YEAR 2000 REPORT OF THE HARRY FRANK GUGGENHEIM FOUNDATION

RESEARCH FOR UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING VIOLENCE, AGGRESSION, AND DOMINANCE
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COVER: The warrior Sindhu Ragini. 1680.
## CONTENTS

- **FOREWORD** 1
- **PRESIDENT’S STATEMENT** 5
- **COMMON SENSE ABOUT VIOLENCE: WHY RESEARCH?** 9
- **GRANTS AND DISSERTATION AWARDS** 22
- **PROGRAM ACTIVITIES** 26
- **HOW TO APPLY** 35
- **RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS** 42
- **DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND STAFF** 48
- **FINANCIAL DATA** 55
OF UTMOST SIGNIFICANCE since our last report was the sale in 1998 of Daniel Island, which our founder and benefactor, Harry Frank Guggenheim, left to the foundation at his death in 1971. Located between the Cooper and Wando Rivers, which flow into the Charleston harbor, the 4,500-acre island is within the city limits and is to be developed by the buyer in tasteful fashion.

Proceeds from the sale have strengthened our financial status and resulted in a more predictable source of funding for our grant program. We now expect to be capable of providing a minimum one-in-ten success ratio for applications, maintaining high standards yet giving promising proposals an appropriate opportunity.

It is noteworthy that Jim Hester, our president, has now provided the foundation with extraordinary leadership for ten years. During his administration the focus of our programming has sharpened, staff morale and performance have been unexcelled, and the stature of our endeavor, due to his high expectations, is recognized in the field.

Our board has been strengthened immeasurably in recent years by the addition of Dana Draper, Howard Graves, Donald Hood, Lewis Lapham, Gillian Lindt, and Tania McCleery.

Joan Van de Maele, Bill Baker, Donald Griffin, and William Westmoreland, I am delighted to report, have assumed the status of Lifetime Director, a position we reserve to honor directors retired from active service to the board.

Sadly, I must report the deaths of George Fountaine, Harry Guggenheim’s indispensable administrative assistant and foundation executive director for 26 years, and Floyd Rafliff, who served with great distinction as our president from 1983 to 1989. We are profoundly grateful for their dedicated and unstinting service to the foundation.

Peter Lawson-Johnston
Chairman of the Board
From the seemingly trivial scuffling of young boys to the gravely consequential use of high-technology weapons, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation considers all forms of aggression and violence to be within its purview.

Images transmitted by “smart bomb” approaching target during 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation makes grants to support research projects, primarily in the sciences and social sciences, that promise to increase understanding of violence, aggression, and dominance and the problems these cause in the modern world. Our mission was defined by the founder, Harry Frank Guggenheim. Towards the end of his life and long career as a philanthropist supporting projects in aviation and rocketry, medicine, architecture, and the arts, Mr. Guggenheim initiated discussions with friends and professional consultants about an appropriate and meaningful legacy, and when he died in 1971, leaving a substantial bequest to the foundation, grant-making had begun and a mission was in place that continues to guide our work.

Mr. Guggenheim decided early on that his foundation would encourage scholarship rather than support direct responses to social problems, noting that creative research in other fields had dramatically changed the way we live, such as advances in medicine, agriculture, transportation, and industry. Professor Paul Fitts, an early advisor, wrote to him, "The successes that man has achieved in other scientific areas offer hope...that he can look forward to comparable successes in social and behavioral science." (Had this exchange happened today we are sure these gentlemen would have acknowledged the contribution of women to these labors of men, and we understand a spirit of inclusiveness in their deliberations that their language may not appear to match.)

Likewise, our specific interests and research priorities have varied over the years as particular scholarly directions have appeared to be more fruitful than others and as particular problems relating to violence have engaged our attention and the world’s; but our grant-making continues to respond to Mr. Guggenheim’s challenge: "Undoubtedly the improvement of man’s relation to man will require much original thought and many years of research. I believe that is a job which deserves support.” Professor Fitts advised him that such a program requires coordinated, sustained support for research efforts, and "continuing interaction, intellectual criticism, cross-disciplinary stimulation and exchange of ideas between empirical scientists, theorists, and informed laymen." This report describes how we have pursued these goals in the period 1996-1999.

We still rely on our grantees and other scholars working in the areas in which we fund for advice in determining future directions. Some of
them replied to a question we posed to them in 1998: "Where is the greatest weakness in the scholarly community's understanding of violence and aggression?" One respondent argued against a premature press for practical policy remedies at the expense of understanding the diversity of types, origins, and meanings of violence and the long-term accumulation of knowledge. Another suggested that priority is often given to the search for causes of violence at the neglect of its contexts, and another urged a better integration of individual aspects of violence with the social contexts in which it appears. A focus on illegal acts by individuals, another claimed, prevents scholars from seeing symbolic and structural violence in everyday life and acknowledging types of violence that are socially permitted.

Similar concerns were repeated in response to our question, "What is the most serious omission in undergraduate education regarding violence and aggression?" Students, they said, learn about contemporary acts of violence in their own countries but are ignorant of history and other cultures. They are taught to think of violence as deviance, not part of "the normative fabric of social life," as one respondent put it. Several scholars urged that students be encouraged to consider the "violence within themselves," meaning behaviors they may take for granted as well as violence they have experienced, and one suggested that privileged college students might have a "blind spot" when it comes to a true understanding of violence in the lives of people less privileged. Another respondent suggested clarifying the distinction between aggression as a biologically grounded behavior and violence as a social construction while teaching about both domains. This would distinguish, for example, between angry retaliation and imprisonment as a social system. Many people referred to a failure of integration of knowledge across disciplines. These responses were helpful as we pursued one of our special projects, the development of an introductory curriculum for violence studies (see p. XX for more about that), and have also provided food for our ongoing thoughts about where original thinking is to be discovered and how we should conceive of priorities to guide our grant-making decisions.

The foundation encourages the study of urgent problems of violence and aggression in the modern world by anthropologists, criminologists, psychologists, and sociologists but also supports related research projects in neuroscience, genetics, animal behavior, and history that illuminate modern human problems. Grants have been given to study aspects of violence related to youth, family relationships, crime, biology, group conflict, political violence in war and terrorism, as well as peace and the control of
Problems related to violence and aggression are prominent among issues mentioned by policymakers and the public as the most important challenges to civil life today. Less agreement pertains when discussion turns to "solutions" to these problems. Harry Guggenheim was convinced that effective policy actions must rest on a firmer body of knowledge about the problems involved, and that new, original ideas about interventions will only come from an informed, objective consideration of violence and aggression as they affect human relationships and organizations. Our grants give scholars the support they need to experiment with ideas, collect data, or study historical records first-hand, and to think about what they learn. We expect that a sustained program of support over many years will yield understandings on which wise public policy and private decision-making can be based.

The foundation is fortunate in the quality of its two program officers. Our senior program officer, Karen Colvard, has served the foundation since 1978 and has become extremely well informed on issues in violence research and scholars who study them. She is frequently consulted on matters of public policy. She is largely responsible for the contents of this report. She is ably assisted by program officer Joel Wallman, who joined us in 1991, and who is also highly knowledgeable about research on violence. His contribution to this report includes the provocative essay, "Common Sense about Violence." It is a great pleasure for me to work with two such able scholars in the fulfilment of the foundation's mission.

James M. Hester
President
Common Sense about Violence: Why Research?

Joel Wallman

One of the fringe benefits of working at the HFG is that people one meets from outside of the “violence world” find it interesting to learn of a foundation dedicated exclusively to research on violence and aggression and often are mildly envious of what sounds like—and is—a fascinating job. Some, however, are less curious about the work of the foundation than they are surprised at the notion that human violence really warrants scholarly research. The nature of the problem, its forms and frequencies, are self-evident to them, and its causes and cures, I have been told, are, if not equally apparent, then at least readily ascertainable through common sense. You don’t have to be a social scientist, in other words, to know where violence comes from and what should be done about it.

