in Timbaúba (“Bom Jesus da Mata”) and on the disappearances and deaths of young black men and street children of the local Alto do Cruzeiro shantytown were already cited and “implicated” in the legal proceedings against Abidoral and his henchmen.

A Spanish translation of *Death without Weeping* had reached members of the local intelligentsia and emerging human rights communities of rural Perambuco. While I had been frustrated early on in my attempts to find a publisher for a Portuguese edition of my book, local activists in Timbaúba had given chapter 6 (“Bodies, Death, and Silence”) to a local secondary school teacher, who had done her best to translate it, after which it had been Xerox copied and distributed to the judge, prosecutor, and (to my horror) to the members of the new police force of Timbaúba.

And so, nearly a decade after this book’s publication in English, the local human rights community of Timbaúba had “discovered” my rudimentary analysis of what was at the time of my writing a still small, incipient, and covert death squad, confined largely to “invisible” populations in the poor and shantytown neighborhoods, where the executions were protected by a strong culture of terror (as well as by a culture of impunity among the dominant class). In chapter 6 I had argued that Brazil’s democratic transition, following twenty years of military rule, was incomplete and that demilitarization at the national political level had not been accompanied by the demilitarization of everyday life. In the context of a free-market-oriented democracy and structural-adjustment policies, the new civil liberties were available only to the affluent social classes. For the majority,

who were excluded from the “Economic Miracle” of Brazil, there was a “disciplinary vacuum” in which a great many ordinary people felt abandoned by the shrinking state to the free-market chaos of urban violence, drugs, and crime. The re-emergence of a once-familiar form of vigilante justice (see Hobsbawm 2000; Scheper-Hughes 1995) gave some ordinary people (at least initially) a false perception of security and of “order and progress”—the elusive promise of Brazilian modernity.

At the time of my writings I could see no exit from the vicious cycle of poverty, hunger, crime, and vigilante violence. Brazil’s new democracy seemed illusory, a cruel ruse played on the socially and economically excluded majority. What I had not anticipated was the incipient transformative power of the Brazilian Constitution and its “bourgeois” Western vision of human rights and the new institutions that allowed it to flourish, including the official roles created to protect the rights of children. In Timbaúba, those elected to fill the roles of child rights counselors and human rights advocates were largely working-class intellectuals without higher education, material resources, or symbolic capital. Nonetheless, these rights workers effectively mobilized and used the constitution to interrupt the perverse circuit of corrupt power and hired guns to begin to rescue and protect what remained of the endangered population of street children and marginal young men of the shantytowns, the main targets of Abidoral’s “hygienic exterminations” project. For example, they took to the streets and gathered vulnerable children into a safe house that was run by the older children themselves, following the human-rights-orientated philosophy of empowerment espoused by the National Movement of Street Boys and Girls (MNMMR).

On my return to Timbaúba in the summer of 2001, accompanied by my husband (a social worker with many years experience working in the field of violence against children), I found the population of Timbaúba, as usual, quite mixed in its views. Many in the community had grown accustomed to the “protection” that the “Guardian Angels” seemed to provide to the working and middle classes and referred to its members not as terrorists and vigilantes, but more positively, as *justiceiros*, the representatives of popular justice. A taxicab driver said, “Look, these people are *like us*, they came from ‘the base.’ The police should not have arrested them. If there was no peace under the *justiceiros*, today there is even more street violence. Now the police have their hands tied by the new ‘woman-judge’ and the ‘little bandits’ [street kids] are once again free to roam the streets like vermin.”

But for those residing on the hillside shantytowns of Alto do Cruzeiro, Abidoral and his band of outlaws had turned them into shut-ins living under self-imposed curfews. Many recalled with horror a night in 1999 when six people were murdered on the Rua do Cruzeiro, the principal road of the hill. “During the revolution,” said Black Irene—using the local idiom describing what they saw as a war or revolution against the poor and socially marginal—“we all went underground. The streets were deserted; we kept our doors locked and our

wooden shutters closed tight. We would slide in and out our back doors to go to work or to the fields or to the market. You never knew when the exterminators might appear or why someone had been 'fingered.'" Irene knew well enough, having lost two sons and her husband during the earlier phase of death squad activities in Timbaúba.

Biu, my fifty-six-year-old comrade and key informant of many years, was among the last in Timbaúba to lose a family member or loved one to Abidoral's band. Emaciated from cancer, her face drawn and her skin stretched tight as a drum over her high cheek bones, Biu explained how her son, twenty-four, had met his untimely end walking home along the main road leading up to the top of Alto do Cruzeiro. It was just after Christmas in 2000 and Gilvan was returning from a party. Neighbors heard the shots and screams, but they were too frightened to leave their homes. The next morning it was left to Gilvan's older sister, Pelzinha, to discover what was left of his body, sprawled over a mound of uncollected garbage. A crowd of greasy-winged vultures had discovered Gilvan first, and Pelzinha could barely recognize her brother.

Well seasoned by a lifetime of traumatic events, including the suicide of her first husband, physical abuse and desertion by her second, and the deaths of several of her infants and toddlers, Biu was stoic, elliptical, and ambivalent about the murder of her son. She began with a disclaimer: "Gilvan was no angel. My family had turned against him, saying he was no good, a brawler, a drinker, and a thief who was always getting into trouble. In one fight he even lost an eye. But when they say to me that Gilvan really had to be killed, I feel dead inside. He was still my son! But I can't tell anyone, except you, how much I miss that boy. My own niece said, 'Be grateful, Tia, for the little bit of tranquility that Gilvan's death has brought into your life.' What does she understand?"

In addition to collecting testimonies from friends in the Alto who had resisted going to court with their stories, I went to work, as usual, in the *cartório civil* of Timbaúba, where I reviewed all the officially registered deaths from 1994 to 2000. These suspicious deaths represented, of course, only the tip of the iceberg, as most of the execution-deaths were not registered. Many of the death squad murders were disguised to appear like traffic or train accidents. Gildete and other local human rights workers reviewed my data from the death registry books, adding their own interpretations and recollections:

Yes, this man you have down here, Sergio Pedro da Silva, he sure was a crazy kid, suffering from mental problems. And he lived in the streets of Timbaúba, since the time he was a child. And, then, suddenly he showed up dead. The people around who saw what happened said that a sugarcane truck had passed by on the street and just then there was a lot of commotion and traffic with many other cars passing by. It looked to them like Sergio just threw himself underneath the truck loaded with its cargo of sugarcane. But we knew that the people were afraid to say that he was thrown under that truck. One of the key techniques of the death squads was just this, to conceal the nature of the execution. Because if they just shot them there would be too many witnesses. So, instead they

invented gruesome accidents—they threw them beneath trains, busses, and cars. Sometimes they pushed them into the traffic and sometimes they shot them and then threw them under train cars afterwards or under cars passing on the highway so they had an alibi—so that the police (who really knew what was going on) could say, well, that they died in an accident. But now, with your list, we can go back to the police and reopen this case. They will have to take notice.

Ultimately, my husband and I, working together as a team for the first time, were able to identify an additional thirty-one youth and young-male homicides which, “following the bodies” to their kin and *companheiros*, we could link to likely death squad operations. Only a fraction of these had been reported to the police, while the other violent deaths had been recorded (no questions asked), their death certificates signed, stamped with the official seal of the *município*, and shelved. At first, I pretended to be looking for infant and child mortalities according to my familiar role in the registry office. After a few weeks, however, I had to explain to the proprietor of the records exactly what I was looking for, and though she expressed no judgment or emotion, she began to facilitate the search in subtle ways.

The average victim in this small sample of likely death squad executions was a young black or mulatto (*moreno*) male, 15-30 years old, unemployed or only casually employed, and residing in one of the informal marginal communities built on the hillsides and peripheries of Timbaúba. In the early part of the 1990s most suspicious homicides were of older street kids and vagrants; toward the end of the decade the homicides were of young men (and some women) who had gotten tangled up in petty crimes, sexual and personal vendettas, and drug deals gone wrong, wayward in that they were not part of the death squads’ own circuit of drug trafficking. We gave our “probable death squad victims report” to the judge, prosecutor, and local Ministry of Public Security in Timbaúba to be used in continuing litigation against members of the death squads.

The Camanhada Contra Morte e Pela Paz: The March against Death

Our outsider status and ultimately very visible (transparent) and matter-of-fact involvement in the ongoing criminal investigations of the local death squads was seen by the human rights community as useful toward building a broader-based coalition. Our daily note-taking on violent deaths, our open conversations in public spaces, our visits to the homes of those who had lost family members to the squads, and my visits to graveyards began to reverse the normal regime that Dr. Humberto describes as “the law of silence, the law of ‘let it be’” (*a lei do silêncio, a lei do deixa pra lá, e a lei do esquecimento*), which people had followed during past decades. The time seemed ripe to break the mold and call for a public denunciation of the death squads. A small meeting was called by the local human rights activists with sympathetic town councilors and other political leaders, Catholic nuns, teachers, and trusted officials from the local Ministries of

Education, Justice, and Public Security to plan a public demonstration, a *caman-hada*, a march against death squad violence and the declaration of a time of peace.