Let me concede at the outset of this essay that common sense is a marvelous thing. It allows us to muddle through life with a measure of understanding and to get through most days without committing errors so grave that we can’t easily recover. There is even something to be said for our common-sense explanations of human affairs, from face-to-face interactions to international relations. Here, for example, are some observations about the scope of violence, its origins, and its amelioration with which, I think, most Americans endowed with a modicum of intelligence and fairly attuned to current events would agree:

Despite the downturn in violent crime over the past few years, serious violence has been increasing in recent decades and is becoming more random in nature—the average person, and not just residents of our beleaguered inner cities, now has a realistic basis for concern about becoming the victim of a violent crime. The recent school shootings in rural and suburban areas by children as young as eleven are dramatic examples of the spread of violence—to our schools, by very young perpetrators, and with that most dangerous of firearms, the assault weapon.

We are not helpless, of course. If we are to make sure that the current drop in violence is more than a temporary lull, we need to
increase our crime-control efforts, and at both ends of the policy spectrum—prevention as well as punishment.

By way of prevention, we should see to it that young people are equipped with the social skills and psychological traits that reduce the likelihood of their engaging in violence. This means that violence-prevention curricula, now present in many schools, should be instituted in every school in the country. In addition, teachers and parents should endeavor to raise the self-esteem of our children to counter the sense of personal inadequacy that so commonly underlies acts of violence. Communities with disproportionate rates of violence are communities in which residents have come to condone, or at least tolerate, antisocial behavior rather than condemning it. Some sort of moral rejuvenation is called for in such neighborhoods. We know as well that fatherless families, the scourge of our inner cities, are major contributors to juvenile delinquency and thus adult criminality—a child from such a family is much more likely to get into trouble than his neighbor who lives with both parents. Encouraging dual parenting in such communities would yield substantial benefit to society at large through reduced criminality in the long term.

At the same time, young citizens must learn that committing a serious crime risks a serious punishment rather than a slap on the wrist. If people are going to be deterred from continued offending, their experience with the penal system should be, to put it plainly, unpleasant. And, to increase the probability that one who commits a crime will be processed by the criminal-justice system, we should raise the likelihood of his capture by putting more police on the street. This would reduce the time between a call to police and the arrival of officers. In addition, officers should not be hesitant to make arrests for minor law-breaking, so-called quality-of-life offenses.

Of course, violence doesn’t occur only on the street. Marital violence, for example, is a significant problem, too long regarded as the business of only those within a household. If we are serious about putting an end to the physical abuse of women by their partners, we can start by implementing a mandatory arrest policy for police responding to domestic-violence calls. A man who is subjected to the social opprobrium of arrest is less likely to repeat the offense than one who is merely spoken to by responding officers.
We can also reduce the incidence of violence against women by providing more shelters for those seeking refuge from an abusive mate.

There is also no dearth of violence in the world beyond U.S. borders. Relations between nations are still fraught with danger. We can take some comfort, however, in the global trend away from authoritarian regimes towards democracy, since democratic states are far less likely to go to war. Group relations within states, like international relations, abound with potential violence, and here there is less reason for optimism. Bloodshed between tribal or religious or ethnic groups—Hutu and Tutsi, Jews and Arabs, Hindus and Muslims, Serbs and Croats—is so prevalent that it is difficult to refute the dismal observation that as long as ethnically or religiously distinct groups are within a stone’s throw of each other, ancient hatreds will assert themselves in the bloodiest way. Difference, it seems, is deadly.

Common sense can be relied upon to produce these and any number of other reasonable interpretations of social problems and remedies for them. There is, though, a drawback to relying exclusively on common sense and, when public policy is informed by it, even a danger: common-sense observations can be wrong, and policies based on them wrongheaded. Consider, as I do for the remainder of this essay, those offered above, nearly every one of which is incorrect or misleading.

serious violence has been increasing in recent decades... After a sharp upturn around 1965, the U.S. homicide rate has oscillated with no consistent trend for the past 25 years, although one hopes that the downturn of the last few years will prove to be more than a brief respite.¹ Robbery has followed the same trendless trajectory.²

more random in nature... Violence has not become more random if by this assertion is meant an increasingly even distribution of risk across race, age, geography, and gender. While the overall U.S. homicide rate is and has been for some time among the highest in the world, there are still enormous differences structured by these categories. The rate of violence in U.S. suburbs is far less than that in our central cities: a recent analysis of the distribution of violence within San Diego found census tracts with 1 recorded violent crime per 1,000 population but also ones with as many as 300.³ The racial gap in risk remains shockingly wide: in 1997, the most recent year for which national data are available, a black male aged 18-24 was 10 times as likely as his white counterpart to become a victim of homi-
cide. If gender and age differences are added in, the risk disparities become truly astonishing: that same black male was fully 70 times as likely to be fatally victimized than a white female of 25 or older.

the spread of violence—

to our schools… Despite several widely publicized school shootings in the past two years, research does not indicate a growth in serious school violence. The percentage of 12th graders who have been injured at school has not changed in 20 years. Fatal assaults in schools remain a rare event—fewer than 1 percent of each year’s violent deaths (homicides and suicides) of school-aged children occur inside a school, on school property, or en route to or from school. In addition to the youth of the perpetrators (see below), these school shootings were atypical in that they occurred in rural or suburban settings, whereas school violence, fatal or not, occurs far more often in urban contexts (constituting yet another of the impediments to learning that beset both students and teachers in our inner cities).

by very young perpetrators… While the rate of homicide offending did increase markedly among young people of 14 to 25 during the crack-related violence spike of 1985 to 1992, offending by young children—those under 14—has not varied from a negligible 2 per million for at least 25 years.

with that most dangerous of firearms, the assault weapon… So-
called assault weapons—military-style semiautomatic weapons with large-capacity magazines—are frequent topics of media coverage and legislative interest because of their great potential lethality and the affection they are accorded by drug traffickers. However, their role in homicide is quite minor compared to that of far more common but less imposing handguns. The best estimate of the contribution of assault weapons comes from requests by police for federal traces of guns used in crimes. In the year prior to the 1994 implementation of a federal ban on these weapons, only about 6 percent of such traces involved assault weapons, and, because of certain influences on which gun crimes police request traces for, this is likely to be an overestimate of the fraction of crime guns that are assault weapons.9

the average person…now has a realistic basis for concern about becoming the victim of a violent crime… It is not possible to objectively answer the question of whether an average citizen is “realistic” in worrying about becoming a victim of violent crime. On the one hand, any probability is too high, and U.S. rates are very high compared to most other countries, both developed and undeveloped. On the other hand, for the average citizen (i.e., putting aside the large risk differences by age, ethnicity, etc.), the risk of injury, illness, and death from other, less newsworthy causes is much greater. Even in 1990, when the average risk of homicide was a good 25 percent greater than it is in 1999, the likelihood of dying from an accident, stroke, cancer, or heart disease was about 3.5, 6, 20, and 30 times greater, respectively, than death by homicide.10

violence-prevention curricula should be instituted in every school in the country… It is hard to quarrel with the suggestion that children should be endowed with an aversion to violence and the ability to defuse dangerous confrontations. What is open to question is the assumption that violence-prevention training in its several versions achieves this goal. For despite the adoption of such curricula in thousands of schools, from elementary to high, there is precious little documentation that they work. Evaluations of their efficacy are few and, as one recent comprehensive review put it, of “uniformly poor” scientific quality.11 An evaluation by its own developers of what is perhaps the most successful such curriculum, with total sales of more than 4,000 by 1990, offered what a National Research Council panel called only “weak support” for its violence-reduction claims.12

A legitimate response to these cavils might be, “Even if rigorous evaluations have yet to show the value of these programs, what harm can come
from trying violence-prevention programs based on reasonable assumptions about what causes and what cures violence?” The short answer is “plenty.” There is a remarkably long list of interventions intended to ameliorate problems of drug use, delinquency, and violence that, subjected to social-scientific scrutiny, proved to have made things worse. There are anti-gang social-work efforts that increased delinquency by inadvertently enhancing the coherence of the gangs. There are peer-counseling programs, in which wayward students engage in group discussions intended to move them toward prosocial attitudes and behavior. An evaluation of one such program found that high-school students receiving such treatment become more delinquent than equally deviant students who didn’t. And there are afterschool programs designed to provide adult supervision for low-income elementary-school children that, according to one evaluation, increased risk taking and impulsiveness in participants.

The point of this litany is not that all such interventions are criminogenic; I have not mentioned research indicating promise in certain programs, such as Big Brothers and Sisters or home visitation, which have shown some benefit in reducing child abuse and/or delinquency. I wish simply to caution against the assumption that good intentions and common sense alone insure a positive outcome in the area of violence prevention.
teachers and parents should endeavor to raise the self-esteem of our children… There is even bad news about self-esteem, at least where violence is concerned. Evidence from experimental psychology suggests that people whose sense of self-esteem exceeds their abilities will respond with more hostility to social experiences that highlight their shortcomings. Presumably, such people are confronted with the gap between self-image and reality more often than others and thus come to experience such reminders as less tolerable than do those with a more realistic level of self-esteem. The moral here is that the widely endorsed policy among parents and teachers of enhancing children’s self-esteem by praising them for virtually anything that isn’t flagrantly objectionable should be replaced by an emphasis on helping children to achieve things worthy of praise.

Communities with disproportionate rates of violence are communities in which residents have come to condone, or at least tolerate, antisocial behavior… It seems reasonable to infer that residents of high-crime communities are more tolerant of the attitudes that facilitate deviant behavior, but the facts are quite otherwise, according to a survey of residents of a diverse array of Chicago neighborhoods. It seems that blacks and Hispanics, whose neighborhoods have higher crime rates than predominantly “white” ones, are substantially less accepting than whites of delinquent behavior among teenagers, including drug use, alcohol consumption, and fist fighting.

Fatherless families…are major contributors to juvenile delinquency and thus adult criminality… The true significance of fatherless families is also somewhat at variance with what common sense would predict. Growing up without a father figure in one’s house is actually not a very reliable predictor of juvenile delinquency or, especially, of adult criminality. Some studies show no difference between children of father-present and father-absent homes. (If we can infer something about rates of fatherless households from the percentage of women who are single parents.)
who are not married when they give birth, then, were fatherlessness the
font of criminality commonly asserted, we might expect France, the u.k.,
and Sweden, with higher unmarried birth ratios than the u.s.,\textsuperscript{21} to have
violent crime levels considerably higher than just a small fraction of our
own.)

The fatherless family is not irrelevant to crime, however, and its effects
are not benign. These effects, though, show up at the level of \textit{neighbor-
hoods} rather than individual families. It turns out that an area’s rate of
juvenile crime is highly correlated with the prevalence of single-parent
households, and the relationship seems to be a causal one rather than mere-
ly one of correlation.\textsuperscript{22} Delinquency is a peer-group phenomenon.
 Neighborhoods with a scarcity of adult males cannot exert the informal
social control that in more fortunate communities keeps teenage boys from
going into trouble. Watching other people’s property, informing other
parents of their children’s activities, intervening in misbehavior—these and
other customary forms of “communal parenting” are scarce in neighbor-
hoods with high rates of family disruption. One result is increased juve-
nile delinquency, including violence, even if the children from the female-
headed households are no more likely than others to be the miscreants.
The high concentration of single-parent families in certain u.s. communi-
ties contrasts with their more even distribution in the European nations
mentioned above. Moreover, virtually all of the difference in violent crime
between mainly black and mainly white communities disappears when
differences in rates of family disruption are taken into account.\textsuperscript{23}
Concentrated family disruption and the consequent low levels of informal
social control also explain how high rates of crime can occur in a commu-
nity despite general condemnation of antisocial behavior by its residents—
social-structural constraints impede the realization of widely held values.

\textbf{Encouraging dual parenting} is a commendable policy. By itself, though,
it is not likely to make a significant dent in the problem of family disrup-
tion in the inner city, which derives from the disappearance of jobs in these
areas\textsuperscript{24} and their literal emasculation by the massive imprisonment of
young black men that is central to the “war on drugs.”\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{their experience with the penal system should be…unpleasant…} A
shift in emphasis has occurred in the American criminal-justice system in
recent years. The ideal of rehabilitation has been more or less replaced by
the goal of retribution. This can be seen especially clearly in the case of
youthful offenders, where a number of “get-tough” initiatives have diminished the
difference between how juveniles and how adults are treated.\textsuperscript{26}
While it is not easy to find justice practices that have appreciable success in rehabilitating wayward youth, it is no challenge to identify which ones don’t work. Programs based on the assumption that a highly aversive experience will reduce offending—“boot camp,” “Scared Straight,” and “shock” parole and probation (incarceration followed by community supervision)—are ineffective at best and criminogenic at worst. Nor does the increasingly common practice of “waiving” youths to criminal rather than juvenile court promise to do much more than reassure us that our legislators are getting tough on violent youths (and exacerbate the extreme overcrowding of our prisons). A study comparing juveniles transferred to criminal court with a matched set of cases kept in the juvenile system found that those treated in adult court reoffended more often and more seriously.

Putting more police on the street…would reduce the time between a call to police and the arrival of officers… The assertion that arrests will increase if we decrease police response time—the interval between dispatching of police and their arrival at the crime scene—makes sense. It just happens not to be true. Most serious crimes are discovered by the victim well after the perpetrator has departed. Even in crimes in which the victim is present, the call to police typically comes well after the crime has been completed. Police response time could not, therefore, have more than a very modest effect on the average probability of immediate arrest, and certainly not a great enough effect to offset the cost of expanding a police force enough to significantly decrease response time.

Officers should not be hesitant to make arrests for minor, so-called quality-of-life offenses… Aggressive policing of minor offenses, such as loitering and subway-fare evasion, has been credited by some, especially the police themselves, as instrumental in New York City’s decline in serious crime, which has exceeded the substantial national drop. There is reason to be concerned, however, that any present benefit of this practice may come at the future cost of an increase in crime by those arrested now. There is some evidence that the experience of being arrested increases the likelihood of reoffending. This effect is probably due in some measure to
reduced job prospects from having a police record as well as, in the case of arrest for a minor offense, diminished legitimacy of the legal system in the eyes of the arrestee. And, conversely, there is evidence that police courtesy and efforts to convey the legitimacy of their actions have crime-reduction benefits.31

a mandatory arrest policy for police responding to domestic-violence calls... Arresting a man in response to a domestic-violence call does reduce his rate of reoffending—unless it has no effect or increases his abuse. It appears that whether arrest acts as a deterrent to further abuse depends upon what the social costs of arrest are for the assailant. Is he married, does he have children, how many friends does he have, what would the neighbors think, and, especially, is he employed? The key question, in other words, is what does he have to lose from the stigma that being arrested as a wife-beater incurs. The variable that seems to matter most is work—arrest decreases recidivism with employed men but either has no effect or increases it among the unemployed.32

providing more shelters for those seeking refuge from an abusive mate... Not even battered-women’s shelters offer an unambiguous remedy, although sound studies of their protective effects are few. One found that women who moved to a shelter and took further steps to help themselves were less likely to be abused again after their stay than women who didn’t enter a shelter. However, the women who entered the shelter but didn’t take additional steps to improve their situation suffered a slightly higher rate of subsequent abuse.33

Lest it be concluded that measures to reduce violence against women are ineffective or worse, consider a recent study of the factors underlying the two-decade decline in domestic-partner homicide.34 Decreasing rates of co-habitation, improvement in women’s economic status, and increased availability of domestic-violence services—specifically, hotlines and legal advocacy for women—were each found to have contributed. The surprising news, somewhat jarring to common sense, is that men are the main beneficiaries of these factors—most of the 33-percent decline in domestic-partner killings consists of a reduction in the killing of husbands by wives. In 1976, there was sexual equality in this domain of dubious achievement. Today, the victims are more often women, although their victimization rate has declined too. (It is also interesting to note that national surveys of Americans’ experience of domestic conflict indicate that women physically assault their partners as often as men do.35 It would be erroneous to infer from this, however, that men and women are equally victimized by
such non-lethal domestic violence. A substantial proportion of women's assaults are in the service of self-defense or retaliation for a partner's persistent abuse and, in any case, women are far more likely to be injured from assaults by their partner than are men.  