This unique event was held on July 19, 2001, exactly one year after the arrest of Abidoral and several of his accomplices in Timbaúba. While most residents were still too fearful of, or complicit with, the death squads (many of whom were still at large) to join the march, the Secretary of Education declared the day a public school holiday, and she herself led the município's grade-school children and adult-school youths in the march. Although it was dark, rain-swept, and windy, hundreds of local residents came out to watch the events from the sidewalk, registering their amazement and occasionally their excitement that such an unheard-of event could possibly be happening in Timbaúba. Although we had some misgivings about it, the front lines of the march were reserved for the cadre of surviving street kids of Timbaúba, each dressed in white, carrying a wooden cross bearing the name of a young person, often a sibling or best friend, who had been executed by Abidoral's extermination group. Following behind them were a small number of women, the mothers and wives of men and boys who had been murdered, making public for the first time what had happened to them. Biu, Black Irene, Marlene, and Severina were among them, Black Irene shaking her head and laughing in disbelief that she could actually be so brave as to protest "in front of the world" the execution-murders of her husband and two young-adult sons. Biu was more reluctant and she hid herself in the middle of the "madres," refusing to carry the cross with the name of her son Gilvan. Several of us took turns carrying the sign for her to honor Gilvan.

In the midst of this demonstration of public will and resistance, and without any forewarning, two heavily armed police jeeps appeared at the front of the march as though cutting it off. Stifled cries of anxiety caused the march to split down the center, with the street children taking one street and the public school children, rights workers, and teachers taking another.

There was a moment of panic. Would the newly installed police force suddenly turn on those who were daring to protest and perhaps open fire? But instead the police were joining the march. Their contribution was to bring into the procession/march the shackled figure of Abidoral Queroz himself—to put the killer on view before the marchers and to force the leader of the death squad to view the spectacle of raised crosses bearing the names of the men and boys he and his gang had murdered on consignment. Later we learned that the judge, Dra. Borges, had arranged this spectacle as a dramatic display of the power of justice and as a sign that the local military and civil police were now representing the people, a term that would henceforth include street children and residents of the favelas and peripheral barrios of Timbaúba.

The march terminated in front of the City Hall (*prefeitura*), and spontaneous speeches were made by the new mayor and town councilors, who were presented with a large brass plaque memorializing the end of the most recent reign of death squad terror in Timbaúba. The town council met and agreed that the

plaque would be placed on the wall of a public square facing the *prefeitura* building. The little plaza was to be renamed the “Placa de Paz.” The plaque reads: “The Gratitude of the People for Those who Fought Against Violence and for Human Rights. Commemorating One Year of Peace in Timbaúba. July 19, 2001.”

For the first time—and I hope not the last—I returned from the field with a relatively happy ending to a sad story. Violent deaths have not stopped in Timbaúba, of course, but at least the courage of a small band of rights workers offers a sober lesson that our well-reasoned anthropological critiques of the limits and deficiencies of universal declarations (such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) should not obscure the real openings these new discourses and practices can create for thoughtful and committed citizens wanting to change the world in which they live.

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Notes

1. For example, her classic documentary *Four Families* was purportedly about French, Canadian, Japanese, and Indian families. In fact, the film is really a rather biting child’s-eye view of adult life, thanks to Mead’s heavy-handed narration, which gently explores the pummeling taken by toddlers and small children as they are fed, bathed, dressed, teased, corrected, and otherwise culturally shaped at the hands of their well-meaning but often clumsy adult caretakers.

2. Here I am referring to Derek Freeman’s attack on Mead as a reliable ethnographer of Samoa in his book *Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth* (1983), Harvard University Press, a controversy I reviewed in “The Margaret Mead Controversy: Culture, Biology, and Anthropological Inquiry,” *Human Organization*, 1984:43(1): 85-93.

3. Aihwa Ong, for example, states that “one is forced to recognize that Western modernist values (including full-fledged democracy) can have only limited applications to non-Western countries.” *Current Anthropology*, 1995, 36(3):429.

4. The moralizing rhetoric opposing child labor is a case in point. The United States will not buy carpets from Northern India unless each product is stamped with a smiling-face label guaranteeing that no child’s labor was exploited in its production. These sanctions fail to acknowledge the contradiction of local labor practices, including child labor, tied to the larger global economy, which demands “competitive” prices. The “booming” shoe industry of Brazil during the final decades of the twentieth century relied heavily (especially in Northern Brazil) on child labor. I found, for example, that the trajectory that led Brazilian children from interior towns to urban settings and to an addiction to glue sniffing was mediated by the shoe industry, which provided the transition through employment—and the glue.

5. Humberto da Silva Graça. Ministério Público do Estado de Pernambuco.

Procurador Geral de Justiça. Segunda Promotoria de Justiça de Timbaúba. "(In) Segurança Pública em Timbaúba." Timbaúba, 30 Março, 2000.

6. In addition to "Bodies, Death and Silences," chapter 6 of *Death without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil* (1993), University of California Press, see Martha Huggins, "From Bureaucratic Consolidation to Structural Devolution: Police Death Squads in Brazil," *Policing Society*, 1997, 7:207-234.

7. See Nancy Scheper-Hughes, 1990, "Theft of Life," *Transaction: Society* 27(6):57-62.

8. The Brazilian Constitution of 1987 institutionalized the role of the public child advocates (*conselhos tutelares*) in each of Brazil's municípios. These advocates, schooled in the new bill of rights, monitor the right of all children to food, shelter, education, and protection from abuse by parents, teachers, or police. Brazilian street children have organized around another, more difficult and provocative right—the right to live in the street free of police harassment.

9. The numbers vary in different official reports. In fact, it may never be known exactly how many were killed by Abidoral's death squad because families of the victims (see Biu's hesitant interview) are still too terrorized or too ashamed to speak. And when questioned directly they will deny that association for fear of the gang members who are still at large.

10. This group included a ragtag band of unlikely comrades—a retired pharmacist, a few former street kids, a German nun, an avowed Marxist intellectual, a few members of a liberation theology "base community."

11. See James Holston, "Spaces of Insurgent Citizenship," in L. Sandercock (ed.), *Making the Invisible Visible*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

12. During 1964–1966 I lived and worked as a neighborhood *visitadora*—a health "promoter"—in the largest shantytown, Alto do Cruzeiro, of Timbaúba. After a fruitless year of immunizing children who died of hunger, I joined forces with a local peasant union and co-founded a shantytown association, UPAC, the Union of the People of Alto do Cruzeiro, and worked with them in the long struggle for clean water, a living wage, and the right to occupy the land that they squatted. When I returned to Timbaúba as an anthropologist in 1982 for the first of many field trips there, the people of the Alto refused to cooperate with me unless I continued to be part of "*a luta*," the political struggle. I tell part of this story in "The Way of an Anthropologist-Companheira" in *Anthropology and the Peace Corps*, edited by Brian Schwimmer and D. Michael Warren, 1993, Iowa University Press.

13. "To do so, writers, artists, and especially researchers (who, by trade are already more inclined and more able than any other occupation to overcome national border) must breach the *sacred boundary*, inscribed in their minds, more or less deeply depending on their national tradition, between *scholarship* and *commitment*, in order to break out of the academic microcosm and to enter resolutely into sustained exchange with the outside world (that is especially with unions, grass-root organizations and issue-oriented activist groups) instead of being content with waging the "political" battles at once intimate and ultimate, and always a bit unreal, of the scholarship universe. Today's researchers must innovate an improbable but indispensable combination: *scholarship with commitment*, that is, a collective politics of intervention in the political field that follows, as much as possible, the rules that govern the scientific field." Pierre Bourdieu in his public lecture on "Scholarship with Commitment," presented at the University of Chicago, 2001.

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The Impact of Research on Communal Conflicts in Cameroon

Vivian Nain Kuma

Introduction

The period between 1990 and 2000 in Cameroon gave rise to a brutal florescence of various forms of conflict characterized at first glance by ethnically based intercommunity violence. The country, which had hitherto been considered one of the most stable in the region, nearly plunged into complete instability. Communities periodically and even regularly confronted each other with weapons, to the extent that deaths were sometimes recorded. These events were locally published in the press and sometimes made international headlines. All of these conflicts took place in the south of the country, in the Centre and East provinces.

The media posited that the conflicts arose from the difficulties of cohabitation among different ethnic/tribal/religious communities. As if by some consensus, communities had turned to ethnic conflicts and wars. The press even talked of the risks of “Rwandalisation,” declaring, “Rwanda is in each of us.” It is within this context that a team of researchers organized their work.

In a country with more than 250 ethnic groups that hitherto had been living in relative harmony, many questions were raised about the foundations of these problems. Could the issue of identity be at the base of this sudden upsurge in intercommunity violence? If so, why did it only break out recently? If the origin could not be traced back to a conflict of identity, what could have been the real nature and cause of this violence? What mechanisms could be set in motion to attempt to solve these conflicts? These are some of the questions authorities in Cameroon asked themselves. For these reasons, the Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research, in partnership with the Ecumenical Service for Peace and with the support of the “Safer Cities” program of the United Nations Development Programme, ordered a study to determine the reasons for this sudden surge of intercommunity violence. Thanks to the study and the use of its findings by government authorities, it has been possible to identify the causes of this upsurge of violence, to implement solutions that appear to be working and thereby considerably reduce tensions in the areas where the study was carried out.