Democratic states are far less likely to go to war... This should be true, but it isn't. While a decade of research by political scientists has demonstrated that democracies do not fight each other, the same work shows that democratic states are no less likely to go to war than other regime types are. Moreover, an analysis of interstate military conflicts over the last two centuries reveals that democratization itself tends to promote military conflict: nations undergoing regime change toward democracy are more likely to become involved in war than are stable regimes, whether democratic or not. So, while a world of democracies may well entail an end to war, the road from here to there may not be smooth.

Ancient hatreds will assert themselves in the bloodiest way. Difference, it seems, is deadly... This explanation of group conflict, invoked with hypnotic regularity, has the virtue of simplicity. Though readily grasped, it misrepresents what is going on. The ancient-hatreds account is based on a conception of humanity as packaged into discrete tribes, religions, or ethnic groups and on the assumption that the differences between such groups generate animosity by their very existence. Both are incorrect. Explaining why requires a little history.

It is important to understand first that many of the tribal and ethnic groupings that figure in contemporary violent conflict are not historically deep but instead of quite recent vintage. Many are the result of contact between a politically and technologically complex society and a simpler one whose lands were on the periphery of the first or who were colonized by it. Colonial authorities organized populations according to administrative convenience rather than cultural affinities or indigenous political divisions. Groups that had been more or less autonomous were clustered into newly created “tribes.” Informal systems of leadership were formalized, leaders appointed. This outright invention of tribes occurred routinely and in diverse regions of the globe, from the Americas to China to, most dramatically, Africa.

Consider the case of the Tutsi and Hutu of central Africa, whose recent bloodshed is typically talked about in news coverage as tribal warfare. Prior to the presence of German and then Belgian colonizers, Rwandan society consisted of kingdoms in which people called Tutsi enjoyed political dominion over people called Hutu but nonetheless had
economic obligations to the latter. Under the Belgian regime, beginning with World War I, this arrangement was hardened into a system of thoroughgoing Tutsi domination, including the removal from power of low- and middle-level Hutu chiefs. This policy was justified by the Belgian notion that the Tutsi and Hutu were ethnically and racially distinct, the Tutsi considered to be Caucasian in character and thus suited for political hegemony. In fact, Tutsi and Hutu were not ethnically distinct, or at least only as distinct as groups who spoke the same language, worshiped the same deities, lived in the same villages, and intermarried and belonged to the same clans could be. Rather, the indigenous meanings of Tutsi and Hutu were “social superior” and “inferior.” Tutsi were primarily cattle-herders, Hutu farmers. One born a Hutu might become a Tutsi, and vice versa, if his economic fortunes changed.

As part of their effort to impose a more systematic differentiation in Rwandan society, the Belgian officials required their subjects to carry identity cards—those with ten or more cows were designated Tutsi, the others Hutu. The privileges and domination accorded the Tutsi early on in the Belgian regime engendered lasting and reciprocal animosity between these groups, manifested in several mass killings since independence in 1962, the most horrendous being the Hutu’s attempted extermination of the Tutsi in 1994. That Hutu killers had to resort to the identity cards to determine whether a potential victim was one of their “ethnic enemy” speaks to the insignificance of true ethnic differences in motivating this violence.

There are, of course, real cultural differences within many societies, more substantial than those characterizing the Hutu and Tutsi. People can be grouped by class, custom, belief, language, and ethnicity, i.e., geographic origin of their forebears, and such attributes may structure patterns of daily life, including frequency of contact with those of different groups. It is not the case, however, that such differences invariably or even typically engender conflict. Comity, or at least coexistence, is the rule, bloodshed the exception. The obduracy of the contemporary conflict between Israel and the Arabs is facilely ascribed to an age-old enmity between Jews and Arabs. This interpretation cannot be squared, however, with historical scholarship, which indicates that the Jews fared considerably better in Muslim countries than in Christian Europe during the Middle Ages and that they found refuge under (Muslim) Ottoman rule for 450 years after expulsion from Spain. In India, Muslims take part in local performances of the Hindu epic Ramayana, while both Muslims and Hindus make pilgrimages to the burial sites of Sufi saints. In Egypt, Muslims have long
Group differences per se, then, do not preclude amicable relations, and they certainly do not inevitably entail hostility, much less violence. The potential is there, of course. What is necessary to turn difference into opposition is an alteration in self-conceptions so that just one of the numerous possible bases of individual identity becomes paramount. One potential group affiliation—Hindu, Hutu, Catholic, French-speaker—is activated and made to feel more important than other, more comprehensive identities—Indian, Rwandan, Christian, Canadian, female, human. Cultivating such a contrastive identity in others is often the project of politicians or political aspirants, “ethnic entrepreneurs” who endeavor to mobilize their ethnic kin and thereby build themselves a constituency. This effort succeeds to the extent that prospective “recruits” find it in their interest to increase their affiliation on this dimension in the hope of cashing in on what the ethnic politician might deliver—jobs, educational opportunities, government contracts, land. Frequent reference to historical inequities or atrocities—real or mythical—is a crucial part of the rhetoric of most such mobilizers. If, in addition, people of one group come to believe that they are in imminent danger of assault by another, they can be motivated to violence; the perpetrators of ethnic violence invariably invoke mortal threat as the impulse to their actions.

It is not an easy undertaking to induce people to take up arms against their neighbors and, in the process, incur a measure of risk to themselves. Certainly, the exhortations of ethnic politicians, no matter how eloquent, are not by themselves a sufficient catalyst. Objective conditions must be at least compatible with ethnic polarization. To take just one dimension, numbers matter. When multi-ethnic nations break up, as occurred with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, a group’s numbers must now be recalculated relative to others within the smaller fission products rather than at the level of the former, larger nation. A group that had once enjoyed a national majority might now find itself a numeric minority within one or more of the new states. Ethnic politicians can be expected to stress the consequent vulnerability of their constituency, a warning whose cogency is enhanced by reminders of past injustices or violence.

Analysis of almost any case of ethnic violence will turn up some com-
bination of ethnic politicking and shifting group power relations as pre-
cursors. In Yugoslavia, some politicians employed extreme nationalist
rhetoric in their effort to save their positions in the face of the inexorable
movement for democratic reform in the 1980s. Calls for secession from
some quarters within various republics were depicted as grave threats by
politicians whose ethnic constituency would become a minority in the
event of secession. The strategy of Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic was to have
Serbian-backed forces perpetrate violence in the other republics. Then,
through his control of the mass media, he represented these incidents as
unprovoked attacks by non-Serbs against Serbian women and children,
likening them to historical precedents for such depredations against the
Serbs. In this way, he was able to provoke the polarization instrumental in
the now infamous violence that ensued.⁴⁸

Prior to the Rwandan massacre, Hutu extremists, including represen-

Ordinary people are capable of unspeakable
violence when leaders or aspirants to power
convince them that they are in mortal danger
from those cast as ethnic others. From left:
campaign banner for Slobodan Milosevic of
Serbia, massacre sites in Bosnia and Rwanda.
tatives of the Hutu-led government, took to the radio to warn of Tutsi plans to violently re-subjugate the Hutu (who had come to power in 1961). When the president’s plane was shot down in 1994, the Hutu-controlled radio stations instantly attributed the killing to Tutsi rebels and urged listeners to seek revenge, an exhortation that would continue and become completely explicit over the course of the three-month slaughter.