Conflicts Studied and Their Apparent Causes

The Nyokon-Bamileke Conflict

The Nyokon-Bamileke conflict broke out in Makenene Sub-division between the Nyokon, who are from the Centre Province, and the Bamileke, who are from

the West province. The Nyokon in this area consider themselves to be “natives” and the Bamileke the “non-natives,” to use the terminology from the 1996 Constitution. Initially, the conflict seemed to be a matter of identity. The Nyokon felt that their position as natives was not recognized and respected in the area by the Bamileke, and that their political, economic, and social potential in Makenene (a prominent business area linking the West and Center provinces and where all travelers stop for refreshment) was threatened. The Nyokon argued that the Bamileke communities were illegally occupying their lands, infringing on their natural rights of ownership, and leaving them in a minority position on their own land, for the Bamileke are more numerous than the Nyokon. Consequently, mutual disrespect and hostilities broke out and the Nyokon rejected any form of contact with the Bamileke, with whom they had previously enjoyed a friendly and peaceful coexistence and even intermarried.

The Nyokon-Banen Conflict

Like that between the Nyokon and the Bamileke, the Nyokon-Banen conflict took place in the Centre province in the village of Nocona in NdiKinimeki. At first the conflict seemed to be one of identity and land ownership. The Banen felt that the Nyokon were “non-natives” occupying Banen land. Not only were the Nyokon occupying the land, but they were also selling some portions of it to the Bamileke.

The Nyokon, who are of Tikari origin, are known for their industrious and enterprising nature, which offends some Banen and other minority groups in the area. The Nyokon argued that these were their ancestral lands, ranging from the Noun and Makombe Valleys to the National Highway. The construction of this highway in 1926 displaced all of these peoples. Although these two communities had been living as good neighbors, they confronted each other openly in November 1998.

The Bitang-Assala Conflict

Also living in the Centre province within the Oumbanou Valley, the Bitang and Assala are close neighbors. A fertile savannah area, crossed by the Oumbanou River, is situated between the Bitang and Assala II villages. The conflict initially stemmed from a land dispute between these two communities. The most populous, the Assala, did not have enough farmland. They were ceded some land by the Bitang for cultivation. After some time, the Assala started encroaching on other lands not formally given to them by the Bitang. The Bitang, who had tolerated the expansionist tendencies for some time, came to feel they were being invaded by the Assala. To make matters worse, the Assala contended that their borders ran beyond the Oumbanou River, near the Nyam Nyoh village on the way to the Government Secondary School, far into the lands of the Bitang. This dispute degenerated into armed conflicts in May 1997, leading to the loss of lives, three from the Bitang and two from the Assala.

The Voute-Eton Conflict

The Voute-Eton conflict took place in the Mbam and Kim division in the Centre province. The causes of the conflict seemed to be problems of identity and land disputes.

The Voute posited that the Eton clandestinely occupied Voute land without authorization and that the Eton spread beyond the boundaries of the area lent to them by the Voute. In response, the Eton held that the lands they occupied belong to the state and that they thus did not have to answer to the Voute. In May 1998 the dispute culminated in confrontations that left one dead. In spite of the armed conflict, Eton migration to the area was still on the rise, thus further fuelling tensions and radicalization between these two peoples. The Voute were more interested in hunting than in farming, but they did not want the Eton, who are primarily agriculturalist, on their land. The Voute therefore asked the Eton to simply leave these lands. Each group rejected the other's claims.

The Bakoum-Bamileke Conflict

The Bakoum-Bamileke conflict took place in the East province of Cameroon. The disputes occurred between the Bakoum of Ngoumbeginou village and the Bamileke residing in Doume, with the support of other Bakoum from Si-Bita village. The initial causes of the conflict appeared to be land disputes and problems of identity. In the early 1970s, three Bamileke migrated to Si-Bita village and begged for a piece of farmland just for their food needs from chief Doko in Ngoa-ping. This chief gave them some land but prohibited them from any farming of cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, or fruit trees. Soon, the Bakoum from Ngoumbeginou noticed three things: the Bamileke farmers had increased, they had gone into cash-crop farming, and each year they presented gifts to notables of Si-Bita village without carrying out any lasting investments in Doume. From August 1997 to January 1998, the Bakoum from Ngoumbeginou invaded the Bamileke plantations, leading to fighting between the two communities. The village chief was seriously wounded during the confrontation between the communities and eventually died from his injuries.

Research Contributions to the Identification of the Causes of these Conflicts

Seven social science researchers (sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and an economist) under the leadership of Charly Gabriel Mbock, Director of the National Centre for Education (NCE), were selected to undertake this study. It was carried out from September 1999 to May 2000 and is published by the Ecumenical Service for Peace (Service Oecumenique Pour la Paix, *Les Conflict Ethniques au Cameroun: Quelle Sources, Quelles Solution*, Yaoundé 2000).

The researchers went into the field, talked with the parties involved in the conflicts, visited the disputed areas, and consulted pertinent documents. In spite of the fact that the sites visited varied from one another, the researchers concluded that the various conflicts had the same sources.

First, the researchers found that, in spite of appearances, these conflicts had nothing to do with the opposition of identities or identity-based claims to territory rooted in ancient history. These were superficial interpretations of observers who did not take enough time to study the facts. In some cases, like Nyokon-Banen and Bitang-Assala, the neighboring peoples had historically deep and stable relationships, and the communities had many common factors that united them.

In the other three cases, it was noted that both the Bamileke and Eton had migrated to other places in the country and lived there without any difficulties, even making many interethnic marriages. This long history of close proximity showed the inadequacy of the identity hypothesis.

Furthermore, in each case the researchers noted a recurrence of land disputes leading to the outbreak of violence. Though land squabbles occur no matter what, extensive land disputes had always existed in all the areas reviewed, and local chiefs had settled many disputes peacefully without any bloodshed between communities. Contrary to the popular belief that conflicts over land had originated from identity clashes, the researchers found in each of the above five cases legal and economic reasons for the conflicts that explain why the disputes arose at this point in time and suggested specific legal and economic solutions.

The conflicts were economic in nature because of an economic crisis that had been ravaging Cameroon since the 1980s and which had led to serious and unprecedented scarcity in various forms. It should be noted that except for the Nyokon-Bamileke conflict, the conflicts took place in rural areas and villages. This phase of economic crisis coincided with an urban exodus, with many people moving from towns and cities to rural villages. These people were either “retrenched” from public services or the private sector or were just unemployed citizens who found town life unbearable. They arrived with the same intention as those already residing in the villages: to farm the land, which had meanwhile become the only source of wealth and livelihood for the local people. The influx of people led to the scarcity of land for production. As land was rediscovered as wealth, old abandoned conflicts were rekindled, and many argued that those who were thought of as “non-natives” should be removed. When the conflicts were described as “native” vs. “non-native,” many were led to believe the conflicts were ethnically motivated. In reality, the economic crisis had triggered a strong rural migration, and this sharp rise in rural populations led to the conflict over the only available source of income, land. The quest for land led to open violence, which was mislabeled as “ethnic violence.”

The second real cause of the conflicts, according to the researchers, was legal. Some of the conflicts in the areas studied stemmed from legal vacuums. The public authorities in Cameroon had not rigorously regulated the land sector. Some parcels of state land had been exploited by some communities for such a long time that they came to believe the lands belonged to them. The Nyokon-Banen, Bitang-Assala, and Voute-Eton conflicts could only be explained in the light of

this misunderstanding. The researchers hold that this legal vacuum played a central role in the crises, and this finding suggested some recommendations to the state authorities.

The identification of the real causes of the conflicts cleared the way to some solutions. In the legal domain, the researchers recommended that the public authorities be actively involved in the resolutions of these conflicts by clearly defining each community's land. They needed to map out clearly the boundaries in such a way that people know which land belongs to the state, an individual, or a community. With such a clarification established, illegal occupation could be more readily and indisputably identified. The resolution of future land conflicts will be made easier because legitimacy of ownership will be easily determined.

An economic recommendation accompanied this legal prescription. The researchers observed that in this area of southern Cameroon, the state has large parcels of unused land and recommended that the state temporarily give these parcels to people willing to work on them. This kind of redistribution targeted mostly at migrants could help solve the problem of scarcity of land for cultivation.

Contrary to prevailing habits, the state immediately reacted to the results and recommendations of the study. The governor of the Centre province, where four of the five conflicts took place, instructed the Senior Divisional officers of the two Mbam divisions to take measures towards the implementation of the recommendations. Through surveying, it was discovered that some of the disputed areas did not really belong to any community at all. Plots were strictly mapped out, and the process of land redistribution has led to the return of peaceful coexistence. The impact of this study has been so positive that the Governor recently received the team of researchers to congratulate them. The former Minister of Scientific and Technical Research drew inspiration from the success of the study to ask the parliament to increase the budget of his ministry. He quotes the impact of this study to show the importance of research.

This study and the subsequent changes in land law have greatly contributed to current peace in the communities studied and in other parts of the country that were sites of land conflict.

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Scholarship, Advocacy, and the Gender Politics of Refuge

Erin K. Baines

Introduction

In 2001, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) commemorated the tenth anniversary of the UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women and Guidelines on Refugee Women to promote gender equality within the organization's mandate. To mark the occasion, a global dialogue was held in Geneva, Switzerland, bringing together 47 refugee women¹ to discuss accomplishments of the decade and identify areas that require greater attention. *The Dialogue with Refugee Women* represents a marked departure from the previous four decades in the organization, when refugee women were treated as dependent and vulnerable and seldom as individuals in their own right. It also represents a departure from a time when gender-specific violence experienced during flight and exile were considered personal tragedies but did not amount to persecution or a basis for extending asylum. While it is recognized that up to 80 percent of all refugees consist of women and their children, UNHCR had no specific policies in place that recognized gender-related differences in camps, including differences in risk of violence.