In India, the major Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, struggled for years to attain popular support, trying to convince India’s Hindus that, despite enormous differences in well-being between castes, they shared more in common than they did with India’s Muslims. The BJP spearheaded the movement of the early 1990s to build a temple to Lord Rama on the site of a mosque in Ayodhya, in northern India. Hindus were urged to right a historical injustice: the mosque was alleged to occupy the site of Rama’s birth and to have been constructed centuries earlier by destruction of a pre-existing temple. At the same time, government provisions for lower castes and those outside the caste system were engendering resentment in the middle and upper castes. The BJP employed the Ayodhya mosque as a symbolic rallying point to build a vertical coalition among Hindus, contrasting a pan-Indian Hindu community (a notion invented only in the nineteenth century by nationalist politicians) with the Muslims outside of it. In December 1992, the Ayodhya mosque was razed. In the
Hindu-Muslim violence that followed, the worst since partition, at least 2,500 people were killed. And in 1996, the BJP won the largest number of seats in the Indian parliament.\textsuperscript{50}

In recent years, Egyptian authorities have taken to prohibiting Muslims from participating in Virgin Mary celebrations, concerned about radical Islamicist violence on occasions when so many Coptic Christians are gathered together. This and similar efforts to “purify” popular practices have served to harden the boundaries between religious communities. As cultural practices and institutions that once integrated these groups have withered, violence against Copts has risen.\textsuperscript{51}

Denigration of indigenous culture and religion by waves of Western colonizers in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) provoked a backlash of chauvinistic group promotion in the Sinhala Buddhist majority. This reification of Sinhalese identity—and, in response, of Tamil as well—was strengthened by the Sinhalese adoption of a notion authored by Western language scholars, an idea strikingly parallel to that promulgated by the Belgians regarding the Tutsi and Hutu in central Africa. The Sinhalese and Tamils were declared to be of different race, with the Sinhalese akin to Europeans and therefore naturally superior to the Tamils. Thus, in the nineteenth century, was laid the basis for the exclusionary ethnicity that both causes and is caused by the violent vying for power that has afflicted Sri Lanka since independence from England in 1948.\textsuperscript{52}

In short, it seems that efforts to narrow identities by those who stand to gain, though not always successful, are recurrent in societies complex enough to provide alternative bases of group affiliation. Intergroup violence doesn’t just happen; it is the product of a furious industry to convince people that they are different from others—others, it is claimed, with whom their interests conflict and from whom they have much to fear. To be sure, convincing people that their interests are opposed to those of another group is not always necessary. Many societies are, in fact, structured along ethnic lines—political-economic interests \textit{do} vary by ethnicity, so that ethnic contention is a constant element in politics. It is crucial to understand, however, that such contention alone does not naturally lead to violence. Moreover, such contention, whether or not it takes a violent turn, is \textit{not} about ethnic differences but about differences in access to resources and power, even though it is often characterized as essentially ethnic by both outside observers and participants themselves.

When it comes to understanding human violence, and especially to
the formulation of foreign and domestic policy intended to curtail it, something more than common sense and casual empiricism is required: scholarly research. Without the long view of the historian and the broad view of the anthropologist or student of comparative politics, common sense too readily invokes a ubiquitous, primordial xenophobia to explain what is really the work of individual agents driven by both calculation and ideal. Students of crime, some favoring small-scale ethnographic work and others the analysis of large bodies of data, provide an objective picture of the risk of criminal violence, its causes, and the efficacy of policies to reduce it. This picture often contrasts with the inevitably partial, often distorted vision of the individual citizen, based as it is on a mix of highly limited personal experience, memorable anecdotes, and misleading popular-media coverage, which almost always favors the dramatic over the typical. Scholarly research is an invaluable, if not always valued, asset in the work of policy makers. Without it, their deliberations will be influenced not just by the strengths of common sense but by its shortcomings as well, what might be called common nonsense, the stubborn foibles of human reasoning: mistaking correlations for causes, assuming that what comes first must cause what comes later, confusing traits of the community with those of the person. From the soft to the hard pole of the spectrum of disciplines, all research is governed by standards of valid explanation that originated in common sense, obviously, and yet provide an essential supplement to the deficiencies of that same human faculty.

References

7. See note 5.
8. See note 4.
31. See note 29.
32. Berk, Richard A., Alec Campbell, Ruth Klap, and Bruce Western. 1992. The deter-


50. See note 44.

51. See note 45.

52. See note 46.
RESEARCH GRANTS

AND

Ph.D. DISSERTATION

AWARDS
RESEARCH GRANTS
JANUARY 1997 – JANUARY 1999

Please contact the foundation to discuss these projects or for information about how to contact a grantee.


LES BACK (Sociology, University of London). The cultural mechanisms of racist expression: A study of racism and anti-Semitism in graffiti, pamphlets, style and body symbolism. 1996.


RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH (Native American Studies, University of Lethbridge). Blackfoot traditional models of aggression and healing. 1996.


KIMBERLY WRIGHT CASSIDY (Psychology, Bryn Mawr College). The relationships between theory of mind, social information processing and aggression in preschool children. 1997.

DAVID CHAPPELL (History, University of Arkansas). The mind of the segregationist: The strategy and propaganda of opposition to civil rights. 1999.


STEPHEN T. DRISCOLL (Archaeology, University of Glasgow). Forging a nation: Ethnic accomodation in the creation of Scotland in the early Middle Ages. 1996.


ALLEN FELDMAN (Anthropology, National Development and Research
Institutes) and PAMELA REYNOLDS (Anthropology, University of Cape Town). From silence and pain to transparency and memory: A proposed ethnography and discourse analysis of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 1998.


LAURENCE FRANK (Psychology, University of California, Berkeley). Proximate and ultimate factors modulating aggression in a unique animal model. 1996.


SHARON ELAINE HUTCHINSON (Anthropology, University of Wisconsin-Madison) and JOK MADUT JOK (History, Loyola Marymount). The militarization of Nuer and Dinka community life: A comparative field study of the transformative impact of Sudan’s unresolved war. 1999.

CYNTHIA L. IRVIN (Political Science, University of Kentucky). Negotiating end games: Basque and Spanish perceptions of the Northern Irish peace process as a model for conflict resolution—prospects, lessons, and limitations. 1999.

BRUCE KAPFERER (Anthropology, James Cook University). Globalization, the forces of poverty, and their formations of violence. 1999.


MENNO R. KRUK (Neuroscience, University of Leiden). Neuroendocrine response to stimulation of the hypothalamic area where aggression is evoked. 1997.


ALBERTO LENA (History, Universita degli Studi di Padova). Narratives of empire: Spanish and British discourse on the conquest and colonization
of America. 1999.


DAVID MAXWELL (History, Keele University). Protestant fundamentalism, post-war reconstruction: Pentecostalism as a transnational religious movement. 1996.


GLENN MELANCON (History, Southeastern Oklahoma State University). Drugs, violence, and national honor: British foreign policy and the opium crisis, 1833-1840. 1998.