As a result of collective efforts of a diverse network of scholars and activists over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s, refugee women have realized important legal and material rights. Under the UNHCR Policy and Guidelines on Refugee Women, they are entitled to their own documentation, the right to participate in camp planning and management, and the right to claim asylum independent of their husband's claim. UNHCR now encourages states to consider gender-related violence as both a form of persecution and grounds for claiming asylum.

The Gender Politics of Refuge

The UNHCR was created in the post-World War II period to protect European refugees and find durable solutions to their situations. Originally, this work was concentrated on urging states to respect the 1951 Refugee Convention. Under the Convention, a refugee is "a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." Emphasis was on individuals fleeing political persecution, and so the general profile of a refugee at the time was that of a man. Most women

were still excluded from formal politics.

But by the late 1960s, the UN Refugee Agency's caseload changed dramatically, as refugees fled *en masse* Cold War proxy conflicts and independence movements sweeping the African continent. By the 1980s, once-generous asylum policies motivated by geo-political interests gave way to increasingly restrictive practices. Many refugees languished within oversized camps for years, dependent on assistance from organizations like the UN and its nongovernmental partners. It was in this period that UNHCR became more focused on providing material assistance to refugees, and its protection mandate fell more and more out of preeminence in a chilly Western climate. By the 1990s this trend was in full swing. UNHCR is now actively involved not only in responding to refugee crises but in seeking to prevent them from occurring in the first place, often by delivering assistance within zones of conflict and thereby hoping to deter displacement (Barnett 2002).

In a sense, refugee women became "visible" through the sheer magnitude of their presence in flight or in camps and the inability of UNHCR and other humanitarian actors to protect them. In Pakistan, special camps specifically for female-headed households had to be built to accommodate the growing number of women left without assistance under the male-head-of-household model.² This model distributes assistance to the male head of household and assumes a trickle-down effect, that women and children will automatically receive resources distributed by their husbands. However, as the case of Pakistan illustrated, large numbers of female-headed households in camps, because men were engaged in combat or had been killed, were left unassisted. Even if men were present in households, the model increased women's dependence on men. In either case, instances of sexual exploitation and violence were facilitated by the model.

Moreover, in the early 1980s, the vulnerability of refugee women during flight was only just being recognized by UNHCR and other actors, largely due to the tragic pirate attacks on Vietnamese boat refugees. The statistics were staggering. In a 1981 study of 452 boats overloaded with 15,479 refugees, UNHCR found that 349 boats had been attacked an average of three times each; 578 women and girls were confirmed to have been raped; 228 women had been abducted; and 881 people were missing or dead (UNHCR 2000, 87). Refugee workers added a more human face to these numbers, documenting the stories of refugees on the boats:

Among Vietnamese boat people there have also been massive instances of rape. The pirates who attacked the refugees in the boats...no longer killed them...but forced the boat people to take active part in the rape of their own girls and women or to look on, in this way they were made accomplices in their own humiliation. This led to a loss of self respect for the entire group, not only for the victims of rape (Dutch Refugee Association 1985, 31).

As the international media increasingly focused attention on the "Asian Holocaust," the sexual violence and rape of Vietnamese women during flight

began to occupy the humanitarian agendas of the UN, governments, and NGOs. In Europe at this time, more and more asylum applications were being filed by women fleeing sexual violence or oppression. A number of high-profile applicants were Iranian women who had fled the fundamentalist revolution in 1979 but whose claims to gender persecution were not recognized under national laws. In all of these cases, little was known about the extent of refugee women's need for protection or assistance. More disconcerting, lead agencies like UNHCR seemed unconvinced about the need to learn more. Many senior officials at the time were unconvinced either that "gender mattered" or that the "gender-neutral" 1951 Refugee Convention and assistance mechanisms failed to address refugee women's specific experiences and protection needs (Camus-Jacques 1989). A decade of critical research and activism would challenge these views and, eventually, lead to significant new gender-sensitive interventions.

The Transnational Campaign for Refugee Women

Feminist scholarship is diverse in approach and explanations but commonly shares the idea that women are an oppressed group globally and that this situation can and should be challenged and changed through scholarship and activism. It is therefore an engaged set of theories, and the roles of the theoretician and activist are more blurred in feminism than in other traditions. For this reason, the change in refugee laws and practices stems from the collective scholarship and activism of feminists.

Moreover, the cumulative knowledge collected and analyzed in this period stemmed from the strategic organization and activism of individual women and men linked together globally in networks. Activists and organizations had both a grass-roots presence in different countries around the world and a global one in international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), state-based foreign departments, and international organizations. Over the UN Decade for Women (1975–1985) and in the years following the 1985 Women's World Conference in Nairobi, these groups collected critical data and information and launched a transnational campaign on the issue of refugee women's protection and assistance needs.

The UN Decade for Women was a highly significant series of events for the advancement of knowledge on women's rights globally (Spencer-Nimmons 1994a). Declared after the first World Conference on Women in Mexico City (1975), the Decade would convene two more world conferences, drawing together interested state and non-state actors. Under the theme "Equality, Development and Peace," the World conferences were marred by some of the very same turbulent geo-political dynamics that shaped the refugee agenda (Winslow 1995), but these monumental events were both a catalyst and fuel to the emergence of a transnational advocacy network for refugee women.

Mindful of the plight of Vietnamese women, some donor states were in agreement with advocates that the issue needed further study. In December 1979,

the General Assembly called upon UNHCR to prepare a report for the mid-term Conference on the situation of refugee women the world over and to make recommendations for action (A/RES/34/161 1979). The UNHCR report was thin but raised substantive awareness of the challenges refugee women faced in exile, including sexual violence. The Copenhagen Declaration adopted at the mid-decade 1980 World Conference on Women included a number of symbolic statements, recognizing the specificity of refugee women's protection needs and urging UNHCR to take corrective steps to extend protection in these areas (Bonnerjea 1985, 15). These public statements were a rallying point for activists, who were inspired to collect more data on the issue.

Conferences and workshops were key forums for sharing what information was known. In 1983, the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) met to discuss particular vulnerabilities of refugee women. Rape, sexual violence, female genital cutting, forced abortion, and lack of access to services were brought into the public domain and debated. In 1984, a Women in Development (WID) Conference at Harvard University left room for a specific panel on refugee women. Here a number of advocates were brought together, ideas were exchanged and commitments made to work jointly to promote the issue more effectively on the global stage (Iris 1985, 33). In Europe, the Dutch Refugee Association brought together thirty-seven representatives from global refugee

Darfur, Sudan, 2004. Women and children flee their homes in response to attacks by government-supported militias, which were frequently preceded by aerial bombing by government forces. Massive killing and displacement of civilians were conducted as part of the Sudanese counterinsurgency campaign.



groups in a conference on refugee women and asylum. Attendees drew up a set of recommendations for the integration of gender into national asylum laws, recognizing that gender-related violence was a form of persecution (Meijer 1988).

Many women attending conferences at this time were part of larger, influential NGOs³ and took information back to their organizations, raising awareness within them and placing refugee women on the agenda (Spencer-Nimmons 1994a). Unlike the decade in which the 1951 Refugee Convention was drawn up, feminist-minded women and men now occupied positions of decision-making in key organizations and government bodies. Advocates also drew upon connections with government insiders, producing a similar agenda-setting effect in some key government departments. This insider connection would prove a powerful lobbying strategy for advocates, where donor states later voiced their concerns to UNHCR in the Executive Committee (ExCom).⁴

At the Nairobi Conference, UNHCR delegates presented a more comprehensive, 16-page report of the organization's activities on behalf of refugee women, touching on protection issues and areas of assistance such as education, health, employment, and basic needs (A/CONF.116/11 1985). The document repeatedly located refugee women in the household sphere, and their protection or assistance needs were assumed to be related to their position within the family. For instance, refugee women's protection concerns were explained in large part by the "dissolution of the family unit," wherein traditional protection mechanisms (men in the family, community) no longer existed. The report, however, emphasized that international refugee law was gender neutral and therefore not itself a source of protection problems for women. Still, it was recognized that the cultural position of women may vitiate "the effects of international refugee instruments" (5).

In reference to material assistance, the UNHCR report again located refugee women within the family, recognizing that she was a "key member...and as such, responsible for preparing food, fetching the water and firewood or fuel, watching over the health of the children and transmitting knowledge to them" (7). As refuge increased this work, UNHCR projects were designed to enhance her ability to carry out traditional gender roles, such as daycare or the provision of milling machines. Training programs such as promoting the "well-being of the family," "family life," or "home economics and food preparation" were also programs UNHCR offered refugee women in camps (12). The "most destitute women" — female heads of household, or women missing men—were recognized as in need of particular assistance strategies (10).

The UNHCR report identified humanitarian practices as gender neutral and therefore not a source of discrimination. Rather, women's dependence on men and their culturally assigned roles were implied to be the root causes of their subordination and lack of access to resources. In short, the report reveals that UNHCR knowledge on the subject was focused largely on women, their cultural position, and their vulnerability perpetuated by traditional gender roles and dependence on men. The main policy focus was to provide projects to alleviate

their domestic work and provide counseling to victims.

While scholars would later challenge the assumptions reflected in this UNHCR report, it did move the global agenda forward. The Nairobi plan of action, *Forward Looking Strategies*, mentions refugee women in at least seven different paragraphs and lumped them into “the most vulnerable groups” in paragraph 41. For scholars and advocates working on behalf of refugee women, the Nairobi Conference was also a turning point (Osaki 1997; Indra 1999, 10). Nairobi “facilitated the exchange of ideas by individual women, including refugee women, and those who represented NGOs at the global level, thus crossing micro- to macro- social levels for innovation and action” (Spencer-Nimmons 1994a, 20). At a parallel NGO forum in Nairobi, hundreds of grass-roots refugee women’s organizations voiced their concerns to other women from all over the world. Over 40 workshops on refugee women were held at the NGO forum, which was attended by several thousand people. An NGO Sub-Committee on Refugee and Migrant Women had been organized prior to the forum to produce a report on the situation of refugee women and put forth recommendations. The Sub-Committee made an impressive effort to bring refugee women from other regions of the world to speak at the forum. The organization Refugee Women in Development (Ref/WID) presented videotapes of testimonials from refugee women in Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Like UNHCR, non-state advocates for refugee women tended to frame the issue in relation to the cultural role of women, although advocates went further to draw a linkage between socio-cultural forms of persecution in the “private sphere” and state complicity, or the responsibility to protect. As H. Bonnerjea described in the first manuscript to be published on the topic, *Shaming the World*:

Death as a punishment for the loss of virginity is accepted in silence, as is the murder of young mothers and their unborn children...there is not risk for the killer. Everyone is proud of them, when family honor is saved by the killing of the victim.... Everywhere it is a punishment of women, and it is defined as a private matter, and excluded from public policy. And women fleeing from their country on grounds of sex related persecution have not been recognized as refugees in law (1984, 19).

Drawing a nexus between private-sphere forms of persecution and the state was essential to revealing the gender biases of international refugee law. Despite the fact that most of the world’s refugees were women and children, most of the world’s resettled refugees were men. Moreover, the 1951 Convention did not recognize gender-related forms of harm or persecution, and sex was not grounds for claiming asylum. That the international women’s rights movement had begun to make important inroads into the claim that “human rights were women’s rights,” moreover, bolstered the theoretical claims of refugee women advocates (Friedman 1995).

Feminist legal scholars (Bunch 1995) and activists argued that the historical separation of public and private has marginalized, indeed excluded, women’s rights

in international law. Similar arguments were put forth by legal advocates for refugee women (Indra 1987). For example, of the absence of sex as grounds for claiming asylum in the Refugee Convention, Indra wrote:

It is remarkable that sex and gender oppression are not even mentioned, where-as oppression arising from parallel forms of invidious status distinction such as race or religious conviction are central. Thus an individual risking death at the hands of the majority group institutions for maintaining a minority religion...fits the definition, whereas a woman...facing death by the same institutions for stepping out of her 'appropriate role' or for deviating from misogynous sexual mores does not (1987, 3).

Suggested corrective measures included adding gender or sex into existing legal instruments and procedures, or at very least, recognizing women as a "particular social group" under the existing Convention grounds (Meijer 1988). This question would lead to a plethora of legal research and debates on the value of adding gender as a new category within the 1951 Refugee Convention, as opposed to integrating gender under the existing ground, "particular social group" (Valji 2001).

In 1984, after controversial decisions regarding gender-related persecution claims in Europe, the European Parliament passed a precedent-setting resolution, recognizing that women are sometimes persecuted for breaking *the social or cultural norms* assigned to their gender. The resolution focused on cultural transgression and opened the door to linking the private and public, recognizing gender-specific forms of harm (such as rape) and the insufficiency of the 1951 Refugee Convention grounds. In 1985, the Executive Committee of the UNHCR followed suit. The conclusion of *Refugee Women and International Protection* encouraged states to adopt resolutions similar to that of the European Parliament. The Note also suggested that UNHCR and host governments design programs to safeguard refugee women's rights and promote equality of treatment. The emphasis, then, was integrating women into existing international refugee laws.

During the post-Nairobi period, the emerging networks of advocates for refugee women were consolidated and strengthened by the formation of the International Working Group on Refugee Women (IWGRW or Working Group)⁵ and a global campaign emerged with greater force. The IWGRW proved to be a dense network of relationships amongst NGOs assisting refugees globally. Collectively, they produced new information on the needs and resources of refugee women. One of the first action plans of the IWGRW, for instance, was the distribution of a letter to major NGOs working in refugee areas, inviting them to join the working group. The letter also requested the attendance of NGO representatives at a formal meeting to be held that fall (1985). The idea behind these invitations was that "collective thinking and strategizing of NGOs concerned about this question is likely to be more productive and effective than isolated" (Camus-Jacques in Spencer-Nimmons 1994a, 249).

The first meeting of the IWGRW was attended by around 40 women and

some men from major NGOs around the world. The meeting resulted in a formal “statement on refugee women” which was then circulated to and endorsed by 77 organizations and individuals, mainly based in Geneva and the United States. Later, the statement was incorporated into the International Committee for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) statement to the UNHCR Executive Committee in its annual meeting. By this point, international NGOs had been given observer status within ExCom and were active in lobbying ExCom members during Pre-Com meetings arranged to facilitate NGO interaction the week prior to each annual meeting.

Over 100 NGOs formally joined the IWGRW. In late 1986, the working group decided to focus on three areas of activity: information sharing, advocacy, and monitoring UNHCR activities on refugee women. In a comprehensive survey of its members’ activities relating to refugee women, IWGRW was able to compile an impressive database (Brenna 1990). This database provided concrete evidence to support the assertion that assistance and protection activities often had negative effects on women and girls when their specific experiences, needs, and resources were not taken into account. This evidence was then widely distributed amongst the network and used to lobby states and the UNHCR. Advocates had reason to be concerned about the degree to which the UNHCR took the issue of refugee women seriously. Beth Ferris, member of the IWGRW, explains:

[When I returned from Nairobi], I was impressed with all the commitments and wonderful papers UNHCR prepared about refugee women. A couple of months later, I ran into a colleague working in UNHCR’s Protection Division and said something like ‘well, we can’t wait to see how you implement all of those policies on refugee women.’ He replied ‘Oh, Nairobi’s over. Now, it’s back to business as usual.’ (Ferris 1998)

In the absence of a UNHCR policy on refugee women and dedicated resources, the IWGRW feared that UNHCR commitments to the Nairobi Declaration, *Forward Looking Strategies*, would not be moved from rhetoric to reality.

To push the organization on its commitments, the IWGRW convened the first international consultation on refugee women in 1988, bringing together 150 representatives from refugee groups, NGOs, and international organizations as well as 50 refugee women. Five major themes were discussed: protection, health, education, employment, and cultural adjustment. Recommendations were put forth in a document entitled *Working with Refugee Women: A Practical Guide* and widely distributed to relevant organizations (UNHCR 1989). This was one of the first comprehensive sets of guidelines offering practical advice to refugee workers and outlining the causes and consequences of gender-related violence. The recommendations had a distinctly liberal overtone, emphasizing equality of access and opportunity (Kelley 1989, 238).

Refugee advocates, such as Susan Forbes Martin of the Refugee Policy Group, also began to appeal to liberal economic sensibilities of humanitarian

workers increasingly working to promote return. In a study of economic self-reliance projects among refugee women in Sudan, Pakistan, and Costa Rica, she and Emily Copeland found that they “not only reduce costs associated with care and maintenance, but also prepare refugees for a possible return to their country or for possible resettlement elsewhere” (Kelley 1989, 5).

References to refugee women as agents and not only victims were gradually making their way into global discussions and documents by the late 1980s. The international community had by now accepted that new approaches to development were needed in order to move beyond the malaise of former approaches. One principle that was becoming rapidly accepted was that excluding women had negative implications for development (Reanda 1999, 55). The Women in Development (WID) approach received considerable attention within Western donor states and was rapidly becoming a central part of new development strategies. The WID approach highlighted the potential contributions and role of women in the broad goals of economic development, proposing a gender-equality approach (Kardam 1991). WID advocates thus strategically appealed to existing goals of international development organizations, drawing a relationship between women’s work and economic growth. It was argued that projects could be made more efficient if women were included in their planning and implementation (Rathgeber 1995).

Advocates for refugee women, many of whom had worked within the WID approach, articulated a similar platform. They argued that assistance to refugees in short- and long-term camps was economized when the needs and capabilities of refugee women were recognized (Kelley 1989; Forbes Martin 1992). Advocates began to point out the disastrous effects of leaving women out of assistance planning. For example, Susan Forbes Martin’s research on camp distribution mechanisms illustrated that

male leaders may have little understanding of the needs and circumstances of those who cook the food or feed their families, that is, the women. As a result, the food distribution procedures and contents may be inappropriate. Food that is inconsistent with the refugees’ and displaced persons’ dietary traditions may be provided. Or, food offered may require preparation that cannot readily be accomplished in a camp setting. These problems are further compounded by cultural practices among some refugee and displaced populations that require that men be fed first. Where supplies are limited, women and children may not receive adequate food (Forbes Martin 1992, 35).