RICHARD H. MELLONI, JR. (Psychiatry, University of Massachusetts Medical Center). Neuronal plasticity and the control of aggressive behavior. 1996.


SONOKO OGAWA (Neuroscience, Rockefeller University). Role of estrogen receptors on aggressive behaviors. 1997.


ALEX PILLEN-ARGENTI (Anthropology, University College London) and NICOLAS ARGENTI (Anthropology, University College London). Communities and families of the disappeared in southern Sri Lanka: Contemporary indigenous modes of survival in interaction with the international medical culture. 1997.


ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY (Biology, Stanford University). The endocrine stress-response and behavioral status in the olive baboon. 1996.


L. J. SHRUM (Marketing, Rutgers State University). Applying social cognition theory toward understanding the influence of television violence on social perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. 1996.

NEAL G. SIMON (Biology, Lehigh University). The neurosteroid dhea:


IRA SOMMERS and DEBORAH BASKIN (Criminology, California State University, Los Angeles). Methamphetamine and violence. 1999.


TERENCE TURNER (Anthropology, University of Chicago). The Kayapo juncture: An indigenous peoples’ alliance with international civil society against violence and rights abuse by the state and national society. 1997.

BERT USEEM (Sociology, University of New Mexico), ANNE M. PIEHL (Government, Harvard University) and RAYMOND LIEDKA (Sociology, University of New Mexico). Prisons and crime control. 1999.


ROBIN MICHEL WRIGHT (Anthropology, Universidad Estadual de Campinas). Hidden violence: Social, political, and historical dynamics of
witchcraft and sorcery among the Baniwa of the northwest Amazon, Brazil. 1999.

**Ph.D. DISSERTATION AWARDS**
**1996 - 1999**


ANDREW W. COHEN (History, University of Chicago). The struggle for order: Law and resistance to the corporate ideal in Chicago, 1900-1940. 1996.


ANDREW JAY DIAMOND (History, University of Michigan). The bat-

![Republican militants battle security forces, Belfast](image-url)

KAREN FRANKLIN (Psychology, California School of Professional Psychology). Hate crime or rite of passage? An exploration of assailant motivations in antigay violence. 1996.


MATTHEW HUSS (Psychology, University of Nebraska). An examination of psychopathic batterers’ violence against women and the implications for treatment and the legal system. 1998.


SCOTT LONDON (Anthropology, University of Arizona). Domestic


SHADD MARUNA (Criminology, Northwestern University). Desistance and development: The psychosocial process of going straight. 1997.


AMINUR RAHMAN (Anthropology, University of Manitoba). Domination and violence in development: A study of women and credit programs in rural Bangladesh. 1996.


DAVID SORENSEN (Criminal Justice, Rutgers University). Intimate partnerships, procreation, and desistance from violent offending: Disentangling the marriage-crime relationship. 1997.


AJANTHA SUBRAMANIAN (Cultural Anthropology, Duke University). A greater share in the sea: Ecology, development and social conflict in a
South Indian fishery. 1998.


PETER VERBEEK (Psychology, Emory University). Peacemaking in young children. 1996.


STEVEN IAN WILKINSON (Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Why violence stops: Hindu-Muslim conflict in India. 1996.
The Curriculum Project

Scholarly information about violence will have little impact on the world unless people learn about it and use such information as they make decisions about their personal and civic lives. In 1998 the foundation invited twenty candidates to enter a competition to design an introductory course in violence studies for undergraduates. We told them we expected the course to cover a wide variety of types of violence; review, assess, and relate material from most or all of the scholarly disciplines which contribute to an understanding of violence and aggression; and pay attention to how what we know about violence suggests policies and interventions to reduce violence.

Professor Robert Jackall (Sociology, Williams College) won the competition with a curriculum which included readings from classical literature, contemporary politics, and criminology, and philosophical, historical, anthropological, and biological perspectives. He encourages students to think about the sources of violence in human biology and in social organization, the range of subjective meanings of violence in different historical and social contexts, the differences between industrialized violence and the violence of traditional warfare, and the contribution of structure, ritual and symbol, as well as the threat of violence, to maintaining social stability and peace. Professor Jackall’s syllabus and reading list has been published as the Fall 1999 issue of our magazine, *The HFG Review*, along with comments from some of the other contestants on the subject of teaching about violence. We are pleased that several of the courses designed for this competition are already being taught to real undergraduates, and we will undertake other efforts to bring these ideas to the attention of educators who may use them as a starting point for courses on violence in their own institutions.

Conferences

When the subjects of various grants coalesce around one general theme, or when a field seems from the foundation’s perspective to need the reframing and clarification that can come from extended discussion, we hold a small, informal conference.

**NOOVR Meets ISRA**

*July 15, 1998 (New York)*

The foundation invited key members of the U.S. National Consortium on Violence Research to describe their work to members of another organization concerned with violence, the International Society for Research on Aggression. Participants: Alfred Blumstein, Patricia Edgar, Daniel Nagin (all from the Heinz School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University) and Richard Rosenfeld (from the University of Missouri-St. Louis). Rowell Huesmann, another member of the Consortium and the 1998 president of ISRA, moderated.

**Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany**

*December 4-6, 1998 (Madrid)*

Robert Gellately and Nathan Stolzus requested historians of the Nazi era to give an account of the Nazi surveillance, persecution, and murder of those they deemed “outsiders”: among them, criminals, mental patients, "unfit mothers," foreigners, homosexuals, and Gypsies. Discussion considered especially how the persecution of particular groups fit into the ideological, social, cultural, and political world of Nazi Germany. Other participants were Shlomo Aronson, Ömer Bartov, Doris Bergen, Richard J. Evans, Henry Friedlander,
Nazi ideology accorded Jews a special significance, but they were not the only category of people Hitler’s regime sought to destroy. Gypsies, homosexuals, and the mentally and physically unfit were also anathema to the Nazi ideal and thus subject to extermination.

Geoffrey Giles, Sybil Milton, Alan Steinweis, and Nicholaus Wachsmann.

*The Crime Drop*

*December 13-14, 1998 (New Orleans)*

The factors responsible for the marked recent decline in U.S. violent crime were discussed by students of crime trends. Demographics, economics, policing, imprisonment, drugs, guns, and community anti-crime initiatives were considered. Each of these factors is the topic of a chapter in the upcoming book *The Crime Drop*, edited by Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman. Other participants: Fox Butterfield, John Eck, James Fox, Andrew Golub, Jeffrey Grogger, Bruce Johnson, Gil Kerlikowske, Edward Maguire, Richard Rosenfeld, William Spelman, Ralph Taylor, and Garen Wintemute.

**Working Groups**

Other issues involve a series of meetings of a working group, whose central participants, with occasional guests, meet together two to four times to build on progress achieved both together and individually over time.

**Punishment**

This project is evaluating the effectiveness of and justifications for modern justice systems but also is developing a challenge to Western legal experiences through perspectives from history, the developing world, and the re-developing world of post-colonial and post-authoritarian societies. A final meeting to discuss papers written for a volume on punishment, edited by Sean McConville, was held in
Queluz, Portugal, on April 11-13, 1996. Other participants were Marcellus Andrews, Alan Duce, Jeffrey Fagan, Mark Fleisher, Roger Hood, Rowell Huesmann, Elizabeth Jelin, Nicola Lacey, Norval Morris, and Monika Platek. A book is expected early in the next millenium.

**War, Victimhood, Remembrance, Resistance**

This project (and the book which has resulted; see p. xx) introduces the agency of civilians, veterans, and grass-roots groups to a previous overemphasis on the memorial projects of states, professional historians, and other authorities. A second meeting with book chapters prepared took place June 26-28, 1996 in Chinchon, Spain. Participants were Paloma Aguilar, Martin Jay, Catherine Merridale, Antoine Prost, Pierre Sorlin, Annette Wieviorka, and Emmanuel Sivan and J.M. Winter, who edited the conference volume.

**Globalization and Violence**

Globalization, an idea on the minds of scholars worldwide, means many things to different people, including the various participants in this project, some of whom had studied global movements of money, commodities, and people and others of whom had viewed the consequences of these processes from the ground up. Many types of violence which are usually studied separately—crime, xenophobia, terrorism, the abrogation of indigenous rights, racism—when viewed in terms of the global system seem to share many causes and contexts and cannot be wholly understood if these relations are not considered. Three meetings have been held to discuss these issues, which will result in a book edited by anthropologist Jonathan Friedman.

*June 16-17, 1997 (Kona):* Kajsa Ekholm Friedman, Jonathan Friedman, Nina Glick Schiller, Bruce Kapferer, Liisa Malkki, Don Nonini, Steven Sampson, and Terry Turner.

The dark side of globalization:

Jakarta, May 1998. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, which engendered rioting in Indonesia that took at least 1,000 lives, resulted from the collapse of financial markets due to overproduction for the world market and depreciation of national currencies, leading to withdrawal of foreign investment, widespread bankruptcy, spiraling inflation, and massive unemployment.
Postwar Issues: Trauma and Memory

The effects on a society of long periods of war and oppression lie not only in the narratives, public and private, which its citizens tell, but in opportunities missed, institutions distrusted, resistance ritualized, and opportunities for recovery invented or reinvented. The shifting meanings of trauma and memory expanded to social domains were analysed in these discussions, which contrasted legal frameworks for memory, such as truth commissions, with what they leave out and augmented medicalized visions of harm and recovery with more personal and traditional processes, among many other issues. A book edited by anthropologist Allen Feldman will result.

International Funding

We have made grants to scholars from Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, although the majority of our grants have gone to scholars from the United States and Europe. We would like to increase the number of first-rate research proposals we receive from other areas and have encouraged grantees whose work takes them to these areas and makes them acquainted with and indebted to local scholars to spread the word about the availability of funding and to offer advice about writing a competitive grant application. As well, we have relied on a network of international scholarly organizations and local groups of scholars (notably, on the African continent the African Association of Political Science, the Council for the Development of Social Science in Africa, and the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies) for introductions to scholars studying problems of violence in their own countries and elsewhere and for the opportunity to talk with them about preparing competitive research proposals. Although we have no funds beyond what we devote to individual grants and our small in-house programs, we recognize that in many parts of the world the most urgent intellectual necessity is capacity-building at the most basic educational levels and that funds are needed for infrastructural and scholarship support far beyond our resources. For this reason we participate in networks of foun-
foundations and development agencies to advocate for the participation and agency of local intellectuals in development and charitable initiatives which originate in the West, and for funds to enable sophisticated senior scholars in these parts of the world to reproduce themselves in the next generation. We regret that this foundation cannot offer such institutional or infrastructural support. However, we encourage scholars from the developing world concerned with problems of violence seriously to consider entering our competition for research grants and to call upon us for help with issues arising in the application process which they feel are peculiar to their geographical and economic situations.

Violent imagery has been prevalent in many domains of representation, from religious symbolism to children’s literature, through centuries and across diverse cultures. *Why We Watch: The Attractions of Violent Entertainment*, a book produced by an HFG working group, considers explanations for the appeal of such imagery.

**Publications**

Our grantees publish the results of their investigations in books and journals read by others in their field, and many of them take care that their messages reach the general public as well. (See “Research Publications” in this report for a list of the publications which have resulted from our grants since we last published such a list, in 1993.)

Papers written for our recent working groups and conferences appear in edited volumes:


Dandeker, Christopher (ed.) 1998. *Nationalism*


The HFG Review

In 1996 the foundation began publishing a magazine, The HFG Review, which is designed to make informed, timely, and concise comments on issues of current concern to the general public. The first issue focused on topics related to substate warfare and state response, the second on criminal violence, the third on the biology of aggressive behavior, and the most recent on teaching about violence. Back copies are available on request, while they last.
HOW TO APPLY

Grants

The foundation makes most grants in the range of $15,000 to $30,000 per year, usually for periods of one or two years. Money is available for salary, field expenses, research assistance, clerical services, and any other expenses directly related to and necessary for the specific research project proposed. Applications for research grants are reviewed once a year and are due in the foundation’s offices on August 1. Decisions are made in December, and money is available for funded projects as early as January 1.

Ph.D. Awards

Fellowships for support during the writing of the Ph.D. dissertation are worth $10,000 each, and are awarded once a year, with a deadline for receipt of applications on February 1 and a decision in June. Dissertation fellowship applicants and their advisors must assure us that the dissertation will be finished during the award year. It is not appropriate to apply if this time constraint cannot be honored.

Citizenship

Applicants for either the research grant or the Ph.D. fellowship may be citizens of any country. Research-grant applicants need not be affiliated with an institution of higher learning, although most are university professors with postgraduate or medical degrees. Ph.D. fellowships are available for graduate students enrolled at any university in the world who are writing Ph.D. dissertations on subjects related to the foundation’s interests.

Advice

Please read this section carefully. It discloses our ideas about what makes a convincing, promising proposal for research. These comments could direct you towards what we see as the most fruitful research plans and could prevent you from sending us an application which asks for support for activities that we do not recognize as supportable research. Refer to “Grants and Dissertation Awards” and “Research Publications” for examples of the sort of work we fund and scholarly products we expect.

We fund research, not interventions. Nor do we fund evaluations of intervention programs where the research question is how well the particular intervention is being implemented or how strong its effects are. Our program aims at new understandings of problems specifically related to aggression and violence themselves, not to the feasibility of interventions. Apart from our own conferences and workshops, we do not fund meetings or group projects, although we do accept proposals for work shared among two or three principal investigators if their roles in and specific contributions to the research are clear.

A good proposal will pose a specific research problem. After reviewing previous work done in the area, the applicant will focus on questions that would still puzzle someone familiar with the relevant literature, and then will propose specific and creative methods to approach the problem directly. As well, an application should not only convince us that its subject is interesting and understudied but also show us how larger general lessons about violence will be drawn from an investigation of this particular instance of it.

A proposal describing a general problem—for example, “violence in the Great Lakes region of central Africa”—that does not include the specific research questions the topic poses and a practical plan to get at the answers to those questions will not convince us that it is feasible and likely to be productive. Likewise, it is not very promising
when an applicant states that “very little is known about”—for example, “resilience in children at risk for problem aggression”—and then proposes a research plan that replicates the many prior research attempts that have resulted in that “very little.” We will not fund one more study which will add only a small increment of progress over past work.

Even if we could afford to give much more money to any one project than we do now, we would prefer to support analysis over raw data collection; scholars whose work relies on large data sets which are expensive to collect may find in our program an opportunity to ask for time to think about what the numbers mean and how their conclusions should affect the design of future studies.

While the practical value of some research is readily apparent, the applicability of scholarly insight is often only potential. We do not expect immediate social change to result from the completion of a foundation-supported project, and we are skeptical about applications which promise to design “solutions” to persistent and vexing problems. However, we do look for evidence that an applicant is involved in the study of aggression because of a concern with aggression as a problem in the world. The “relevance” box on the application form’s abstract page is the applicant’s chance to tell us, in a persuasive, pithy paragraph, about the value of the research and its contribution to the larger goals of the foundation. Why is this particular case chosen by which to investigate this larger problem? How do salient questions to be investigated here relate to understandings developed elsewhere?

We do not fund in an area just because a project addresses an unsolved and apparently urgent problem related to aggression if we cannot be assured that first-rate, useful research can be done. And we do not fund studies in areas that can be argued to have an ultimate, basic relevance to understanding aggression but not a particular focus on it, such as basic neuroscience, sociology, or economics. Should there be any concern about whether a planned project is relevant to the foundation’s interests, please consult with one of our program officers.