Refugee women’s participation was framed as an important step to improving assistance and eventually to the promotion of self-sustaining camps. UNHCR began to pick up on this point, a compelling one given the economic crises facing the organization in long-term care and maintenance programs. In 1988, the Executive Committee referred to refugee women as an important economic force and urged the promotion of their “participation as agents as well as beneficiaries in the planning of protection and assistance programmes.” ExCom

Conclusion No. 54 also urged the integration of women into the program and planning cycle, foreshadowing the move towards mainstreaming in the 1990s.⁶ Refugee women more and more appealed to the economic sensibilities of an organization seeking to maximize its efficiency in the face of a crisis in donor funding.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of key reports and texts on refugee women helped to consolidate the findings of the previous decade. In 1987, ECOSOC requested and received a comprehensive study on women. The Division for the Advancement of Women and the Committee on the Status of Women were by now following up on the commitments made in the FLS, holding actors accountable. The UNHCR Executive Committee adopted a conclusion entitled *Refugee Women and International Protection* (No. 39) requesting that a senior level Steering Committee be convened to coordinate and oversee the assessment and revision of UNHCR policies and programs in support of refugee women. The Steering Committee was convened in 1988, and by 1989, UNHCR agreed to establish the office of the Senior Coordinator for Refugee Women to “co-ordinate, integrate and oversee the process [of mainstreaming refugee women] throughout the UNHCR” (ExCom 1988).

The Senior Coordinator undertook a number of global awareness-raising initiatives to stimulate donor support, including the release of a special issue on refugee women in *Refugees*, UNHCR’s monthly publication. Around the same time, Susan Forbes Martin published the first comprehensive text on the issue, *Refugee Women*. Originally this text was published in collaboration with the UN NGO Liaison Services and, after wide distribution within UNHCR, it was released to the general public. UNHCR publicists began to incorporate refugee women in public-information campaigns, referring to their particular needs and resources and using images of refugee women in posters.

Finally, the tragic events in Bosnia-Herzegovina contributed to public awareness of the plight of refugee women. Media coverage of rape camps and ethnically motivated rapes horrified Western audiences and reinvigorated the peace agenda within transnational women’s rights movements and also that of “femocrats” within government and UN agencies. Feminist scholars emphasized the political nature of rape, redefining it from the personal to the public (Stiglmeier 1994; Alien 1996; Hansen 2001). These actions helped transform international law, where rape was recognized as a war crime. The events in Bosnia were only too tragically repeated in Rwanda, where an estimated 250,000–500,000 women were raped during the 1994 genocide. The international community could no longer deny or ignore the strategic links between rape and military campaigns, nor could organizations such as UNHCR deny that rape was indeed a protection issue.

Assessing the Impacts

Perhaps the most obvious impact of the research and activism within the transnational campaign has been process-oriented policy and program change. With the creation of the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Refugee Women, an impressive number of strategies have been pursued, including the release of not only a Policy on Refugee Women (UNHCR 1990) but operational Guidelines (UNHCR 1991; UNHCR 1995), a pioneering training program, the creation of a global network of gender focal points, documentation of Good Practices (Office of the Senior Coordinator for Refugee Women and Gender Equality 2000), and multi-million-dollar women's empowerment initiatives in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and beyond.

Regional Gender Advisors have helped galvanize gender mainstreaming processes in country offices. In Turkey, gender teams have involved different sectors in the process together, with the positive result of making all activities more gender sensitive. In Latin America, the Regional Advisor worked closely with women's groups, NGOs, governments, and other UN officials to sensitize the refugee-status determination process. The Division for International Protection has lobbied states to adopt the Women at Risk program, designed to "fast track" women in particularly violent situations in camps through the inland asylum procedure and to safety. Moreover, significant progress has been made in domestic asylum laws, where gender-related violence is now recognized as both a potential form of persecution (a harm specific to women, such as forced abortion or sterilization) and a grounds for claiming asylum (for example, persecution because one is a woman, or holds feminist beliefs contrary to the norms in her country).⁷

On the one hand, one can argue with certainty that refugee women have realized greater leverage within the global refugee regime, illustrated not only in these policy and procedural changes but also in the energetic and impressive leadership women demonstrated at the *Dialogue with Refugee Women*. The *Dialogue* was precedent setting—never before had refugee women been invited to meet with senior officials. The sophisticated analysis and solutions proposed by participants illustrated how far we have come in terms of our knowledge and awareness of the issues. In marked contrast to assumptions held in the 1980s about women's vulnerability or the gender neutrality of UNHCR practices, it was widely agreed at the *Dialogue* that refugee women were agents of change, capable of and willing to act on their own behalf.

On the other, lack of progress is revealed in the seeming elusiveness of gender-related change within UN and NGO institutions and individuals. It is not uncommon today to hear a UNHCR manager or officer openly comment on the uselessness of a gender approach. The *Dialogue* itself was at times a stark contrast of perspectives, highlighting a gap between promise and practice. Senior managers sat at the front of a large and impressive conference room reciting various policies, guidelines, and initiatives they had taken to protect refugee women over the past decade. Across from them sat refugee women, who one by one recalled

stories of rape, sexual exploitation, and lack of documentation, employment, and access to services and assistance in UNHCR-run camps and areas of return. In a ten-year review of the organization's Policy and Guidelines on Refugee Women, mixed results were articulated. The review found that implementation was "uneven and incomplete, occurring on an ad hoc basis" and, as a result, "positive actions tend to be sporadic, and they are often insufficient to provide refugee women with equitable protection" (WCRWC 2002, 2). More research is needed to explain these gaps and inconsistencies in program results.

Future Research and Advocacy Directions

While policy and process-oriented changes are good indicators that transnational campaigns were successful, they ultimately tell us little about the actual impact of these changes. Are the lives of refugee women more secure? How have the initiatives undertaken by the Senior Coordinator for Refugee Women and other advocates for women in refugee organizations changed the attitudes and behavior of staff in UNHCR or its implementing partners? What happens when global gender policies are implemented within the range of diverse contexts of displacement? What difference have Guidelines on Gender Persecution made for refugee women, particularly given the current policy of containment, which severely limits refugee mobility? Refugee scholars, feminists, and advocates need to do vastly more research on the challenges of implementation and obstacles to substantive change.

To identify new research agendas, we might also simply listen to the voices of refugee women. The *Dialogue* outlines an extensive research agenda as well as platform for action (Office of the Senior Coordinator for Refugee Women and Gender Equality 2001). For instance, delegates argued that refugee women are among the first to suffer from rollbacks in donor funding. Education was referred to across the board as a critical area for intervention in improving refugee lives, yet last year this important program was cut in UNHCR's Africa Bureau. How will budget cuts differentially affect men and women? To date, no analysis has been done from a gender perspective to guide the streamlining of UNHCR operations.

Delegates also highlighted the importance of supporting refugee women's organizations and networks. More research is needed to critically investigate the potential contributions women's organizations make in exile and return, identifying the challenges faced, risks encountered, and contributions made to peace and security. Another area identified in the *Dialogue* was the lack of program response for domestic violence within camps. While sexual violence is now more or less accepted as a protection issue under UNHCR's mandate (Benedetti 2002), there remains a great deal of ambivalence on the issue of domestic violence and how specifically to address the issue. Refugee women delegates clearly identified domestic violence as a central protection concern facing them in camps, collective centers, and places of return (Office of the Senior Coordinator for Refugee

Women and Gender Equality 2001, 19). In interviews with UN staff in the summer of 2002, I learned that the once-productive relationships between transnational advocates and UN officials are now more antagonistic. Many UN staff members feel that reports from Human Rights Watch or the WCRWC are highly critical without offering much by way of practical solutions or even substantive feedback on what the organization might be doing right. New methodological tools may be needed to systematically analyze the implementation of UNHCR Policy and Guidelines and point to new areas of intervention.

Finally, while the global refugee regime has come a long way in the past two decades towards protecting refugee women, it is essential that more research be conducted on the impact of the changing nature of the global refugee regime itself on refugee women and men. Any attempt to promote gender-related change in the global refugee regime must engage the pressures and transformations the UN body has undergone in the past decade. Too often, advocates for refugee women are simply concerned with adding “women” to existing policies, laws, and organizations dealing with refugees without examining the nature of, or constraints upon, the refugee regime itself. Research must begin to move beyond a construction of refugee women as vulnerable to recognizing the vulnerability of the refugee regime. As the *Dialogue* report suggests, refugee women may be the future to rescuing UNHCR from some of the financial, legal, and ethical dilemmas it faces in the present.

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Notes

1. The term “refugee women” will be used throughout this essay to refer to women in various settings of displacement, including internally displaced, stateless, urban or rural, resettled, and returnees.

2. This was a standard practice of UNHCR and related NGOs until the late 1990s and in some areas continues to be the standard practice today.

3. Such as the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), with a presence in hundreds of countries.

4. For example, a number of prominent states-persons from donor countries took part in a UNHCR Roundtable on Refugee Women held in preparation for the end-of-decade World Conference on Women (1985) in Nairobi. In attendance was the former American Secretary of State, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who bitinglly reminded UNHCR that “in gathering statistical data and in planning programs and implementing programs, UNHCR must treat women as persons, and not persons for whom any other person, namely any man, can speak or act in the camps” (quoted in Iris 1985).

5. The IWGRW was formed by participants of the Nairobi workshops on refugee women at a meeting of the NGO Sub-Committee on the Status of Women.

6. Western governments donating to UNHCR, especially the US, Canada, and the

Nordic countries, began to advocate within the ExCom for a specific organizational policy position on refugee women. This important lobby voice was the result of increasingly successful domestic lobbies that targeted bilateral development agencies, national foreign offices, and population bureaus.

7. The United States, Canada, Australia, Panama, Guatemala, South Africa, and several Western European countries are some of the states which now use Guidelines on Gender-Based Persecution for making their rulings on asylum cases. UNHCR's Division for International Protection has only recently come out with a firm policy position on the issue. However, the Division has been an active participant and contributor to the debate, as have feminist legal scholars.

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The Role of Research in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Ivan Zverzhanovski

Introduction: Origins and Establishment of the ICTY

From the early stages of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the international community was under pressure from numerous NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and public opinion to act on what was seen as the worst atrocities committed in Europe since the Second World War. The UN Security Council, monitoring the situation, and after numerous reports from NGOs and media as well as UN agencies in the field, decided to investigate the claims of grave breaches of humanitarian law in the conflict. In July of 1992, the Security Council declared that the persons responsible for commission or ordering of crimes would be held individually responsible. In May of 1993 the Security Council adopted Resolution 827, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter and establishing the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (ICTY). This was the first case of international judicial intervention and the first instance of an international tribunal set up to prosecute individuals since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the Second World War.

The ICTY represents a landmark in international law, as it clearly establishes the individual as subject to international law and confirms that grave violations of international humanitarian law represent a threat to the security of the international community. The official reasons for the establishment of an international tribunal were fourfold: to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, to render justice to the victims, to deter further crimes, and to contribute to the restoration of peace by promoting reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. This was a result of the acceptance by most UN member states that peace and justice are complementary.

The establishment of the ICTY has been a major contribution to international peace and security (IPS) on a number of levels. Locally, the ICTY continues to contribute to the establishment of a lasting peace between the peoples of southeastern Europe through a process of catharsis. Globally, the relative success of the ICTY has been a significant spur to the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunal for Rwanda and, more important, has sped up the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Its effect is attributable to crucial research by

Professor James Gow of King's College London, whose work led to his serving as Expert Advisor and Expert Witness for the Office of the Prosecutor. Gow's research on the various aspects of the war—military, political, diplomatic, and international—enabled the Prosecutor to establish the ICTY's jurisdiction. Without establishing jurisdiction, there could have been no cases to answer legally at the Tribunal. Had there been no cases, the ICTY, initially wanting in political support anyway, would most likely have foundered. Instead, it has developed as a mainstay of international efforts to restore, maintain, and build peace in the former Yugoslav lands, and it has proved to be a catalyst to other major developments in the fields of international humanitarian law and IPS. The later success of the ICTY owes a considerable debt to Gow's research and its introduction in evidence to establish subject matter jurisdiction at the ICTY.

Explaining the ICTY: Peace, Justice, and International Judicial Intervention

Since the establishment of the ICTY, there has been a division between those who believed that the Tribunal would be an impediment to peace in the Balkans and those who believed it to be a necessary ingredient. For many, it was clear that “the pursuit of justice for yesterday's victims should not be pursued in such a manner that it makes today's living the dead of tomorrow.”¹ It was widely held that indicting the likes of Karadzic and Mladic would damage prospects for a negotiated peace in Bosnia.

As A. J. Colson articulated in *The Logic of Peace* (2000), the key to a balanced solution is the concept of catharsis, “a process that discharges emotions thus decreasing tension, clarifying thoughts and enabling the subject to reach a harmonious state.”² Although the proof of any international tribunal will be the number of people it has successfully tried, the focus should be on the impact of the process of seeking justice through telling the stories—testifying—and indicting alleged war criminals (thus removing them from the political arena) rather than on the quantitative results.

The ICTY was created by a mandate from the UN Security Council. The Security Council draws its powers from the UN Charter. Articles 24 and 25 define the functions and powers of the Security Council, whereas Articles 39–51 define the actions the Security Council can take with regard to threats to IPS. Hence the Security Council has the power to define such threats (see Article 39). It is the sole organ that can legally do so. Its measures are binding on all states. As the Security Council determined that the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia were a threat to IPS, it had not only the legal right but also the responsibility and the obligation to act.

During the Cold War, it was assumed that only interstate armed conflict presented a threat to IPS. However, the end of the Cold War opened the way for a wider definition of such threats. The statement from the Summit of the Security Council Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 defined what constituted a threat to IPS. UN Document S/23500 states that “the absence of war

and military conflict among States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.”

This statement served to codify the Security Council’s actions under Chapter VII, as it became obvious that it intended to take action more often than was the case during the Cold War. In the event, the Security Council had already moved away from the Cold War restraint on the use of Chapter VII during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis in 1990-91, when Chapter VII was invoked more times than during the whole of the Cold War.

The statement also indicated that the era in which the Security Council considered internal matters of states to be exclusively their own domain was over. It became clear that internal matters had a wider impact and thus could constitute threats to peace and security in the larger world. This statement ushered in the era in which the Security Council acted under Chapter VII in the internal conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and later Rwanda, as well as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola, declaring these and the humanitarian catastrophes they provoked as threats to IPS. It even went as far as to declare the lack of democracy in Haiti as a threat to IPS and it imposed sanctions on Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan for harboring terrorists.

Establishing Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Contribution of Research on the Yugoslav War

In order for the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to indict someone, they need to establish jurisdiction. That is to say that the Office of the Prosecutor has to convince the judge presiding that a crime committed was within the Jurisdiction of the ICTY.

The Statute establishing the ICTY states that the ICTY has the power to prosecute “persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991” (Article 1). It may only prosecute crimes defined by Articles 2 through 5. These are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article 2), violations of laws or customs of war (Article 3), genocide (Article 4), and crimes against humanity (Article 5).

Establishing subject matter jurisdiction for each of the four counts mentioned requires certain conditions to be met. For Articles 2, 3, and 5, the Prosecutor has to demonstrate the existence of an armed conflict under the specific terms of the instruments of international law on which the Articles were based, requiring at least two organized armed forces for there to be any discussion of invoking the relevant law. As Article 2 (and, initially it was thought, also Article 3) can only apply to international armed conflict, the Prosecutor has to prove that the conflict in question was of international character. Applying Article 5 requires the Prosecutor to show that there was a widespread or systematic commission of the alleged crimes. Finally, for genocide (Article 4), the Prosecutor needs to prove intent in order to secure a conviction. Genocide is a

particular case, as jurisdiction and elements of crime come together: in order to prove the jurisdiction, the Prosecutor has to establish that the crime happened and that there was intent aimed at a particular ethnic, racial, religious, or other group.

Establishing jurisdiction at the ICTY is a complicated matter. The issue of international character raises the question of the dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia. This is particularly problematic for crimes committed between June 1991 and April 1992, when it was not entirely clear whether SFRY still existed, and it is even more problematic for periods thereafter, where the status of some of the combatants and their links to political authority were a matter of contention. Most notable was the issue of whether the actions of the Bosnian Serb Army were to be taken as actions of belligerents in an internal war or as agents of Serbia in an international armed conflict. While the latter position was often asserted by many commentators, those assertions lacked supporting evidence that would satisfy the judges' beyond-reasonable-doubt test in a criminal trial. There have been conflicting points of view (some issues, such as the date of internationality regarding the conflict in Croatia, remain to be settled), but it is clear that in terms of international law and politics, until June 1991 there was only one independent international personality, the SFRY, but by April 1992, there were five states, each with independent international personality. As there was no clear date, it was up to the Prosecutor to convince the Trial Chamber that at the moment of the commission of the crime, the conflict was international and not internal in character and therefore that the alleged victims were protected persons covered by the relevant law. Then, having established internationality, the Prosecutor would have to establish that the alleged crimes were committed by participants in the international armed conflict and not merely parallel to it. This meant, for example, that even if an international situation were to be established, and even if an international armed conflict were established (and international situation and international armed conflict are not to be treated as the same in terms of the law), it would also have to be shown that a murder was committed as part of the international armed conflict, not simply where an international armed conflict was occurring, if the judges were to have jurisdiction to try the alleged crimes. This was an issue that emerged explicitly during the first trial.

Internationality was initially also thought to be a major aspect of jurisdiction with regard to Article 3, dealing with the laws and customs of war. However, while the Prosecutor initially gave considerable attention to the question of internationality in this context, the Appeals Chamber opened the doors for a wide interpretation of "violations of laws or customs of war" and dropped any requirement for the conflict to be international, while indicating that it would adopt a very strong and conservative interpretation of internationality regarding Article 2 and the application of the Geneva Conventions. This is quite probably because the latter are the most strongly established instruments of international law governing armed conflict, established by treaty and broadly signed and ratified by

states. In contrast, Article 3 deals with matters based in customary international law, that is, based on various treaties, precedents, statements of judicial opinion, and normative political declarations. The general interpretive character of this part of the law made it more susceptible of customary adaptation and interpretation by the judges than would be the case regarding the “grave breaches” provisions of Article 2: fewer legal and political sensibilities would be affected. However, jurisdiction for Article 3 still required the establishment of the existence of an armed conflict.