Detailed guidelines for submitting applications for research grants and for dissertation fellowships accompany this report and also are available on request from the foundation’s offices. Applications must include a title page, abstract, statement of relevance, informative budget, descriptive research plan, and curriculum vita for the principal investigator and each professional collaborator or, in the case of the Ph.D. fellowship, for the doctoral candidate and advisor. Four copies of all materials must be submitted.

Please read the guidelines carefully—including the budget rules—and follow instructions meticulously, providing all of the information requested and in the quantity specified. Disorganized, incomplete, sloppy applications testify to the same qualities in the conduct of research and seriously damage a proposal’s chances of funding. Take the space necessary to describe your research adequately, with full attention to methodology, but have pity on our reviewers and be succinct—typically, a research plan ranges from ten to twenty pages, and we prefer them double-spaced and printed on one side of the page. It is not a good idea to shrink text to make it appear shorter than it is: the readable application is clear in both appearance and thought. Even typographical errors will distract the reader from your argument and might lead to a negative evaluation. Take the trouble to proofread the text and to check your math and you will impress our reviewers as a careful and accurate worker.

**Budgets**

Budget requests are appropriate only for expenses specifically related to the proposed research, and salary requests should cover only the
time required by the research. We do not make it a priority to fund small percentages (3-7%) of the salaries of scholars employed in research universities so that they can devote small portions of their time to overseeing a project where the work is being done by students. These salary portions, with attached benefit percentages, add thousands of dollars to the cost of a project, money that could be given to other investigators who cannot complete their work without grant aid. Ask only for the salaries essential to getting the work done and which are not being paid by other sources.

**Deadlines**

Deadlines refer to receipt by the foundation, not postmark, and applications will be returned if they reach us after the due date. If the due date falls on a weekend, the deadline is the following Monday. There are no exceptions to this policy.

**Evaluation**

The applications are evaluated for their scientific quality and methodological aptness, as well as for the salience of the research questions to the foundation's interests and mission. This is done with the help of a panel of consultants who work together over several years and contribute to defining and refining the foundation's mission and to our ideas about how to pursue it.

Serving on this panel for the first part of the period reported on here (through spring 1998) were Israel Abramov (Psychology, Brooklyn College, a neuroscientist), Clark McCauley (Social Psychology, Bryn Mawr College), Fred Myers (Anthropology, New York University), Sunita Parikh (Political Science, Washington University), and Arthur Waldron (History, University of Pennsylvania).

In summer 1998 this panel was expanded and reconstituted. It now consists of Assaad Azzi (Chaire Internationale en Psychologie Sociale, Universite Libre de Bruxelles), Russel Barsh (Native American Studies, University of Lethbridge), Catherine Merridale (Historical Studies, University of Bristol), Fred Myers (Anthropology, New York University), Daniel K. O’Leary (Psychology, SUNY Stony Brook), Geoffrey Parker (History, Ohio State University), Roger Petersen (Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis), Richard Rosenfeld (Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Missouri, St. Louis), Neal Simon (Biological Sciences, Lehigh University), and Cathy Spatz Widom (Criminology, SUNY at Albany). Recommendations are made by this panel to the Program Committee of the HFG board, who choose according to their interpretation of the foundation's mission the proposals to be considered for funding by the full board of directors each year at its meetings in December and June.

If a proposal is turned down, it can be resubmitted, although our reviewers will want to see evidence of progress in your thinking in the meantime. Although often it is not easy to pinpoint what is “wrong” with a proposal which has been rejected, on request we will describe our general concerns about the work so that you can re-think areas which might have affected our decision. But keep in mind that the grant evaluation process is very competitive, and often the only thing wrong with a rejected proposal is that what we consider better ones have been funded instead. We can only fund about one in ten of the projects proposed to us. If your proposal is rejected twice, it is usually not worthwhile to try yet again unless you have amended it considerably.

Members of the foundation staff are happy to discuss possible applications, describe the review procedure, and answer questions about the application materials, by either phone or letter. Our job includes helping applicants prepare the best applications they can and then choosing among these the sharpest, most promising ones for funding.
RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS

The following list continues the bibliography of foundation-sponsored research last published in our 1993 report. This list includes products of research grants made both before and during the period covered by this report as well as publications resulting from HFG conferences and working groups, described in “Activities.”


Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Lexington Books.


Chase, Ivan D. 1980. Social process and hierarchy formation in small groups: A compar-


Petersburgskogo universiteta ekonomiki i finansov.
1997. Storming the last citadel: The Bolshevik assault on the church, 1922. In Vladimir
N. Brovkin (ed.) The Bolsheviks in Russian Society: Revolution and Civil Wars. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
ical studies of social cognition and close relationships. In J. Simpson and D. Kenrick
Daly, M., L. S. Singh, and M. Wilson. 1993. Children fathered by previous partners: A
1993. Stepparenthood and the evolved psychology of discriminative parental solicitude.
In S. Parmigiani and F. vom Saal (eds.) Infanticide and Parental Care. London:
Harwood.
1994. Discriminative parental solicitude and the relevance of evolutionary models to
the analysis of motivational systems. In M. S. Gazzaniga (ed.) The Cognitive Neuro-
sciences. Cambridge: MIT.
1994. Some differential attributes of lethal assaults on small children by stepfathers ver-
In D. M. Buss and N. Malamuth (eds.) Sex, Power, and Conflict: Feminist and
1997. The evolutionary social psychology of family violence. In C. Crawford and D.
251-300.
1998. An evolutionary psychological perspective on homicide. In D. Smith and M.
Zahn (eds.) Homicide Studies: A Sourcebook of Social Research.
Dandeker, Christopher, and James Gow. 1997. The future of peace support operations:
1996. The political tensions of representations and misrepresentations: Intellectuals vs.
Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal.
de la Fuente, Alejandro. 1996. Negros y electores: Desigualdad y politicas raciales en


Gregor, Thomas. 1993. *Dreams from the Forest.* 16 min, 56 min. BBC.


Gregor, Thomas, and Leslie Sponsel (eds.) 1994. *The Anthropology of Peace and
1996. Medial amygdaloid suppression of predatory attack behavior in the cat: II. Role
of a GABAergic pathway from the medial to the lateral hypothalamus. Brain Research 716: 72-83.


Obeyesekere, Gananath. 1998. Cannibal feasts in nineteenth-century Fiji: Seamen’s yarns and the ethnographic imagination. In Francis Barker, et al. (eds.) *Cannibalism and the


1996. Ethnographic seduction, transference and resistance in dialogues about terror and


1995. *Vox Alouattinae: A preliminary survey of the acoustic characteristics of the long-


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83
# FINANCIAL DATA

## STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION, DECEMBER 31, 1998

### ASSETS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>$96,892</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>$49,889,903</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Assets</td>
<td>$179,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in a Charitable Remainder Trust</td>
<td>$21,823,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Assets</strong></td>
<td><strong>$71,989,164</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LIABILITIES AND NET ASSETS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses</td>
<td>$39,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants and Charitable Contributions Payable</td>
<td>$905,857</td>
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<tr>
<td>Postretirement Benefits Payable</td>
<td>$471,434</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Liabilities</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,416,562</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unrestricted</td>
<td>$48,749,413</td>
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<tr>
<td>Temporarily Restricted</td>
<td>$21,823,189</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Net Assets</strong></td>
<td><strong>$70,572,602</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Liabilities and Net Assets</strong></td>
<td><strong>$71,989,164</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Images

Cover: Christie’s/PNI
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20: Tom Sobolik/PNI; Lau Van Der Stockt/Liaison
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This report was written by Karen Colvard, Brian Slattery, and Joel Wallman.