The next challenge is to prove “widespread or systematic”: there needs to be a plan or a certain scale and coherence. This raises the question of how to prove systematic as well as how to determine what magnitude matters. In order to do that the Prosecutor has to piece together multiple occurrences across a large geographical area as well as evidence of strategic coherence. Patterns of attack as well as evidence of preparation (detention centers, processing centers, political institutions) have to be considered.

Establishing the Patterns: The Yugoslav War and James Gow’s Work

James Gow’s work on the Yugoslav war comprises a large number of articles as well as the book *Triumph of the Lack of Will*.³ However, the research most relevant to this essay is captured in his book *The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes*.⁴ This book captures more than a decade of Gow’s research and demonstrates its importance for the work of the ICTY. His ideas have helped shape the work of the Office of the Prosecutor, which enabled it to argue successfully the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

Having begun with the study of the Yugoslav military in the early 1980s, Gow was exceptionally well placed at the beginning of the conflict.⁵ From reading of Yugoslav military publications and other research, he compiled references that demonstrate in evidentiary terms both planning and internationality. He also analyzed coherent patterns of behavior and was aware of the rare cases in which there was publicly available evidence to support the analysis drawn from other sources. As will be shown below, this proved invaluable to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in the early days of the ICTY, as Western governments were not forthcoming with intelligence and other evidence.

Making use of work available only in Serbo-Croatian (such as the book by Veljko Kadijevic, the last Minister of Defence of the SFRY, and a book by Borisav Jovic, the Serbian member of the collective Presidency and an accomplice of Slobodan Milosevic), interviews (conducted with participants of both local and foreign origin), the work on the “Death of Yugoslavia” project, where Gow was a consultant, and analysis of documents acquired by the OTP, Gow pieced together the small and rare bits of evidence that could establish the grounds for ICTY jurisdiction. These included internationality (JNA and VJ presence, HV presence in BiH, role of Serbian Security Service, the SDB, the Jovic-Milosevic decision on 5 December 1991 to split the JNA into VJ/VRS in order to disguise Belgrade

involvement and so international responsibility); widespread or systematic (the SDS document on plans for Crisis Headquarters, with option A for Serb majority areas and Option B for non-Serb majority areas within the plan); identifying the pattern of political preparation and implementation (associations of “Serbian” municipalities in Croatia and BiH, the autonomous regions, then RSK and RS); military-strategic analysis of initial attacks creating a frame around BiH at key communication and access points into and out of it and identifying the network of camps.

Gow identified the “Serbian Project” as an ambitious strike for power led by Milosevic and not only aimed at mobilizing ethnic Serb support and taking control of territory but also having more extensive aspirations. Gow was able to identify the continuity of the project from the rise of Slobodan Milosevic to his fall, distinguishing the concept from different plans to achieve it.

Gow’s work was instrumental in helping distinguish between the military strategy behind the Serbian project, with its rational relating of means and ends, and the widely held perception of the conflict as “simply a chaotic maelstrom of uncivilized ‘Balkan’ peoples exorcising their ghosts in orgies of primordial blood-letting.” His analysis identifies war crimes as the core of Serbian strategy in the Yugoslav war.

Assessing the Importance of Gow’s Research: From Subject Matter Jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court

Gow’s work was instrumental in the early success of the Tribunal, which in turn contributed immensely to ending the war in the former Yugoslavia. His role was to provide not background information but rather the substantive material that could be used by the Prosecutor to argue for jurisdiction. The importance of jurisdiction is worth restating: without jurisdiction there would have been no trials, and without trials there would have been no Tribunal. Without the Tribunal, the outcome of the war in Bosnia would have probably been different and that over Kosovo would most certainly have been different. It is obvious that without the factual material from Gow’s research included as evidence presented in court, it is highly improbable that the Prosecutor would have been able to argue the case for jurisdiction to prosecute the charges successfully, even in the less demanding context of obtaining a public indictment, and certainly not faced with the need to establish a case beyond reasonable doubt at trial.

The importance of the evidence given by Gow can be seen in both the Appeal Chamber’s judgment in the Tadic case (Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic IT-94-1-A) and the judgment in the Celebici case (Prosecutor v. Delali Celebici IT-96-21-T). In both, Gow’s testimony is mentioned by the judges as instrumental for the establishment of subject matter jurisdiction for Article 2 and Article 3 crimes.

The Trial Chamber dismissed a number of counts from the indictment on the basis that the OTP had not done enough to prove jurisdiction. The Appeal Chamber judges, however, relied on the evidence provided by Gow to conclude

that “a distinguishing feature of the VJ [Yugoslav Army] and VRS [Bosnian Serb Army] was that they possessed shared military objectives...these forces were of the same mind.” Further on they noted that “a clear intention existed to mask the commanding role of the FRY; a point which was amply demonstrated by the Prosecution,” here making reference to Gow. This seemed enough for the judges to reverse the decision by the Trial Chamber, with the opinion that the evidence introduced by the Prosecution through the expert testimony of James Gow was sufficient to show that Belgrade controlled Bosnian Serb forces, thus making the conflict an international rather than internal one, and extending the jurisdiction of the ICTY. In addition, the Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber’s judgment was based on the acceptance at face value of the devices put in place by Belgrade to conceal its link with the VRS. These had clearly been exposed by Gow’s research. A second example of his role can be found in the Celebici case, where evidence based on his research went a long way toward proving that the



A Bosnian Muslim who lost most of her family in the war in Bosnia, and Slobodan Milosevic, former president of Serbia, on trial at The Hague for war crimes.

conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was an international one.

Gow’s work gave the OTP the much-needed factual evidence to establish the internationality of the armed conflict and to successfully argue that the victims were protected persons under the Geneva Conventions. His meticulous research helped identify the patterns which made the Serbian approach widespread and systematic, a well-defined strategy as opposed to just chaotic violence. His knowledge and investigative precision were key in identifying the link between Belgrade and the Serb forces in Bosnia and Croatia and hence arguing for the internationality of the conflict as opposed to the civil war argument used by many critics and the defense in the early cases. In short, Gow’s research was the cornerstone of the

early success, which allowed the OTP to continue its work and the ICTY to grow stronger.

The initial success of the Tribunal can be seen in the number of indictments the OTP has been able to get confirmed. Having established jurisdiction, it was possible to argue the case with the judges for most of the indictments. The activity that resulted convinced the international community of the importance of prosecuting individuals held responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Hence cooperation with the ICTY was imbedded in the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war in Bosnia. The result was twofold. Firstly, it enabled the process of catharsis to take place by providing the environment and opportunity for victims to tell their story and face those who perpetrated the crimes. Secondly, by indicting the highest officials for their responsibility in the war, the ICTY created the chance to remove those individuals from public life, thereby enabling more moderate politicians and soldiers to take their place and start a process of healing. Thereby, the ICTY's contribution has greatly facilitated the reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The ICTY has built upon this success, and, aided by more cooperative Western governments, it has been increasingly successful in its role. However, its most important success was still to come. In May 1999, the ICTY indicted Slobodan Milosevic for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. It is now clear how important this indictment was in forcing Milosevic to accept NATO demands and end the Kosovo campaign. It was instrumental in ending the last phase of his project. The Serbian project was exposed and finally ended; peace in the former Yugoslavia was again tied to the ICTY. Milosevic's appearance in the Trial Chamber symbolically ended "The Project."

The ICTY has become the key element in the maintenance of peace in the former Yugoslavia. It has gone a long way in initiating a process of reconciliation by forcing a national rethinking of the past in most of the Yugoslav successor states as well as providing a forum for the victims to relieve their pain by getting their stories told. It has been instrumental in disqualifying the most important figures of the war from political life, decreasing their influence and potential to hinder progress towards reconciliation.

The impact of the ICTY, however, goes further than combating organized violence in the form of the Yugoslav war. The ICTY has made an important contribution to international law, international politics, and, in consequence, to international peace and security. The evidence to support this statement can be seen in the rapid work towards a draft Statute of the International Criminal Court, especially after 1998, and its surprisingly rapid ratification by the number of states required for the ICC to become a reality.

The evidence provided by the research of James Gow can be said to have contributed significantly to real and notable change in international society and has in an important way aided the combating of organized violence, in this case

war defined by a strategy of war crimes. The contribution of the ICTY to international peace and security in general and to the peace in the former Yugoslavia in particular has been much aided by academic research. The research has served a wider purpose. The success of the ICTY has helped in the creation of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, reinforced the concept of international judicial intervention, and paved the way for the newly formed ICC, all great achievements in combating organized violence.

Ivan Zverzhanovski is completing the Ph.D. in War Studies at the Department of War Studies, King's College London.

Notes

1. Anonymous, 1996, "Human Rights in Peace Negotiations." *Human Rights Quarterly* 18:249-58.
2. Aurelien J. Colson, 2000, "The Logic of Peace and the Logic of Justice." *International Relations* 15:51-62.
3. James Gow, 1997, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
4. James, Gow, 2003, *The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes*. London: Hurst & Co.
5. See James Gow, 1991, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis*. London: Pinter Publishers.

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STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION, DECEMBER 31, 2004

ASSETS

Cash	\$	159,802
Investments		56,165,620
Other Assets		196,533
Interest in a Charitable Remainder Trust		<u>23,847,079</u>
TOTAL ASSETS	\$	<u><u>80,369,084</u></u>

NET ASSETS

Unrestricted	\$	56,522,005
Temporarily Restricted		<u>23,847,079</u>
TOTAL NET ASSETS	\$	<u><u>80,369,084</u></u>